diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | proposals/125-bridges.txt | 35 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/proposals/125-bridges.txt b/proposals/125-bridges.txt index 9601de4..a0d51f3 100644 --- a/proposals/125-bridges.txt +++ b/proposals/125-bridges.txt @@ -24,11 +24,13 @@ Status: Open 1.1. PublishServerDescriptor To configure your relay to be a bridge relay, just add + BridgeRelay 1 PublishServerDescriptor bridge to your torrc. This will cause your relay to publish its descriptor to the bridge authorities rather than to the default authorities. Alternatively, you can say + BridgeRelay 1 PublishServerDescriptor 0 which will cause your relay to not publish anywhere. This could be useful for private bridges. @@ -40,28 +42,17 @@ Status: Open can supply their bridge users with cached copies of all the various Tor network information. - Right now (0.2.0.11-alpha) we require that bridges turn their DirPort on - -- which means both that we answer BEGIN_DIR requests and that we fetch - and cache directory information in an aggressive way like other servers. - - But: - a) we don't enforce that DirPort is on, since it's not clear how to - detect if the user meant to be a bridge. So it's easy to set up a bridge - relay that silently refuses BEGIN_DIR requests and is thus useless. - b) We don't actually care if they have an open or reachable DirPort. So - at some point we should separate having an open DirPort from answering - directory questions. Which leads to: - c) We need to investigate if there are any anonymity worries with - answering BEGIN_DIR requests when our DirPort is off. If there aren't, - we should drop the DirPort requirement. - - I claim that we don't open any new attacks by answering BEGIN_DIR - questions when DirPort is off: it's still a fine question to ask what - partitioning attacks there are when you can query a Tor client about - its current directory opinions, but these attacks already exist when - DirPort is on. - - We need to answer this issue in 0.2.0.x. + As for Tor 0.2.0.13-alpha, bridges will answer begin_dir questions + (and cache dir info they see so the answers will be more useful) + whether their DirPort is enabled or not. (After all, we don't care if + they have an open or reachable DirPort to answer begin_dir questions.) + + We need to investigate if there are any anonymity worries with answering + BEGIN_DIR requests when our DirPort is off. I claim that we don't open + any new attacks: it's still a fine question to ask what partitioning + attacks there are when you can query a Tor client about its current + directory opinions, but these attacks already exist when DirPort is on. + We should investigate this in 0.2.1.x. 1.3. Exit policy |