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-
-                                  Glossary
-
-                               The Tor Project
-
-This document aims to specify terms, notations, and phrases related
-to Tor, as used in the Tor specification documents and other documentation.
-
-This glossary is not a design document; it is only a reference.
-
-This glossary is a work-in-progress; double-check its definitions before
-citing them authoritatively. ;)
-
-Table of Contents
-
-    0. Preliminaries
-    1.0. Commonly used Tor configuration terms
-    2.0. Tor network components
-        2.1. Relays, aka OR (onion router)
-            2.1.1. Specific roles
-        2.2. Client, aka OP (onion proxy)
-        2.3. Authorities
-        2.4. Hidden Service
-        2.5. Circuit
-        2.6. Edge connection
-        2.7. Consensus
-        2.8. Descriptor
-    3.0. Tor network protocols
-        3.1. Link handshake
-        3.2. Circuit handshake
-        3.3. Hidden Service Protocol
-        3.4. Directory Protocol
-    4.0. General network definitions
-
-0. Preliminaries
-
-      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
-      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
-      "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
-      RFC 2119.
-
-1.0. Commonly used Tor configuration terms
-
-   ORPort  - Onion Router Port
-   DirPort - Directory Port
-
-2.0. Tor network components
-
-2.1. Relays, aka OR (onion router)
-
-    [Style guide: prefer the term "Relay"]
-
-2.1.1. Specific roles
-
-      Exit relay: The final hop in an exit circuit before traffic leaves
-      the Tor network to connect to external servers.
-
-      Non-exit relay: Relays that send and receive traffic only to
-      other Tor relays and Tor clients.
-
-      Entry relay: The first hop in a Tor circuit. Can be either a guard
-      relay or a bridge, depending on the client's configuration.
-
-      Guard relay: A relay that a client uses as its entry for a longer
-      period of time.  Guard relays are rotated more slowly to prevent
-      attacks that can come from being exposed to too many guards.
-
-      Bridge: A relay intentionally not listed in the public Tor
-      consensus, with the purpose of circumventing entities (such as
-      governments or ISPs) seeking to block clients from using Tor.
-      Currently, bridges are used only as entry relays.
-
-      Directory cache: A relay that downloads cached directory information
-      from the directory authorities and serves it to clients on demand.
-      Any relay will act as a directory cache, if its bandwidth is high enough.
-
-      Rendezvous point: A relay connecting a client to a hidden service.
-      Each party builds a three-hop circuit, meeting at the
-      rendezvous point.
-
-2.2. Client, aka OP (onion proxy)
-
-    [Style: the "OP" and "onion proxy" terms are deprecated.]
-
-2.3. Authorities:
-
-    Directory Authority: Nine total in the Tor network, operated by
-    trusted individuals. Directory authorities define and serve the
-    consensus document, defining the "state of the network." This document
-    contains a "router status" section for every relay currently
-    in the network. Directory authorities also serve router descriptors,
-    extra info documents, microdescriptors, and the microdescriptor consensus.
-
-    Bridge Authority: One total. Similar in responsibility to directory
-    authorities, but for bridges.
-
-    Fallback directory mirror: One of a list of directory caches distributed
-    with the Tor software. (When a client first connects to the network, and
-    has no directory information, it asks a fallback directory. From then on,
-    the client can ask any directory cache that's listed in the directory
-    information it has.)
-
-2.4. Hidden Service:
-
-   A hidden service is a server that will only accept incoming
-   connections via the hidden service protocol. Connection
-   initiators will not be able to learn the IP address of the hidden
-   service, allowing the hidden service to receive incoming connections,
-   serve content, etc, while preserving its location anonymity.
-
-2.5. Circuit:
-
-   An established path through the network, where cryptographic keys
-   are negotiated using the ntor protocol or TAP (Tor Authentication
-   Protocol (deprecated)) with each hop. Circuits can differ in length
-   depending on their purpose. See also Leaky Pipe Topology.
-
-    Origin Circuit -
-
-    Exit Circuit: A circuit which connects clients to destinations
-    outside the Tor network. For example, if a client wanted to visit
-    duckduckgo.com, this connection would require an exit circuit.
-
-    Internal Circuit: A circuit whose traffic never leaves the Tor
-    network. For example, a client could connect to a hidden service via
-    an internal circuit.
-
-2.6. Edge connection:
-
-2.7. Consensus: The state of the Tor network, published every hour,
-     decided by a vote from the network's directory authorities. Clients
-     fetch the consensus from directory authorities, fallback
-     directories, or directory caches.
-
-2.8. Descriptor: Each descriptor represents information about one
-    relay in the Tor network. The descriptor includes the relay's IP
-    address, public keys, and other data. Relays send
-    descriptors to directory authorities, who vote and publish a
-    summary of them in the network consensus.
-
-3.0. Tor network protocols
-
-3.1. Link handshake
-
-      The link handshake establishes the TLS connection over which two
-      Tor participants will send Tor cells.  This handshake also
-      authenticates the participants to each other, possibly using Tor
-      cells.
-
-3.2. Circuit handshake
-
-      Circuit handshakes establish the hop-by-hop onion encryption
-      that clients use to tunnel their application traffic.  The
-      client does a pairwise key establishment handshake with each
-      individual relay in the circuit.  For every hop except the
-      first, these handshakes tunnel through existing hops in the
-      circuit.  Each cell type in this protocol also has a newer
-      version (with a "2" suffix), e.g., CREATE2.
-
-      CREATE cell: First part of a handshake, sent by the initiator.
-
-      CREATED cell: Second part of a handshake, sent by the responder.
-
-      EXTEND cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTEND cell) First part of a
-      handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit.  The last relay
-      in the circuit so far will decrypt this cell and send the
-      payload in a CREATED cell to the chosen next hop relay.
-
-      EXTENDED cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTENDED cell) Second part
-      of a handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit.  The last
-      relay in the circuit so far receives the CREATED cell from the
-      new last hop relay and encrypts the payload in an EXTENDED cell
-      to tunnel back to the client.
-
-      Onion skin: A CREATE/CREATE2 or EXTEND/EXTEND2 payload that
-      contains the first part of the TAP or ntor key establishment
-      handshake.
-
-3.3. Hidden Service Protocol
-
-3.4. Directory Protocol
-
-
-4.0. General network definitions
-
-   Leaky Pipe Topology: The ability for the origin of a circuit to address
-   relay cells to be addressed to any hop in the path of a circuit. In Tor,
-   the destination hop is determined by using the 'recognized' field of relay
-   cells.
-
-   Stream: A single application-level connection or request, multiplexed over
-   a Tor circuit.  A 'Stream' can currently carry the contents of a TCP
-   connection, a DNS request, or a Tor directory request.
-
-   Channel: A pairwise connection between two Tor relays, or between a
-   client and a relay. Circuits are multiplexed over Channels. All
-   channels are currently implemented as TLS connections.
-