From e4e0d93d56ee8c1aec4c2efaa7046b651f0fe55c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Mathewson Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 12:27:58 -0400 Subject: Move all text-only specifications into the OLD_TXT directory. --- glossary.txt | 198 ----------------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 198 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 glossary.txt (limited to 'glossary.txt') diff --git a/glossary.txt b/glossary.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 68de376..0000000 --- a/glossary.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ - - Glossary - - The Tor Project - -This document aims to specify terms, notations, and phrases related -to Tor, as used in the Tor specification documents and other documentation. - -This glossary is not a design document; it is only a reference. - -This glossary is a work-in-progress; double-check its definitions before -citing them authoritatively. ;) - -Table of Contents - - 0. Preliminaries - 1.0. Commonly used Tor configuration terms - 2.0. Tor network components - 2.1. Relays, aka OR (onion router) - 2.1.1. Specific roles - 2.2. Client, aka OP (onion proxy) - 2.3. Authorities - 2.4. Hidden Service - 2.5. Circuit - 2.6. Edge connection - 2.7. Consensus - 2.8. Descriptor - 3.0. Tor network protocols - 3.1. Link handshake - 3.2. Circuit handshake - 3.3. Hidden Service Protocol - 3.4. Directory Protocol - 4.0. General network definitions - -0. Preliminaries - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL - NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and - "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in - RFC 2119. - -1.0. Commonly used Tor configuration terms - - ORPort - Onion Router Port - DirPort - Directory Port - -2.0. Tor network components - -2.1. Relays, aka OR (onion router) - - [Style guide: prefer the term "Relay"] - -2.1.1. Specific roles - - Exit relay: The final hop in an exit circuit before traffic leaves - the Tor network to connect to external servers. - - Non-exit relay: Relays that send and receive traffic only to - other Tor relays and Tor clients. - - Entry relay: The first hop in a Tor circuit. Can be either a guard - relay or a bridge, depending on the client's configuration. - - Guard relay: A relay that a client uses as its entry for a longer - period of time. Guard relays are rotated more slowly to prevent - attacks that can come from being exposed to too many guards. - - Bridge: A relay intentionally not listed in the public Tor - consensus, with the purpose of circumventing entities (such as - governments or ISPs) seeking to block clients from using Tor. - Currently, bridges are used only as entry relays. - - Directory cache: A relay that downloads cached directory information - from the directory authorities and serves it to clients on demand. - Any relay will act as a directory cache, if its bandwidth is high enough. - - Rendezvous point: A relay connecting a client to a hidden service. - Each party builds a three-hop circuit, meeting at the - rendezvous point. - -2.2. Client, aka OP (onion proxy) - - [Style: the "OP" and "onion proxy" terms are deprecated.] - -2.3. Authorities: - - Directory Authority: Nine total in the Tor network, operated by - trusted individuals. Directory authorities define and serve the - consensus document, defining the "state of the network." This document - contains a "router status" section for every relay currently - in the network. Directory authorities also serve router descriptors, - extra info documents, microdescriptors, and the microdescriptor consensus. - - Bridge Authority: One total. Similar in responsibility to directory - authorities, but for bridges. - - Fallback directory mirror: One of a list of directory caches distributed - with the Tor software. (When a client first connects to the network, and - has no directory information, it asks a fallback directory. From then on, - the client can ask any directory cache that's listed in the directory - information it has.) - -2.4. Hidden Service: - - A hidden service is a server that will only accept incoming - connections via the hidden service protocol. Connection - initiators will not be able to learn the IP address of the hidden - service, allowing the hidden service to receive incoming connections, - serve content, etc, while preserving its location anonymity. - -2.5. Circuit: - - An established path through the network, where cryptographic keys - are negotiated using the ntor protocol or TAP (Tor Authentication - Protocol (deprecated)) with each hop. Circuits can differ in length - depending on their purpose. See also Leaky Pipe Topology. - - Origin Circuit - - - Exit Circuit: A circuit which connects clients to destinations - outside the Tor network. For example, if a client wanted to visit - duckduckgo.com, this connection would require an exit circuit. - - Internal Circuit: A circuit whose traffic never leaves the Tor - network. For example, a client could connect to a hidden service via - an internal circuit. - -2.6. Edge connection: - -2.7. Consensus: The state of the Tor network, published every hour, - decided by a vote from the network's directory authorities. Clients - fetch the consensus from directory authorities, fallback - directories, or directory caches. - -2.8. Descriptor: Each descriptor represents information about one - relay in the Tor network. The descriptor includes the relay's IP - address, public keys, and other data. Relays send - descriptors to directory authorities, who vote and publish a - summary of them in the network consensus. - -3.0. Tor network protocols - -3.1. Link handshake - - The link handshake establishes the TLS connection over which two - Tor participants will send Tor cells. This handshake also - authenticates the participants to each other, possibly using Tor - cells. - -3.2. Circuit handshake - - Circuit handshakes establish the hop-by-hop onion encryption - that clients use to tunnel their application traffic. The - client does a pairwise key establishment handshake with each - individual relay in the circuit. For every hop except the - first, these handshakes tunnel through existing hops in the - circuit. Each cell type in this protocol also has a newer - version (with a "2" suffix), e.g., CREATE2. - - CREATE cell: First part of a handshake, sent by the initiator. - - CREATED cell: Second part of a handshake, sent by the responder. - - EXTEND cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTEND cell) First part of a - handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit. The last relay - in the circuit so far will decrypt this cell and send the - payload in a CREATED cell to the chosen next hop relay. - - EXTENDED cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTENDED cell) Second part - of a handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit. The last - relay in the circuit so far receives the CREATED cell from the - new last hop relay and encrypts the payload in an EXTENDED cell - to tunnel back to the client. - - Onion skin: A CREATE/CREATE2 or EXTEND/EXTEND2 payload that - contains the first part of the TAP or ntor key establishment - handshake. - -3.3. Hidden Service Protocol - -3.4. Directory Protocol - - -4.0. General network definitions - - Leaky Pipe Topology: The ability for the origin of a circuit to address - relay cells to be addressed to any hop in the path of a circuit. In Tor, - the destination hop is determined by using the 'recognized' field of relay - cells. - - Stream: A single application-level connection or request, multiplexed over - a Tor circuit. A 'Stream' can currently carry the contents of a TCP - connection, a DNS request, or a Tor directory request. - - Channel: A pairwise connection between two Tor relays, or between a - client and a relay. Circuits are multiplexed over Channels. All - channels are currently implemented as TLS connections. - -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf