path: root/proposals/271-another-guard-selection.txt

```
Filename: 271-another-guard-selection.txt
Title: Another algorithm for guard selection
Author:  Isis Lovecruft, George Kadianakis, Ola Bini, Nick Mathewson
Created: 2016-07-11
Supersedes: 259, 268
Status: Closed
Implemented-In: 0.3.0.1-alpha

0.0. Preliminaries

   This proposal derives from proposals 259 and 268; it is meant to
   supersede both.  It is in part a restatement of it, in part a
   simplification, and in part a refactoring so that it does not
   have the serialization problems noted by George Kadianakis.  It
   makes other numerous small changes.  Isis, George, and Ola should
   all get the credit for the well-considered ideas.

   Whenever I say "Y is a subset of X" you can think in terms of
   "Y-membership is a flag that can be set on members of X" or
   "Y-membership is a predicate that can be evaluated on members of
   X."

   "More work is needed."  There's a to-do at the end of the
   document.

0.1. Notation: identifiers

   We mention identifiers of these kinds:

   [SECTIONS]

   {INPUTS}, {PERSISTENT_DATA}, and {OPERATING_PARAMETERS}.

   {non_persistent_data}

   <states>.

   Each named identifier receives a type where it is defined, and
   is used by reference later on.

   I'm using this convention to make it easier to tell for certain
   whether every thingy we define is used, and vice versa.

1. Introduction and motivation

  Tor uses entry guards to prevent an attacker who controls some
  fraction of the network from observing a fraction of every user's
  traffic. If users chose their entries and exits uniformly at
  random from the list of servers every time they build a circuit,
  then an adversary who had (k/N) of the network would deanonymize
  F=(k/N)^2 of all circuits... and after a given user had built C
  circuits, the attacker would see them at least once with
  probability 1-(1-F)^C.  With large C, the attacker would get a
  sample of every user's traffic with probability 1.

  To prevent this from happening, Tor clients choose a small number
  of guard nodes (currently 3).  These guard nodes are the only
  nodes that the client will connect to directly.  If they are not
  compromised, the user's paths are not compromised.

  But attacks remain.  Consider an attacker who can run a firewall
  between a target user and the Tor network, and make many of the
  guards they don't control appear to be unreachable.  Or consider
  an attacker who can identify a user's guards, and mount
  denial-of-service attacks on them until the user picks a guard
  that the attacker controls.

  In the presence of these attacks, we can't continue to connect to
  the Tor network unconditionally.  Doing so would eventually result
  in the user choosing a hostile node as their guard, and losing
  anonymity.

  This proposal outlines a new entry guard selection algorithm,
  which tries to meet the following goals:

    - Heuristics and algorithms for determining how and which guards
      are chosen should be kept as simple and easy to understand as
      possible.

    - Clients in censored regions or who are behind a fascist
      firewall who connect to the Tor network should not experience
      any significant disadvantage in terms of reachability or
      usability.

    - Tor should make a best attempt at discovering the most
      appropriate behaviour, with as little user input and
      configuration as possible.

    - Tor clients should discover usable guards without too much
      delay.

    - Tor clients should resist (to the extent possible) attacks
      that try to force them onto compromised guards.


2. State instances

   In the algorithm below, we describe a set of persistent and
   non-persistent state variables.  These variables should be
   treated as an object, of which multiple instances can exist.

   In particular, we specify the use of three particular instances:

     A. UseBridges

      If UseBridges is set, then we replace the {GUARDS} set in
      [Sec:GUARDS] below with the list of list of configured
      bridges.  We maintain a separate persistent instance of
      {SAMPLED_GUARDS} and {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} and other derived
      values for the UseBridges case.

      In this case, we impose no upper limit on the sample size.

    B. EntryNodes / ExcludeNodes / Reachable*Addresses /
        FascistFirewall / ClientUseIPv4=0

      If one of the above options is set, and UseBridges is not,
      then we compare the fraction of usable guards in the consensus
      to the total number of guards in the consensus.

      If this fraction is less than {MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_FRAC},
      we use a separate instance of the state.

      (While Tor is running, we do not change back and forth between
      the separate instance of the state and the default instance
      unless the fraction of usable guards is 5% higher than, or 5%
      lower than, {MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_FRAC}.  This prevents us
      from flapping back and forth between instances if we happen to
      hit {MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_FRAC} exactly.

      If this fraction is less than {EXTREME_RESTRICTION_FRAC}, we use a
      separate instance of the state, and warn the user.

      [TODO: should we have a different instance for each set of heavily
      restricted options?]

   C. Default

      If neither of the above variant-state instances is used,
      we use a default instance.

3. Circuit Creation, Entry Guard Selection (1000 foot view)

   A circuit in Tor is a path through the network connecting a client to
   its destination. At a high-level, a three-hop exit circuit will look
   like this:

   Client <-> Entry Guard <-> Middle Node <-> Exit Node <-> Destination

   Entry guards are the only nodes which a client will connect to
   directly, Exit relays are the nodes by which traffic exists the
   Tor network in order to connect to an external destination.

   3.1 Path selection

   For any circuit, at least one entry guard and middle node(s) are
   required. An exit node is required if traffic will exit the Tor
   network. Depending on its configuration, a relay listed in a
   consensus could be used for any of these roles. However, this
   proposal defines how entry guards specifically should be selected and
   managed, as opposed to middle or exit nodes.

   3.1.1 Entry guard selection

   At a high level, a relay listed in a consensus will move through the
   following states in the process from initial selection to eventual
   usage as an entry guard:

      relays listed in consensus
                 |
               sampled
               |     |
         confirmed   filtered
               |     |      |
               primary      usable_filtered

   Relays listed in the latest consensus can be sampled for guard usage
   if they have the "Guard" flag. Sampling is random but weighted by
   bandwidth.

[Paul Syverson in a conversation at the Wilmington Meeting 2017 says that
we should look into how we're doing this sampling.  Essentially, his
concern is that, since we are sampling by bandwidth at first (when we
choose the `sampled` set), then later there is another bias—when trying to
build circuits (and hence marking guards as confirmed) we select those
which completed a usable circuit first (and hence have the lowest
latency)—that this sort of "doubly skewed" selection may "snub" some
low-consensus-weight guards and leave them unused completely.  Thus the
issue is primarily that we're not allocating network resources
efficiently.  Mine and Nick's guard algorithm simulation code never
checked what percentage of possible guards the algorithm reasonably
allowed clients to use; this would be an interesting thing to check in
simulation at some point.  If it does turn out to be a problem, Paul's
intuition for a fix is to select uniformly at random to obtain the
`sampled` set, then weight by bandwidth when trying to build circuits and
marking guards as confirmed. —isis]

   Once a path is built and a circuit established using this guard, it
   is marked as confirmed. Until this point, guards are first sampled
   and then filtered based on information such as our current
   configuration (see SAMPLED and FILTERED sections) and later marked as
   usable_filtered if the guard is not primary but can be reached.

   It is always preferable to use a primary guard when building a new
   circuit in order to reduce guard churn; only on failure to connect to
   existing primary guards will new guards be used.

   3.1.2 Middle and exit node selection

   Middle nodes are selected at random from relays listed in the
   latest consensus, weighted by bandwidth. Exit nodes are chosen
   similarly but restricted to relays with an exit policy.

   3.2 Circuit Building

   Once a path is chosen, Tor will use this path to build a new circuit.

   If the circuit is built successfully, it either can be used
   immediately or wait for a better guard, depending on whether other
   circuits already exist with higher-priority guards.

   If at any point the circuit fails, the guard is marked as
   unreachable, the circuit is closed, and waiting circuits are updated.

4. The algorithm.

4.0.  The guards listed in the current consensus. [Section:GUARDS]

   By {set:GUARDS} we mean the set of all guards in the current
   consensus that are usable for all circuits and directory
   requests. (They must have the flags: Stable, Fast, V2Dir, Guard.)

      **Rationale**

   We require all guards to have the flags that we potentially need
   from any guard, so that all guards are usable for all circuits.

4.1.  The Sampled Guard Set. [Section:SAMPLED]

   We maintain a set, {set:SAMPLED_GUARDS}, that persists across
   invocations of Tor. It is an unordered subset of the nodes that
   we have seen listed as a guard in the consensus at some point.
   For each such guard, we record persistently:

      - {pvar:ADDED_ON_DATE}: The date on which it was added to
        sampled_guards.

        We base this value on RAND(now, {GUARD_LIFETIME}/10). See
        Appendix [RANDOM] below.

      - {pvar:ADDED_BY_VERSION}: The version of Tor that added it to
        sampled_guards.

      - {pvar:IS_LISTED}: Whether it was listed as a usable Guard in
        the _most recent_ consensus we have seen.

      - {pvar:FIRST_UNLISTED_AT}: If IS_LISTED is false, the publication date
        of the earliest consensus in which this guard was listed such that we
        have not seen it listed in any later consensus.  Otherwise "None."
        We randomize this, based on
          RAND(added_at_time, {REMOVE_UNLISTED_GUARDS_AFTER} / 5)

   For each guard in {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, we also record this data,
   non-persistently:

      - {tvar:last_tried_connect}: A 'last tried to connect at'
        time.  Default 'never'.

      - {tvar:is_reachable}: an "is reachable" tristate, with
        possible values { <state:yes>, <state:no>, <state:maybe> }.
        Default '<maybe>.'

               [Note: "yes" is not strictly necessary, but I'm
                making it distinct from "maybe" anyway, to make our
                logic clearer.  A guard is "maybe" reachable if it's
                worth trying. A guard is "yes" reachable if we tried
                it and succeeded.]

      - {tvar:failing_since}: The first time when we failed to
        connect to this guard. Defaults to "never".  Reset to
        "never" when we successfully connect to this guard.

      - {tvar:is_pending} A "pending" flag.  This indicates that we
        are trying to build an exploratory circuit through the
        guard, and we don't know whether it will succeed.

   We require that {SAMPLED_GUARDS} contain at least
   {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE} guards from the consensus (if possible),
   but not more than {MAX_SAMPLE_THRESHOLD} of the number of guards
   in the consensus, and not more then {MAX_SAMPLE_SIZE} in total.
   (But if the maximum would be smaller than {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE}, we
   set the maximum at {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE}.)

   To add a new guard to {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, pick an entry at random
   from ({GUARDS} - {SAMPLED_GUARDS}), weighted by bandwidth.

   We remove an entry from {SAMPLED_GUARDS} if:

      * We have a live consensus, and {IS_LISTED} is false, and
        {FIRST_UNLISTED_AT} is over {REMOVE_UNLISTED_GUARDS_AFTER}
        days in the past.

     OR

      * We have a live consensus, and {ADDED_ON_DATE} is over
        {GUARD_LIFETIME} ago, *and* {CONFIRMED_ON_DATE} is either
        "never", or over {GUARD_CONFIRMED_MIN_LIFETIME} ago.

   Note that {SAMPLED_GUARDS} does not depend on our configuration.
   It is possible that we can't actually connect to any of these
   guards.

     **Rationale**

   The {SAMPLED_GUARDS} set is meant to limit the total number of
   guards that a client will connect to in a given period.  The
   upper limit on its size prevents us from considering too many
   guards.

   The first expiration mechanism is there so that our
   {SAMPLED_GUARDS} list does not accumulate so many dead
   guards that we cannot add new ones.

   The second expiration mechanism makes us rotate our guards slowly
   over time.


4.2. The Usable Sample [Section:FILTERED]

   We maintain another set, {set:FILTERED_GUARDS}, that does not
   persist. It is derived from:
       - {SAMPLED_GUARDS}
       - our current configuration,
       - the path bias information.

   A guard is a member of {set:FILTERED_GUARDS} if and only if all
   of the following are true:

       - It is a member of {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, with {IS_LISTED} set to
         true.
       - It is not disabled because of path bias issues.
       - It is not disabled because of ReachableAddress police,
         the ClientUseIPv4 setting, the ClientUseIPv6 setting,
         the FascistFirewall setting, or some other
         option that prevents using some addresses.
       - It is not disabled because of ExcludeNodes.
       - It is a bridge if UseBridges is true; or it is not a
         bridge if UseBridges is false.
       - Is included in EntryNodes if EntryNodes is set and
         UseBridges is not. (But see 2.B above).

   We have an additional subset, {set:USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}, which
   is defined to be the subset of {FILTERED_GUARDS} where
   {is_reachable} is <yes> or <maybe>.

   We try to maintain a requirement that {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}
   contain at least {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE} elements:

     Whenever we are going to sample from {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS},
     and it contains fewer than {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE} elements, we
     add new elements to {SAMPLED_GUARDS} until one of the following
     is true:

       * {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS} is large enough,
     OR
       * {SAMPLED_GUARDS} is at its maximum size.


     ** Rationale **

  These filters are applied _after_ sampling: if we applied them
  before the sampling, then our sample would reflect the set of
  filtering restrictions that we had in the past.

4.3. The confirmed-guard list. [Section:CONFIRMED]

  [formerly USED_GUARDS]

  We maintain a persistent ordered list, {list:CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.
  It contains guards that we have used before, in our preference
  order of using them.  It is a subset of {SAMPLED_GUARDS}.  For
  each guard in this list, we store persistently:

      - {pvar:IDENTITY} Its fingerprint

      - {pvar:CONFIRMED_ON_DATE} When we added this guard to
        {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.

        Randomized as RAND(now, {GUARD_LIFETIME}/10).

  We add new members to {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} when we mark a circuit
  built through a guard as "for user traffic."  That is, a circuit is
  considered for use for client traffic when we have decided that we
  could attach a stream to it; at that point the guard for that
  circuit SHOULD be added to {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.

  Whenever we remove a member from {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, we also remove
  it from {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.

      [Note: You can also regard the {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} list as a
      total ordering defined over a subset of {SAMPLED_GUARDS}.]

  Definition: we call Guard A "higher priority" than another Guard B
  if, when A and B are both reachable, we would rather use A.  We
  define priority as follows:

     * Every guard in {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} has a higher priority
       than every guard not in {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.

     * Among guards in {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}, the one appearing earlier
       on the {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} list has a higher priority.

     * Among guards that do not appear in {CONFIRMED_GUARDS},
       {is_pending}==true guards have higher priority.

     * Among those, the guard with earlier {last_tried_connect} time
       have higher priority.

     * Finally, among guards that do not appear in
       {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} with {is_pending==false}, all have equal
       priority.

   ** Rationale **

  We add elements to this ordering when we have actually used them
  for building a usable circuit.  We could mark them at some other
  time (such as when we attempt to connect to them, or when we
  actually connect to them), but this approach keeps us from
  committing to a guard before we actually use it for sensitive
  traffic.

4.4. The Primary guards [Section:PRIMARY]

  We keep a run-time non-persistent ordered list of
  {list:PRIMARY_GUARDS}.  It is a subset of {FILTERED_GUARDS}.  It
  contains {N_PRIMARY_GUARDS} elements.

  To compute primary guards, take the ordered intersection of
  {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} and {FILTERED_GUARDS}, and take the first
  {N_PRIMARY_GUARDS} elements.  If there are fewer than
  {N_PRIMARY_GUARDS} elements, add additional elements to
  PRIMARY_GUARDS chosen _uniformly_ at random from
  ({FILTERED_GUARDS} - {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}).

  Once an element has been added to {PRIMARY_GUARDS}, we do not remove it
  until it is replaced by some element from {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}. Confirmed
  elements always proceed unconfirmed ones in the {PRIMARY_GUARDS} list.

  Note that {PRIMARY_GUARDS} do not have to be in
  {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}: they might be unreachable.

    ** Rationale **

  These guards are treated differently from other guards.  If one of
  them is usable, then we use it right away. For other guards
  {FILTERED_GUARDS}, if it's usable, then before using it we might
  first double-check whether perhaps one of the primary guards is
  usable after all.

4.5. Retrying guards. [Section:RETRYING]

  (We run this process as frequently as needed. It can be done once
  a second, or just-in-time.)

  If a primary sampled guard's {is_reachable} status is <no>, then
  we decide whether to update its {is_reachable} status to <maybe>
  based on its {last_tried_connect} time, its {failing_since} time,
  and the {PRIMARY_GUARDS_RETRY_SCHED} schedule.

  If a non-primary sampled guard's {is_reachable} status is <no>, then
  we decide whether to update its {is_reachable} status to <maybe>
  based on its {last_tried_connect} time, its {failing_since} time,
  and the {GUARDS_RETRY_SCHED} schedule.

    ** Rationale **

  An observation that a guard has been 'unreachable' only lasts for
  a given amount of time, since we can't infer that it's unreachable
  now from the fact that it was unreachable a few minutes ago.

4.6. Selecting guards for circuits. [Section:SELECTING]

  Every origin circuit is now in one of these states:
     <state:usable_on_completion>,
     <state:usable_if_no_better_guard>,
     <state:waiting_for_better_guard>, or
     <state:complete>.

  You may only attach streams to <complete> circuits.
  (Additionally, you may only send RENDEZVOUS cells, ESTABLISH_INTRO
  cells, and INTRODUCE cells on <complete> circuits.)

  The per-circuit state machine is:

      New circuits are <usable_on_completion> or
      <usable_if_no_better_guard>.

      A <usable_on_completion> circuit may become <complete>, or may
      fail.

      A <usable_if_no_better_guard> circuit may become
      <usable_on_completion>; may become <waiting_for_better_guard>; or may
      fail.

      A <waiting_for_better_guard> circuit will become <complete>, or will
      be closed, or will fail.

      A <complete> circuit remains <complete> until it fails or is
      closed.

      Each of these transitions is described below.

  We keep, as global transient state:

    * {tvar:last_time_on_internet} -- the last time at which we
      successfully used a circuit or connected to a guard.  At
      startup we set this to "infinitely far in the past."

  When we want to build a circuit, and we need to pick a guard:

    * If any entry in PRIMARY_GUARDS has {is_reachable} status of
      <maybe> or <yes>, return the first such guard. The circuit is
      <usable_on_completion>.

      [Note: We do not use {is_pending} on primary guards, since we
      are willing to try to build multiple circuits through them
      before we know for sure whether they work, and since we will
      not use any non-primary guards until we are sure that the
      primary guards are all down.  (XX is this good?)]

    * Otherwise, if the ordered intersection of {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}
      and {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS} is nonempty, return the first
      entry in that intersection that has {is_pending} set to
      false. Set its value of {is_pending} to true.  The circuit
      is now <usable_if_no_better_guard>.  (If all entries have
      {is_pending} true, pick the first one.)

    * Otherwise, if there is no such entry, select a member at
      random from {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}. Set its {is_pending}
      field to true.  The circuit is <usable_if_no_better_guard>.

  We update the {last_tried_connect} time for the guard to 'now.'

  In some cases (for example, when we need a certain directory feature,
  or when we need to avoid using a certain exit as a guard), we need to
  restrict the guards that we use for a single circuit. When this happens, we
  remember the restrictions that applied when choosing the guard for
  that circuit, since we will need them later (see [UPDATE_WAITING].).

    ** Rationale **

  We're getting to the core of the algorithm here.  Our main goals are to
  make sure that
    1. If it's possible to use a primary guard, we do.
    2. We probably use the first primary guard.

  So we only try non-primary guards if we're pretty sure that all
  the primary guards are down, and we only try a given primary guard
  if the earlier primary guards seem down.

  When we _do_ try non-primary guards, however, we only build one
  circuit through each, to give it a chance to succeed or fail.  If
  ever such a circuit succeeds, we don't use it until we're pretty
  sure that it's the best guard we're getting. (see below).

         [XXX timeout.]

4.7. When a circuit fails. [Section:ON_FAIL]

   When a circuit fails in a way that makes us conclude that a guard
   is not reachable, we take the following steps:

      * We set the guard's {is_reachable} status to <no>.  If it had
        {is_pending} set to true, we make it non-pending.

      * We close the circuit, of course.  (This removes it from
        consideration by the algorithm in [UPDATE_WAITING].)

      * Update the list of waiting circuits.  (See [UPDATE_WAITING]
        below.)

   [Note: the existing Tor logic will cause us to create more
   circuits in response to some of these steps; and also see
   [ON_CONSENSUS].]

    ** Rationale **

   See [SELECTING] above for rationale.

4.8. When a circuit succeeds [Section:ON_SUCCESS]

   When a circuit succeeds in a way that makes us conclude that a
   guard _was_ reachable, we take these steps:

      * We set its {is_reachable} status to <yes>.
      * We set its {failing_since} to "never".
      * If the guard was {is_pending}, we clear the {is_pending} flag.
      * If the guard was not a member of {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}, we add
        it to the end of {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.

      * If this circuit was <usable_on_completion>, this circuit is
        now <complete>. You may attach streams to this circuit,
        and use it for hidden services.

      * If this circuit was <usable_if_no_better_guard>, it is now
        <waiting_for retry>.  You may not yet attach streams to it.
        Then check whether the {last_time_on_internet} is more than
        {INTERNET_LIKELY_DOWN_INTERVAL} seconds ago:

           * If it is, then mark all {PRIMARY_GUARDS} as "maybe"
             reachable.

           * If it is not, update the list of waiting circuits. (See
             [UPDATE_WAITING] below)

   [Note: the existing Tor logic will cause us to create more
   circuits in response to some of these steps; and see
   [ON_CONSENSUS].]

    ** Rationale **

   See [SELECTING] above for rationale.

4.9. Updating the list of waiting circuits [Section:UPDATE_WAITING]

   We run this procedure whenever it's possible that a
   <waiting_for_better_guard> circuit might be ready to be called
   <complete>.

   * If any circuit C1 is <waiting_for_better_guard>, AND:
       * All primary guards have reachable status of <no>.
       * There is no circuit C2 that "blocks" C1.
     Then, upgrade C1 to <complete>.

   Definition: In the algorithm above, C2 "blocks" C1 if:
       * C2 obeys all the restrictions that C1 had to obey, AND
       * C2 has higher priority than C1, AND
       * Either C2 is <complete>, or C2 is <waiting_for_better_guard>,
         or C2 has been <usable_if_no_better_guard> for no more than
         {NONPRIMARY_GUARD_CONNECT_TIMEOUT} seconds.

   We run this procedure periodically:

   * If any circuit stays is <waiting_for_better_guard>
     for more than {NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT} seconds,
     time it out.

      **Rationale**

   If we open a connection to a guard, we might want to use it
   immediately (if we're sure that it's the best we can do), or we
   might want to wait a little while to see if some other circuit
   which we like better will finish.


   When we mark a circuit <complete>, we don't close the
   lower-priority circuits immediately: we might decide to use
   them after all if the <complete> circuit goes down before
   {NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT} seconds.

4.10.  Whenever we get a new consensus. [Section:ON_CONSENSUS]

   We update {GUARDS}.

   For every guard in {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, we update {IS_LISTED} and
   {FIRST_UNLISTED_AT}.

   [**] We remove entries from {SAMPLED_GUARDS} if appropriate,
   according to the sampled-guards expiration rules.  If they were
   in {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}, we also remove them from
   {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}.

   We recompute {FILTERED_GUARDS}, and everything that derives from
   it, including {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}, and {PRIMARY_GUARDS}.

   (Whenever one of the configuration options that affects the
   filter is updated, we repeat the process above, starting at the
   [**] line.)

4.11. Deciding whether to generate a new circuit.
  [Section:NEW_CIRCUIT_NEEDED]

   In current Tor, we generate a new circuit when we don't have
   enough circuits either built or in-progress to handle a given
   stream, or an expected stream.

   For the purpose of this rule, we say that <waiting_for_better_guard>
   circuits are neither built nor in-progress; that <complete>
   circuits are built; and that the other states are in-progress.

A. Appendices

A.1.  Parameters with suggested values. [Section:PARAM_VALS]

   (All suggested values chosen arbitrarily)

   {param:MAX_SAMPLE_THRESHOLD} -- 20%

   {param:MAX_SAMPLE_SIZE} -- 60

   {param:GUARD_LIFETIME} -- 120 days

   {param:REMOVE_UNLISTED_GUARDS_AFTER} -- 20 days
     [previously ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER]

   {param:MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE} -- 20

   {param:N_PRIMARY_GUARDS} -- 3

   {param:PRIMARY_GUARDS_RETRY_SCHED}
      -- every 30 minutes for the first 6 hours.
      -- every 2 hours for the next 3.75 days.
      -- every 4 hours for the next 3 days.
      -- every 9 hours thereafter.

   {param:GUARDS_RETRY_SCHED} -- 1 hour
      -- every hour for the first 6 hours.
      -- every 4 hours for the next 3.75 days.
      -- every 18 hours for the next 3 days.
      -- every 36 hours thereafter.

   {param:INTERNET_LIKELY_DOWN_INTERVAL} -- 10 minutes

   {param:NONPRIMARY_GUARD_CONNECT_TIMEOUT} -- 15 seconds

   {param:NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT} -- 10 minutes

   {param:MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_FRAC} -- .2

   {param:EXTREME_RESTRICTION_FRAC} -- .01

   {param:GUARD_CONFIRMED_MIN_LIFETIME} -- 60 days

A.2. Random values [Section:RANDOM]

   Frequently, we want to randomize the expiration time of something
   so that it's not easy for an observer to match it to its start
   time. We do this by randomizing its start date a little, so that
   we only need to remember a fixed expiration interval.

   By RAND(now, INTERVAL) we mean a time between now and INTERVAL in
   the past, chosen uniformly at random.


A.3. Why not a sliding scale of primaryness? [Section:CVP]

   At one meeting, I floated the idea of having "primaryness" be a
   continuous variable rather than a boolean.

   I'm no longer sure this is a great idea, but I'll try to outline
   how it might work.

   To begin with: being "primary" gives it a few different traits:

      1) We retry primary guards more frequently. [Section:RETRYING]

      2) We don't even _try_ building circuits through
         lower-priority guards until we're pretty sure that the
         higher-priority primary guards are down. (With non-primary
         guards, on the other hand, we launch exploratory circuits
         which we plan not to use if higher-priority guards
         succeed.) [Section:SELECTING]

      3) We retry them all one more time if a circuit succeeds after
         the net has been down for a while. [Section:ON_SUCCESS]

   We could make each of the above traits continuous:

      1) We could make the interval at which a guard is retried
         depend continuously on its position in CONFIRMED_GUARDS.

      2) We could change the number of guards we test in parallel
         based on their position in CONFIRMED_GUARDS.

      3) We could change the rule for how long the higher-priority
         guards need to have been down before we call a
         <usable_if_no_better_guard> circuit <complete> based on a
         possible network-down condition.  For example, we could
         retry the first guard if we tried it more than 10 seconds
         ago, the second if we tried it more than 20 seconds ago,
         etc.

   I am pretty sure, however, that if these are worth doing, they
   need more analysis!  Here's why:

      * They all have the potential to leak more information about a
        guard's exact position on the list.  Is that safe? Is there
        any way to exploit that?  I don't think we know.

      * They all seem like changes which it would be relatively
        simple to make to the code after we implement the simpler
        version of the algorithm described above.

A.3. Controller changes

   We will add to control-spec.txt a new possible circuit state, GUARD_WAIT,
   that can be given as part of circuit events and GETINFO responses about
   circuits.  A circuit is in the GUARD_WAIT state when it is fully built,
   but we will not use it because a circuit with a better guard might
   become built too.

A.4. Persistent state format

   The persistent state format doesn't need to be part of this
   proposal, since different implementations can do it
   differently. Nonetheless, here's the one Tor uses:

   The "state" file contains one Guard entry for each sampled guard
   in each instance of the guard state (see section 2).  The value
   of this Guard entry is a set of space-separated K=V entries,
   where K contains any nonspace character except =, and V contains
   any nonspace characters.

   Implementations must retain any unrecognized K=V entries for a
   sampled guard when the regenerate the state file.

   The order of K=V entries is not allowed to matter.

   Recognized fields (values of K) are:

        "in" -- the name of the guard state instance that this
        sampled guard is in.  If a sampled guard is in two guard
        states instances, it appears twice, with a different "in"
        field each time. Required.

        "rsa_id" -- the RSA id digest for this guard, encoded in
        hex. Required.

        "bridge_addr" -- If the guard is a bridge, its configured
        address and OR port. Optional.

        "nickname" -- the guard's nickname, if any. Optional.

        "sampled_on" -- the date when the guard was sampled. Required.

        "sampled_by" -- the Tor version that sampled this guard.
        Optional.

        "unlisted_since" -- the date since which the guard has been
        unlisted. Optional.

        "listed" -- 0 if the guard is not listed ; 1 if it is. Required.

        "confirmed_on" -- date when the guard was
        confirmed. Optional.

        "confirmed_idx" -- position of the guard in the confirmed
        list. Optional.

        "pb_use_attempts", "pb_use_successes", "pb_circ_attempts",
        "pb_circ_successes", "pb_successful_circuits_closed",
        "pb_collapsed_circuits", "pb_unusable_circuits",
        "pb_timeouts" -- state for the circuit path bias algorithm,
        given in decimal fractions. Optional.

   All dates here are given as a (spaceless) ISO8601 combined date
   and time in UTC (e.g., 2016-11-29T19:39:31).

   I do not plan to build a migration mechanism from the old format
   to the new.


TODO. Still non-addressed issues [Section:TODO]

   Simulate to answer:  Will this work in a dystopic world?

   Simulate actual behavior.

   For all lifetimes: instead of storing the "this began at" time,
   store the "remove this at" time, slightly randomized.

   Clarify that when you get a <complete> circuit, you might need to
   relaunch circuits through that same guard immediately, if they
   are circuits that have to be independent.


   Fix all items marked XX or TODO.

   "Directory guards" -- do they matter?

       Suggestion: require that all guards support downloads via BEGINDIR.
       We don't need to worry about directory guards for relays, since we
       aren't trying to prevent relay enumeration.

   IP version preferenes via ClientPreferIPv6ORPort

       Suggestion: Treat it as a preference when adding to
       {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}, but not otherwise.

```