1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
|
```
Filename: 143-distributed-storage-improvements.txt
Title: Improvements of Distributed Storage for Tor Hidden Service Descriptors
Author: Karsten Loesing
Created: 28-Jun-2008
Status: Superseded
Change history:
28-Jun-2008 Initial proposal for or-dev
Overview:
An evaluation of the distributed storage for Tor hidden service
descriptors and subsequent discussions have brought up a few improvements
to proposal 114. All improvements are backwards compatible to the
implementation of proposal 114.
Design:
1. Report Bad Directory Nodes
Bad hidden service directory nodes could deny existence of previously
stored descriptors. A bad directory node that does this with all stored
descriptors causes harm to the distributed storage in general, but
replication will cope with this problem in most cases. However, an
adversary that attempts to make a specific hidden service unavailable by
running relays that become responsible for all of a service's
descriptors poses a more serious threat. The distributed storage needs to
defend against this attack by detecting and removing bad directory nodes.
As a countermeasure hidden services try to download their descriptors
every hour at random times from the hidden service directories that are
responsible for storing it. If a directory node replies with 404 (Not
found), the hidden service reports the supposedly bad directory node to
a random selection of half of the directory authorities (with version
numbers equal to or higher than the first version that implements this
proposal). The hidden service posts a complaint message using HTTP 'POST'
to a URL "/tor/rendezvous/complain" with the following message format:
"hidden-service-directory-complaint" identifier NL
[At start, exactly once]
The identifier of the hidden service directory node to be
investigated.
"rendezvous-service-descriptor" descriptor NL
[At end, Excatly once]
The hidden service descriptor that the supposedly bad directory node
does not serve.
The directory authority checks if the descriptor is valid and the hidden
service directory responsible for storing it. It waits for a random time
of up to 30 minutes before posting the descriptor to the hidden service
directory. If the publication is acknowledged, the directory authority
waits another random time of up to 30 minutes before attempting to
request the descriptor that it has posted. If the directory node replies
with 404 (Not found), it will be blacklisted for being a hidden service
directory node for the next 48 hours.
A blacklisted hidden service directory is assigned the new flag BadHSDir
instead of the HSDir flag in the vote that a directory authority creates.
In a consensus a relay is only assigned a HSDir flag if the majority of
votes contains a HSDir flag and no more than one third of votes contains
a BadHSDir flag. As a result, clients do not have to learn about the
BadHSDir flag. A blacklisted directory node will simply not be assigned
the HSDir flag in the consensus.
In order to prevent an attacker from setting up new nodes as replacement
for blacklisted directory nodes, all directory nodes in the same /24
subnet are blacklisted, too. Furthermore, if two or more directory nodes
are blacklisted in the same /16 subnet concurrently, all other directory
nodes in that /16 subnet are blacklisted, too. Blacklisting holds for at
most 48 hours.
2. Publish Fewer Replicas
The evaluation has shown that the probability of a directory node to
serve a previously stored descriptor is 85.7% (more precisely, this is
the 0.001-quantile of the empirical distribution with the rationale that
it holds for 99.9% of all empirical cases). If descriptors are replicated
to x directory nodes, the probability of at least one of the replicas to
be available for clients is 1 - (1 - 85.7%) ^ x. In order to achieve an
overall availability of 99.9%, x = 3.55 replicas need to be stored. From
this follows that 4 replicas are sufficient, rather than the currently
stored 6 replicas.
Further, the current design stores 2 sets of descriptors on 3 directory
nodes with consecutive identities. Originally, this was meant to
facilitate replication between directory nodes, which has not been and
will not be implemented (the selection criterion of 24 hours uptime does
not make it necessary). As a result, storing descriptors on directory
nodes with consecutive identities is not required. In fact it should be
avoided to enable an attacker to create "black holes" in the identifier
ring.
Hidden services should store their descriptors on 4 non-consecutive
directory nodes, and clients should request descriptors from these
directory nodes only. For compatibility reasons, hidden services also
store their descriptors on 2 consecutive directory nodes. Hence, 0.2.0.x
clients will be able to retrieve 4 out of 6 descriptors, but will fail
for the remaining 2 descriptors, which is sufficient for reliability. As
soon as 0.2.0.x is deprecated, hidden services can stop publishing the
additional 2 replicas.
3. Change Default Value of Being Hidden Service Directory
The requirements for becoming a hidden service directory node are an open
directory port and an uptime of at least 24 hours. The evaluation has
shown that there are 300 hidden service directory candidates in the mean,
but only 6 of them are configured to act as hidden service directories.
This is bad, because those 6 nodes need to serve a large share of all
hidden service descriptors. Optimally, there should be hundreds of hidden
service directories. Having a large number of 0.2.1.x directory nodes
also has a positive effect on 0.2.0.x hidden services and clients.
Therefore, the new default of HidServDirectoryV2 should be 1, so that a
Tor relay that has an open directory port automatically accepts and
serves v2 hidden service descriptors. A relay operator can still opt-out
running a hidden service directory by changing HidServDirectoryV2 to 0.
The additional bandwidth requirements for running a hidden service
directory node in addition to being a directory cache are negligible.
4. Make Descriptors Persistent on Directory Nodes
Hidden service directories that are restarted by their operators or after
a failure will not be selected as hidden service directories within the
next 24 hours. However, some clients might still think that these nodes
are responsible for certain descriptors, because they work on the basis
of network consensuses that are up to three hours old. The directory
nodes should be able to serve the previously received descriptors to
these clients. Therefore, directory nodes make all received descriptors
persistent and load previously received descriptors on startup.
5. Store and Serve Descriptors Regardless of Responsibility
Currently, directory nodes only accept descriptors for which they think
they are responsible. This may lead to problems when a directory node
uses an older or newer network consensus than hidden service or client
or when a directory node has been restarted recently. In fact, there are
no security issues in storing or serving descriptors for which a
directory node thinks it is not responsible. To the contrary, doing so
may improve reliability in border cases. As a result, a directory node
does not pay attention to responsibilty when receiving a publication or
fetch request, but stores or serves the requested descriptor. Likewise,
the directory node does not remove descriptors when it thinks it is not
responsible for them any more.
6. Avoid Periodic Descriptor Re-Publication
In the current implementation a hidden service re-publishes its
descriptor either when its content changes or an hour elapses. However,
the evaluation has shown that failures of hidden service directory nodes,
i.e. of nodes that have not failed within the last 24 hours, are very
rare. Together with making descriptors persistent on directory nodes,
there is no necessity to re-publish descriptors hourly.
The only two events leading to descriptor re-publication should be a
change of the descriptor content and a new directory node becoming
responsible for the descriptor. Hidden services should therefore consider
re-publication every time they learn about a new network consensus
instead of hourly.
7. Discard Expired Descriptors
The current implementation lets directory nodes keep a descriptor for two
days before discarding it. However, with the v2 design, descriptors are
only valid for at most one day. Directory nodes should determine the
validity of stored descriptors and discard them one hour after they have
expired (to compensate wrong clocks on clients).
8. Shorten Client-Side Descriptor Fetch History
When clients try to download a hidden service descriptor, they memorize
fetch requests to directory nodes for up to 15 minutes. This allows them
to request all replicas of a descriptor to avoid bad or failing directory
nodes, but without querying the same directory node twice.
The downside is that a client that has requested a descriptor without
success, will not be able to find a hidden service that has been started
during the following 15 minutes after the client's last request.
This can be improved by shortening the fetch history to only 5 minutes.
This time should be sufficient to complete requests for all replicas of a
descriptor, but without ending in an infinite request loop.
Compatibility:
All proposed improvements are compatible to the currently implemented
design as described in proposal 114.
```
|
