|
The following changes were made:
* Randomize second and third guard layers.
* Fold in my comments about using disjoint sets ("buckets") for the
third level guard.
* Make the paremeter discussion subsection its own section, and include tables
with far more detail for the Sybil success rates.
* Changed the default parameters based on these tables, and based on my own
intuition about Tor's performance properties.
* Move the load balancing, torrc, and other performance considerations to
their own section (Section 5).
* Move "3.2. Distinguishing new HS circuits from normal HS circuits" to
section 4.1.
* Fold in some of "3.3. Circuit nodes can now be linked to specific hidden
services" into 4.1. Some of it I just removed, though, because I did not find
it credible.
* Added Roger's concerns about guard linkability to Section 4.2.
* Added a denial of service subsection to Section 4.3.
* Try to make a coherent threat model and specify its assumptions
* Put the rotation period in a separate subsection from the number of guards
* Switch to using min(X,X) and max(X,X) for the distribution for the
second and third layer guard lifespans, respectively. Add a subsection
describing this distribution (3.2.3)
* Include python functions for the min and max probability distributions.
* Mention that third nodes can probe to see if they are one of the current
RPs.
* Provide CDF for rotation functions for Sybil runtime expecations.
* Add s7r's DoS points.
* Add notes from Thursday dev meeting discussion.
* Address Aaron's mailinglist comments (except for the CDF).
* Add discussion items from the dev meeting.
|
