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The problem was that clients would, when contacting caches, identify
consensuses by the sha3 digest of the entire consensus, including
signatures. But there are multiple valid encodings for a set of
signatures, meaning that a malicious cache could serve each client a
different encoding, and recognize the clients using the sha3 digests
in their requests.
The first part of the solution is to fetch consensuses diffs based
only on the consensus's digest-as-signed: the digest of the
consensus with no signatures on it.
The second part of the solution is to generate diffs using the
<n>,$d format to first remove all trailing signatures, so that the
diffs will apply to any valid consensus, no matter how the
signatures are encoded.
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Update to new stats, note newer proposals, note flavors, add
parameters to say how much to cache, restore diff-only URLs, say
what "Digest" means. -nickm
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Martà <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
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This includes marking "for 0.2.3" everything arma and I suggested
should be "tageted" for 0.2.3, and unmarking everything that was not
done but targetted for 0.2.2 or earlier.
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Tor doesn't use SVN anymore, making $Revision$, $Id$ and $Date$
meaningless. Remove them without replacement.
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bumped to 0.2.2.x
svn:r18546
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svn:r15904
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Update proposal statuses for 0.2.1.x.
svn:r15843
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svn:r15293
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