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+<a id="rend-spec-v3.txt-G"></a>
+
+# Appendix G: Managing authorized client data \[CLIENT-AUTH-MGMT\]
+
+Hidden services and clients can configure their authorized client data either
+using the torrc, or using the control port. This section presents a suggested
+scheme for configuring client authorization. Please see appendix
+\[HIDSERVDIR-FORMAT\] for more information about relevant hidden service files.
+
+(NOTE: client authorization is implemented as of 0.3.5.1-alpha.)
+
+G.1. Configuring client authorization using torrc
+
+G.1.1. Hidden Service side configuration
+
+```text
+ A hidden service that wants to enable client authorization, needs to
+ populate the "authorized_clients/" directory of its HiddenServiceDir
+ directory with the ".auth" files of its authorized clients.
+
+ When Tor starts up with a configured onion service, Tor checks its
+ <HiddenServiceDir>/authorized_clients/ directory for ".auth" files, and if
+ any recognized and parseable such files are found, then client
+ authorization becomes activated for that service.
+
+ G.1.2. Service-side bookkeeping
+
+ This section contains more details on how onion services should be keeping
+ track of their client ".auth" files.
+
+ For the "descriptor" authentication type, the ".auth" file MUST contain
+ the x25519 public key of that client. Here is a suggested file format:
+
+ <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
+
+ Here is an an example:
+
+ descriptor:x25519:OM7TGIVRYMY6PFX6GAC6ATRTA5U6WW6U7A4ZNHQDI6OVL52XVV2Q
+
+ Tor SHOULD ignore lines it does not recognize.
+ Tor SHOULD ignore files that don't use the ".auth" suffix.
+
+ G.1.3. Client side configuration
+
+ A client who wants to register client authorization data for onion
+ services needs to add the following line to their torrc to indicate the
+ directory which hosts ".auth_private" files containing client-side
+ credentials for onion services:
+
+ ClientOnionAuthDir <DIR>
+
+ The <DIR> contains a file with the suffix ".auth_private" for each onion
+ service the client is authorized with. Tor should scan the directory for
+ ".auth_private" files to find which onion services require client
+ authorization from this client.
+
+ For the "descriptor" auth-type, a ".auth_private" file contains the
+ private x25519 key:
+
+ <onion-address>:descriptor:x25519:<base32-encoded-privkey>
+
+ The keypair used for client authorization is created by a third party tool
+ for which the public key needs to be transferred to the service operator
+ in a secure out-of-band way. The third party tool SHOULD add appropriate
+ headers to the private key file to ensure that users won't accidentally
+ give out their private key.
+
+ G.2. Configuring client authorization using the control port
+
+ G.2.1. Service side
+
+ A hidden service also has the option to configure authorized clients
+ using the control port. The idea is that hidden service operators can use
+ controller utilities that manage their access control instead of using
+ the filesystem to register client keys.
+
+ Specifically, we require a new control port command ADD_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH
+ which is able to register x25519/ed25519 public keys tied to a specific
+ authorized client.
+ [XXX figure out control port command format]
+
+ Hidden services who use the control port interface for client auth need
+ to perform their own key management.
+
+ G.2.2. Client side
+
+ There should also be a control port interface for clients to register
+ authorization data for hidden services without having to use the
+ torrc. It should allow both generation of client authorization private
+ keys, and also to import client authorization data provided by a hidden
+ service
+
+ This way, Tor Browser can present "Generate client auth keys" and "Import
+ client auth keys" dialogs to users when they try to visit a hidden service
+ that is protected by client authorization.
+
+ Specifically, we require two new control port commands:
+ IMPORT_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA
+ GENERATE_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA
+ which import and generate client authorization data respectively.
+
+ [XXX how does key management work here?]
+ [XXX what happens when people use both the control port interface and the
+ filesystem interface?]
+```