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diff --git a/spec/param-spec.md b/spec/param-spec.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..daa70f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/spec/param-spec.md @@ -0,0 +1,656 @@ +# Tor network parameters + +This file lists the recognized parameters that can appear on the "params" +line of a directory consensus. + +<a id="param-spec.txt-1"></a> + +## Network protocol parameters {#network-protocol} + +"circwindow" -- the default package window that circuits should be +established with. It started out at 1000 DATA-bearing relay cells, +but some research +indicates that a lower value would mean fewer cells in transit in the +network at any given time. +Min: 100, Max: 1000, Default: 1000 +First-appeared: Tor 0.2.1.20 + +"UseOptimisticData" -- If set to zero, clients by default shouldn't try +to send optimistic data to servers until they have received a +CONNECTED message. +Min: 0, Max: 1, Default: 1 +First-appeared: 0.2.3.3-alpha +Default was 0 before: 0.2.9.1-alpha +Removed in 0.4.5.1-alpha; now always on. + +"usecreatefast" -- Used to control whether clients use the CREATE_FAST +handshake on the first hop of their circuits. +Min: 0, Max: 1. Default: 1. +First-appeared: 0.2.4.23, 0.2.5.2-alpha +Removed in 0.4.5.1-alpha; now always off. + +"min_paths_for_circs_pct" -- A percentage threshold that determines +whether clients believe they have enough directory information to +build circuits. This value applies to the total fraction of +bandwidth-weighted paths that the client could build; see +path-spec.txt for more information. +Min: 25, Max: 95, Default: 60 +First-appeared: 0.2.4 + +"ExtendByEd25519ID" -- If true, clients should include Ed25519 +identities for relays when generating EXTEND2 messages. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0. +First-appeared: 0.3.0 + +"sendme_emit_min_version" -- Minimum SENDME version that can be sent. +Min: 0. Max: 255. Default 0. +First appeared: 0.4.1.1-alpha. + +"sendme_accept_min_version" -- Minimum SENDME version that is accepted. +Min: 0. Max: 255. Default 0. +First appeared: 0.4.1.1-alpha. + +"allow-network-reentry" -- If true, the Exit relays allow connections that +are exiting the network to re-enter. If false, any exit connections going +to a relay ORPort or an authority ORPort and DirPort is denied and the +stream is terminated. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0 +First appeared: 0.4.5.1-alpha. + +<a id="param-spec.txt-2"></a> + +## Performance-tuning parameters {#performance-tuning} + +"CircuitPriorityHalflifeMsec" -- the halflife parameter used when +weighting which circuit will send the next relay cell. Obeyed by Tor +0.2.2.10-alpha and later. (Versions of Tor between 0.2.2.7-alpha and +0.2.2.10-alpha recognized a "CircPriorityHalflifeMsec" parameter, but +mishandled it badly.) +Min: 1, Max: 2147483647 (INT32_MAX), Default: 30000. +First-appeared: Tor 0.2.2.11-alpha + +```text + "perconnbwrate" and "perconnbwburst" -- if set, each relay sets up a + separate token bucket for every client OR connection, and rate limits + that connection independently. Typically left unset, except when used for + performance experiments around trac entry 1750. Only honored by relays + running Tor 0.2.2.16-alpha and later. (Note that relays running + 0.2.2.7-alpha through 0.2.2.14-alpha looked for bwconnrate and + bwconnburst, but then did the wrong thing with them; see bug 1830 for + details.) + Min: 1, Max: 2147483647 (INT32_MAX), Default: (user setting of + BandwidthRate/BandwidthBurst). + First-appeared: 0.2.2.7-alpha + Removed-in: 0.2.2.16-alpha +``` + +"NumNTorsPerTAP" -- When balancing ntor and TAP requests at relays, +how many ntor handshakes should we perform for each TAP handshake? +Min: 1. Max: 100000. Default: 10. +First-appeared: 0.2.4.17-rc + +"circ_max_cell_queue_size" -- This parameter determines the maximum +number of relay cells allowed per circuit queue. +Min: 1000. Max: 2147483647 (INT32_MAX). Default: 50000. +First-appeared: 0.3.3.6-rc. + +"KISTSchedRunInterval" -- How frequently should the "KIST" scheduler +run in order to decide which data to write to the network? Value in +units of milliseconds. +Min: 2. Max: 100. Default: 2 +First appeared: 0.3.2 + +"KISTSchedRunIntervalClient" -- How frequently should the "KIST" scheduler +run in order to decide which data to write to the network, on clients? Value +in units of milliseconds. The client value needs to be much lower than +the relay value. +Min: 2. Max: 100. Default: 2. +First appeared: 0.4.8.2 + +<a id="param-spec.txt-3"></a> + +## Voting-related parameters {#voting} + +"bwweightscale" -- Value that bandwidth-weights are divided by. If not +present then this defaults to 10000. +Min: 1 +First-appeared: 0.2.2.10-alpha + +"maxunmeasuredbw" -- Used by authorities during voting with method 17 or +later. The maximum value to give for any Bandwidth= entry for a router +that isn't based on at least three measurements. + +(Note: starting in version 0.4.6.1-alpha +there was a bug where Tor authorities would instead look at +a parameter called "maxunmeasurdbw", without the "e". +This bug was fixed in 0.4.9.1-alpha and in 0.4.8.8. +Until all relays are running a fixed version, then either this parameter +must not be set, or it must be set to the same value for both +spellings.) + +First-appeared: 0.2.4.11-alpha + +"FastFlagMinThreshold", "FastFlagMaxThreshold" -- lowest and highest +allowable values for the cutoff for routers that should get the Fast +flag. This is used during voting to prevent the threshold for getting +the Fast flag from being too low or too high. +FastFlagMinThreshold: Min: 4. Max: INT32_MAX: Default: 4. +FastFlagMaxThreshold: Min: -. Max: INT32_MAX: Default: INT32_MAX +First-appeared: 0.2.3.11-alpha + +"AuthDirNumSRVAgreements" -- Minimum number of agreeing directory +authority votes required for a fresh shared random value to be written in +the consensus (this rule only applies on the first commit round of the +shared randomness protocol). +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 2/3 of the total number of +dirauth. + +<a id="param-spec.txt-4"></a> + +## Circuit-build-timeout parameters {#cbt} + +"cbtdisabled", "cbtnummodes", "cbtrecentcount", "cbtmaxtimeouts", +"cbtmincircs", "cbtquantile", "cbtclosequantile", "cbttestfreq", +"cbtmintimeout", "cbtlearntimeout", "cbtmaxopencircs", and +"cbtinitialtimeout" -- see "2.4.5. Consensus parameters governing +behavior" in path-spec.txt for a series of circuit build time related +consensus parameters. + +<a id="param-spec.txt-5"></a> + +## Directory-related parameters {#directory} + +"max-consensus-age-to-cache-for-diff" -- Determines how much +consensus history (in hours) relays should try to cache in order to +serve diffs. (min 0, max 8192, default 72) + +"try-diff-for-consensus-newer-than" -- This parameter determines how +old a consensus can be (in hours) before a client should no longer +try to find a diff for it. (min 0, max 8192, default 72) + +<a id="param-spec.txt-6"></a> + +## Pathbias parameters {#pathbias} + +"pb_mincircs", "pb_noticepct", "pb_warnpct", "pb_extremepct", +"pb_dropguards", "pb_scalecircs", "pb_scalefactor", +"pb_multfactor", "pb_minuse", "pb_noticeusepct", +"pb_extremeusepct", "pb_scaleuse" -- DOCDOC + +<a id="param-spec.txt-7"></a> + +## Relay behavior parameters {#relay-behavior} + +"refuseunknownexits" -- if set to one, exit relays look at the previous +hop of circuits that ask to open an exit stream, and refuse to exit if +they don't recognize it as a relay. The goal is to make it harder for +people to use them as one-hop proxies. See trac entry 1751 for details. +Min: 0, Max: 1 +First-appeared: 0.2.2.17-alpha + +<a id="onion-key-rotation-days"></a> + +"onion-key-rotation-days" -- (min 1, max 90, default 28) + +"onion-key-grace-period-days" -- (min 1, max +onion-key-rotation-days, default 7) + +Every relay should list each onion key it generates for +onion-key-rotation-days days after generating it, and then +replace it. Relays should continue to accept their most recent +previous onion key for an additional onion-key-grace-period-days +days after it is replaced. (Introduced in 0.3.1.1-alpha; +prior versions of tor hardcoded both of these values to 7 days.) + +"AllowNonearlyExtend" -- If true, permit EXTEND/EXTEND2 requests that are not inside +RELAY_EARLY cells. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0. +First-appeared: 0.2.3.11-alpha + +"overload_dns_timeout_scale_percent" -- This value is a percentage of how +many DNS timeout over N seconds we accept before reporting the overload +general state. It is scaled by a factor of 1000 in order to be able to +represent decimal point. As an example, a value of 1000 means 1%. +Min: 0. Max: 100000. Default: 1000. +First-appeared: 0.4.6.8 +Deprecated: 0.4.7.3-alpha-dev + +"overload_dns_timeout_period_secs" -- This value is the period in seconds +of the DNS timeout measurements (the N in the +"overload_dns_timeout_scale_percent" parameter). For this amount of +seconds, we will gather DNS statistics and at the end, we'll do an +assessment on the overload general signal with regards to DNS timeouts. +Min: 0. Max: 2147483647. Default: 600 +First-appeared: 0.4.6.8 +Deprecated: 0.4.7.3-alpha-dev + +"overload_onionskin_ntor_scale_percent" -- This value is a percentage of +how many onionskin ntor drop over N seconds we accept before reporting the +overload general state. It is scaled by a factor of 1000 in order to be +able to represent decimal point. As an example, a value of 1000 means 1%. +Min: 0. Max: 100000. Default: 1000. +First-appeared: 0.4.7.5-alpha + +"overload_onionskin_ntor_period_secs" -- This value is the period in +seconds of the onionskin ntor overload measurements (the N in the +"overload_onionskin_ntor_scale_percent" parameter). For this amount of +seconds, we will gather onionskin ntor statistics and at the end, we'll do +an assessment on the overload general signal. +Min: 0. Max: 2147483647. Default: 21600 (6 hours) +First-appeared: 0.4.7.5-alpha + +"assume-reachable" -- If true, relays should publish descriptors +even when they cannot make a connection to their IPv4 ORPort. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0. +First appeared: 0.4.5.1-alpha. + +"assume-reachable-ipv6" -- If true, relays should publish +descriptors even when they cannot make a connection to their IPv6 +ORPort. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0. +First appeared: 0.4.5.1-alpha. + +"exit_dns_timeout" -- The time in milliseconds an Exit sets libevent to +wait before it considers the DNS timed out. The corresponding libevent +option is "timeout:". +Min: 1. Max: 120000. Default: 1000 (1sec) +First appeared: 0.4.7.5-alpha. + +"exit_dns_num_attempts" -- How many attempts _after the first_ should an +Exit should try a timing-out DNS query before calling it hopeless? (Each of +these attempts will wait for "exit_dns_timeout" independently). The +corresponding libevent option is "attempts:". +Min: 0. Max: 255. Default: 2 +First appeared: 0.4.7.5-alpha. + +<a id="param-spec.txt-8"></a> + +## V3 onion service parameters {#onion-service} + +"hs_intro_min_introduce2", "hs_intro_max_introduce2" -- +Minimum/maximum amount of INTRODUCE2 messages allowed per circuit +before rotation (actual amount picked at random between these two +values). +Min: 0. Max: INT32_MAX. Defaults: 16384, 32768. + +"hs_intro_min_lifetime", "hs_intro_max_lifetime" -- Minimum/maximum +lifetime in seconds that a service should keep an intro point for +(actual lifetime picked at random between these two values). +Min: 0. Max: INT32_MAX. Defaults: 18 hours, 24 hours. + +"hs_intro_num_extra" -- Number of extra intro points a service is +allowed to open. This concept comes from proposal #155. +Min: 0. Max: 128. Default: 2. + +"hsdir_interval" -- The length of a time period, _in minutes_. See +rend-spec-v3.txt section \[TIME-PERIODS\]. +Min: 30. Max: 14400. Default: 1440. + +"hsdir_n_replicas" -- Number of HS descriptor replicas. +Min: 1. Max: 16. Default: 2. + +"hsdir_spread_fetch" -- Total number of HSDirs per replica a tor +client should select to try to fetch a descriptor. +Min: 1. Max: 128. Default: 3. + +"hsdir_spread_store" -- Total number of HSDirs per replica a service +will upload its descriptor to. +Min: 1. Max: 128. Default: 4 + +"HSV3MaxDescriptorSize" -- Maximum descriptor size (in bytes). +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 50000 + +"hs_service_max_rdv_failures" -- This parameter determines the +maximum number of rendezvous attempt an HS service can make per +introduction. +Min 1. Max 10. Default 2. +First-appeared: 0.3.3.0-alpha. + +<a id="HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense"></a> +"HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense" -- This parameter makes +introduction points +start using a rate-limiting defense if they support it. +Introduction points use this value when no +[`DOS_PARAMS` extension] is sent in the ESTABLISH_INTRO message. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0. +First appeared: 0.4.2.1-alpha. + +<a id="HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec"></a> +"HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec" -- Default maximum burst +rate to be used +for token bucket for the introduction point rate-limiting. +Introduction points use this value when no +[`DOS_PARAMS` extension] is sent in the ESTABLISH_INTRO message. +Min: 0. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 200 +First appeared: 0.4.2.1-alpha. + +> Note that the above parameter is slightly misnamed: +> a burst is not meaningfully "per second". + +<a id="HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec"></a> +"HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec" -- Default maximum rate per second +to be used +for token bucket for the introduction point rate-limiting. +Introduction points use this value when no +[`DOS_PARAMS` extension] is sent. +Min: 0. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 25 +First appeared: 0.4.2.1-alpha. + +[`DOS_PARAMS` extension]: ./rend-spec/introduction-protocol.md#DOS_PARAMS + +<a id="param-spec.txt-9"></a> + +## Vanguard parameters {#vanguards} + +```text + "vanguards-enabled" -- The type of vanguards to use by default when + building onion service circuits + 0: No vanguards. + 1: Lite vanguards. + 2: Full vanguards. +``` + +```text + "vanguards-hs-service" -- If higher than vanguards-enabled, and we are + running an onion service, we use this level for all our onion service + circuits + 0: No vanguards. + 1: Lite vanguards. + 2: Full vanguards. +``` + +"guard-hs-l2-number" -- The number of guards in the L2 guardset +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 4 + +"guard-hs-l2-lifetime-min" -- The minimum lifetime of L2 guards +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 86400 (1 day) + +"guard-hs-l2-lifetime-max" -- The maximum lifetime of L2 guards +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 1036800 (12 days) + +"guard-hs-l3-number" -- The number of guards in the L3 guardset +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 8 + +"guard-hs-l3-lifetime-min" -- The minimum lifetime of L3 guards +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 3600 (1 hour) + +"guard-hs-l3-lifetime-max" -- The maximum lifetime of L3 guards +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 172800 (48 hours) + +## Denial-of-service parameters {#dos} + +Denial of Service mitigation parameters. Introduced in 0.3.3.2-alpha: + +"DoSCircuitCreationEnabled" -- Enable the circuit creation DoS +mitigation. + +"DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections" -- Minimum threshold of +concurrent connections before a client address can be flagged as +executing a circuit creation DoS + +"DoSCircuitCreationRate" -- Allowed circuit creation rate per second +per client IP address once the minimum concurrent connection +threshold is reached. + +"DoSCircuitCreationBurst" -- The allowed circuit creation burst per +client IP address once the minimum concurrent connection threshold +is reached. + +```text + "DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType" -- Defense type applied to a + detected client address for the circuit creation mitigation. + 1: No defense. + 2: Refuse circuit creation for the length of + "DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod". +``` + +"DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod" -- The base time period that +the DoS defense is activated for. + +"DoSConnectionEnabled" -- Enable the connection DoS mitigation. + +"DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount" -- The maximum threshold of +concurrent connection from a client IP address. + +```text + "DoSConnectionDefenseType" -- Defense type applied to a detected + client address for the connection mitigation. Possible values are: + 1: No defense. + 2: Immediately close new connections. +``` + +"DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous" -- Refuse establishment of +rendezvous points for single hop clients. + +"DoSStreamCreationEnabled" -- Enable the stream creation DoS +mitigation. +First appeared: 0.4.9.0-alpha-dev. + +"DoSStreamCreationRate" -- Allowed stream creation rate per second +per circuit. +First appeared: 0.4.9.0-alpha-dev. + +"DoSStreamCreationBurst" -- The allowed stream creation burst per +circuit. +First appeared: 0.4.9.0-alpha-dev. + +```text + "DoSStreamCreationDefenseType" -- Defense type applied to a + stream for the stream creation mitigation. + 1: No defense. + 2: Reject the stream or resolve request. + 3: Close the underlying circuit. + First appeared: 0.4.9.0-alpha-dev. +``` + +<a id="param-spec.txt-10"></a> + +## Padding-related parameters {#padding} + +"circpad_max_circ_queued_cells" -- The circuitpadding module will +stop sending more padding relay cells if more than this many cells are in +the circuit queue a given circuit. +Min: 0. Max: 50000. Default 1000. +First appeared: 0.4.0.3-alpha. + +"circpad_global_allowed_cells" -- This is the number of padding relay cells +that must be sent before the 'circpad_global_max_padding_percent' +parameter is applied. +Min: 0. Max: 65535. Default: 0 + +"circpad_global_max_padding_pct" -- This is the maximum ratio of +padding relay cells to total relay cells, specified as a percent. If the global +ratio of padding cells to total cells across all circuits exceeds +this percent value, no more padding is sent until the ratio becomes +lower. 0 means no limit. +Min: 0. Max: 100. Default: 0 + +"circpad_padding_disabled" -- If set to 1, no circuit padding machines +will negotiate, and all current padding machines will cease padding +immediately. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0 + +"circpad_padding_reduced" -- If set to 1, only circuit padding +machines marked as "reduced"/"low overhead" will be used. +(Currently no such machines are marked as "reduced overhead"). +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0 + +"nf_conntimeout_clients" + - The number of seconds to keep never-used circuits opened and + available for clients to use. Note that the actual client timeout is + randomized uniformly from this value to twice this value. + - The number of seconds to keep idle (not currently used) canonical + channels are open and available. (We do this to ensure a sufficient + time duration of padding, which is the ultimate goal.) + - This value is also used to determine how long, after a port has been + used, we should attempt to keep building predicted circuits for that + port. (See path-spec.txt section 2.1.1.) This behavior was + originally added to work around implementation limitations, but it + serves as a reasonable default regardless of implementation. + - For all use cases, reduced padding clients use half the consensus + value. + - Implementations MAY mark circuits held open past the reduced padding + quantity (half the consensus value) as "not to be used for streams", + to prevent their use from becoming a distinguisher. +Min: 60. Max: 86400. Default: 1800 + +"nf_conntimeout_relays" -- The number of seconds that idle +relay-to-relay connections are kept open. +Min: 60. Max: 604800. Default: 3600 + +"nf_ito_low" -- The low end of the range to send padding when +inactive, in ms. +Min: 0. Max: 60000. Default: 1500 + +"nf_ito_high" -- The high end of the range to send padding, in ms. +If nf_ito_low == nf_ito_high == 0, padding will be disabled. +Min: nf_ito_low. Max: 60000. Default: 9500 + +"nf_ito_low_reduced" -- For reduced padding clients: the low +end of the range to send padding when inactive, in ms. +Min: 0. Max: 60000. Default: 9000 + +"nf_ito_high_reduced" -- For reduced padding clients: the high +end of the range to send padding, in ms. +Min: nf_ito_low_reduced. Max: 60000. Default: 14000 + +"nf_pad_before_usage" -- If set to 1, OR connections are padded +before the client uses them for any application traffic. If 0, +OR connections are not padded until application data begins. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 1 + +"nf_pad_relays" -- If set to 1, we also pad inactive +relay-to-relay connections. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0 + +"nf_pad_single_onion" -- DOCDOC + +<a id="param-spec.txt-11"></a> + +## Guard-related parameters + +(See guard-spec.txt for more information on the vocabulary used here.) + +"UseGuardFraction" -- If true, clients use `GuardFraction` +information from the consensus in order to decide how to weight +guards when picking them. +Min: 0. Max: 1. Default: 0. +First appeared: 0.2.6 + +"guard-lifetime-days" -- Controls guard lifetime. If an unconfirmed +guard has been sampled more than this many days ago, it should be +removed from the guard sample. +Min: 1. Max: 3650. Default: 120. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-confirmed-min-lifetime-days" -- Controls confirmed guard +lifetime: if a guard was confirmed more than this many days ago, it +should be removed from the guard sample. +Min: 1. Max: 3650. Default: 60. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-internet-likely-down-interval" -- If Tor has been unable to +build a circuit for this long (in seconds), assume that the internet +connection is down, and treat guard failures as unproven. +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 600. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-max-sample-size" -- Largest number of guards that clients +should try to collect in their sample. +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 60. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-max-sample-threshold-percent" -- Largest bandwidth-weighted +fraction of guards that clients should try to collect in their +sample. +Min: 1. Max: 100. Default: 20. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-meaningful-restriction-percent" -- If the client has +configured tor to exclude so many guards that the available guard +bandwidth is less than this percentage of the total, treat the guard +sample as "restricted", and keep it in a separate sample. +Min: 1. Max: 100. Default: 20. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-extreme-restriction-percent" -- Warn the user if they have +configured tor to exclude so many guards that the available guard +bandwidth is less than this percentage of the total. +Min: 1. Max: 100. Default: 1. +First appeared: 0.3.0. MAX was INT32_MAX, which would have no meaningful +effect. MAX lowered to 100 in 0.4.7. + +"guard-min-filtered-sample-size" -- If fewer than this number of +guards is available in the sample after filtering out unusable +guards, the client should try to add more guards to the sample (if +allowed). +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 20. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-n-primary-guards" -- The number of confirmed guards that the +client should treat as "primary guards". +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 3. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +```text + "guard-n-primary-guards-to-use", "guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use" + -- number of primary guards and primary directory guards that the + client should be willing to use in parallel. Other primary guards + won't get used unless the earlier ones are down. + "guard-n-primary-guards-to-use": + Min 1, Max INT32_MAX: Default: 1. + "guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use" + Min 1, Max INT32_MAX: Default: 3. + First appeared: 0.3.0 +``` + +"guard-nonprimary-guard-connect-timeout" -- When trying to confirm +nonprimary guards, if a guard doesn't answer for more than this long +in seconds, treat lower-priority guards as usable. +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 15 +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-nonprimary-guard-idle-timeout" -- When trying to confirm +nonprimary guards, if a guard doesn't answer for more than this long +in seconds, treat it as down. +Min: 1. Max: INT32_MAX. Default: 600 +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +"guard-remove-unlisted-guards-after-days" -- If a guard has been +unlisted in the consensus for at least this many days, remove it +from the sample. +Min: 1. Max: 3650. Default: 20. +First appeared: 0.3.0 + +<a id="param-spec.txt-X"></a> + +## Obsolete parameters {#obsolete} + +"NumDirectoryGuards", "NumEntryGuards" -- Number of guard nodes +clients should use by default. If NumDirectoryGuards is 0, we +default to NumEntryGuards. +NumDirectoryGuards: Min: 0. Max: 10. Default: 0 +NumEntryGuards: Min: 1. Max: 10. Default: 3 +First-appeared: 0.2.4.23, 0.2.5.6-alpha +Removed in: 0.3.0 + +"GuardLifetime" -- Duration for which clients should choose guard +nodes, in seconds. +Min: 30 days. Max: 1826 days. Default: 60 days. +First-appeared: 0.2.4.12-alpha +Removed in: 0.3.0. + +"UseNTorHandshake" -- If true, then versions of Tor that support +NTor will prefer to use it by default. +Min: 0, Max: 1. Default: 1. +First-appeared: 0.2.4.8-alpha +Removed in: 0.2.9. + +"Support022HiddenServices" -- Used to implement a mass switch-over +from sending timestamps to hidden services by default to sending no +timestamps at all. If this option is absent, or is set to 1, +clients with the default configuration send timestamps; otherwise, +they do not. +Min: 0, Max: 1. Default: 1. +First-appeared: 0.2.4.18-rc +Removed in: 0.2.6 |