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So far our attempts at limiting the impact of introduction flooding DoS
attacks on onion services has been focused on horizontal scaling with
- Onionbalance, optimizing the CPU usage of Tor and applying congestion control
- using rate limiting. While these measures move the goalpost forward, a core
- problem with onion service DoS is that building rendezvous circuits is a
- costly procedure both for the service and for the network. For more
- information on the limitations of rate-limiting when defending against DDoS,
- see [REF_TLS_1].
+ Onionbalance, optimizing the CPU usage of Tor and applying rate limiting.
+ While these measures move the goalpost forward, a core problem with onion
+ service DoS is that building rendezvous circuits is a costly procedure both
+ for the service and for the network. For more information on the limitations
+ of rate-limiting when defending against DDoS, see [REF_TLS_1].
If we ever hope to have truly reachable global onion services, we need to
make it harder for attackers to overload the service with introduction