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-rw-r--r--proposals/196-transport-control-ports.txt24
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/proposals/196-transport-control-ports.txt b/proposals/196-transport-control-ports.txt
index 549e8ce..c7f1c3a 100644
--- a/proposals/196-transport-control-ports.txt
+++ b/proposals/196-transport-control-ports.txt
@@ -159,7 +159,27 @@ Target: 0.2.4.x
command it MAY want to shutdown its connections to the transport
proxy.
-5. Security Considerations
+5. Authentication
+
+ To defend against cross-protocol attacks on the Extended ORPOrt,
+ proposal 213 defines an authentication scheme that should be used to
+ protect it.
+
+ If the Extended ORPort is enabled, Tor should regenerate the cookie
+ file of proposal 213 on startup and store it in
+ $DataDirectory/extended_orport_auth_cookie.
+
+ The location of the cookie can be overriden by using the
+ configuration file parameter ExtORPortCookieAuthFile, which is
+ defined as:
+
+ ExtORPortCookieAuthFile <path>
+
+ where <path> is a filesystem path.
+
+ XXX should we also add an ExtORPortCookieFileGroupReadable torrc option?
+
+6. Security Considerations
Extended ORPort or TransportControlPort do _not_ provide link
confidentiality, authentication or integrity. Sensitive data, like
@@ -176,7 +196,7 @@ Target: 0.2.4.x
instructed to connect to a non-localhost Extended ORPort or
TransportControlPort.
-6. Future
+7. Future
In the future, we might have pluggable transports which require the
_client_ transport proxy to use the TransportControlPort and exchange