1 files changed, 198 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/attic/text_formats/glossary.txt b/attic/text_formats/glossary.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68de376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/attic/text_formats/glossary.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+
+                                  Glossary
+
+                               The Tor Project
+
+This document aims to specify terms, notations, and phrases related
+to Tor, as used in the Tor specification documents and other documentation.
+
+This glossary is not a design document; it is only a reference.
+
+This glossary is a work-in-progress; double-check its definitions before
+citing them authoritatively. ;)
+
+Table of Contents
+
+    0. Preliminaries
+    1.0. Commonly used Tor configuration terms
+    2.0. Tor network components
+        2.1. Relays, aka OR (onion router)
+            2.1.1. Specific roles
+        2.2. Client, aka OP (onion proxy)
+        2.3. Authorities
+        2.4. Hidden Service
+        2.5. Circuit
+        2.6. Edge connection
+        2.7. Consensus
+        2.8. Descriptor
+    3.0. Tor network protocols
+        3.1. Link handshake
+        3.2. Circuit handshake
+        3.3. Hidden Service Protocol
+        3.4. Directory Protocol
+    4.0. General network definitions
+
+0. Preliminaries
+
+      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
+      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
+      "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+      RFC 2119.
+
+1.0. Commonly used Tor configuration terms
+
+   ORPort  - Onion Router Port
+   DirPort - Directory Port
+
+2.0. Tor network components
+
+2.1. Relays, aka OR (onion router)
+
+    [Style guide: prefer the term "Relay"]
+
+2.1.1. Specific roles
+
+      Exit relay: The final hop in an exit circuit before traffic leaves
+      the Tor network to connect to external servers.
+
+      Non-exit relay: Relays that send and receive traffic only to
+      other Tor relays and Tor clients.
+
+      Entry relay: The first hop in a Tor circuit. Can be either a guard
+      relay or a bridge, depending on the client's configuration.
+
+      Guard relay: A relay that a client uses as its entry for a longer
+      period of time.  Guard relays are rotated more slowly to prevent
+      attacks that can come from being exposed to too many guards.
+
+      Bridge: A relay intentionally not listed in the public Tor
+      consensus, with the purpose of circumventing entities (such as
+      governments or ISPs) seeking to block clients from using Tor.
+      Currently, bridges are used only as entry relays.
+
+      Directory cache: A relay that downloads cached directory information
+      from the directory authorities and serves it to clients on demand.
+      Any relay will act as a directory cache, if its bandwidth is high enough.
+
+      Rendezvous point: A relay connecting a client to a hidden service.
+      Each party builds a three-hop circuit, meeting at the
+      rendezvous point.
+
+2.2. Client, aka OP (onion proxy)
+
+    [Style: the "OP" and "onion proxy" terms are deprecated.]
+
+2.3. Authorities:
+
+    Directory Authority: Nine total in the Tor network, operated by
+    trusted individuals. Directory authorities define and serve the
+    consensus document, defining the "state of the network." This document
+    contains a "router status" section for every relay currently
+    in the network. Directory authorities also serve router descriptors,
+    extra info documents, microdescriptors, and the microdescriptor consensus.
+
+    Bridge Authority: One total. Similar in responsibility to directory
+    authorities, but for bridges.
+
+    Fallback directory mirror: One of a list of directory caches distributed
+    with the Tor software. (When a client first connects to the network, and
+    has no directory information, it asks a fallback directory. From then on,
+    the client can ask any directory cache that's listed in the directory
+    information it has.)
+
+2.4. Hidden Service:
+
+   A hidden service is a server that will only accept incoming
+   connections via the hidden service protocol. Connection
+   initiators will not be able to learn the IP address of the hidden
+   service, allowing the hidden service to receive incoming connections,
+   serve content, etc, while preserving its location anonymity.
+
+2.5. Circuit:
+
+   An established path through the network, where cryptographic keys
+   are negotiated using the ntor protocol or TAP (Tor Authentication
+   Protocol (deprecated)) with each hop. Circuits can differ in length
+   depending on their purpose. See also Leaky Pipe Topology.
+
+    Origin Circuit -
+
+    Exit Circuit: A circuit which connects clients to destinations
+    outside the Tor network. For example, if a client wanted to visit
+    duckduckgo.com, this connection would require an exit circuit.
+
+    Internal Circuit: A circuit whose traffic never leaves the Tor
+    network. For example, a client could connect to a hidden service via
+    an internal circuit.
+
+2.6. Edge connection:
+
+2.7. Consensus: The state of the Tor network, published every hour,
+     decided by a vote from the network's directory authorities. Clients
+     fetch the consensus from directory authorities, fallback
+     directories, or directory caches.
+
+2.8. Descriptor: Each descriptor represents information about one
+    relay in the Tor network. The descriptor includes the relay's IP
+    address, public keys, and other data. Relays send
+    descriptors to directory authorities, who vote and publish a
+    summary of them in the network consensus.
+
+3.0. Tor network protocols
+
+3.1. Link handshake
+
+      The link handshake establishes the TLS connection over which two
+      Tor participants will send Tor cells.  This handshake also
+      authenticates the participants to each other, possibly using Tor
+      cells.
+
+3.2. Circuit handshake
+
+      Circuit handshakes establish the hop-by-hop onion encryption
+      that clients use to tunnel their application traffic.  The
+      client does a pairwise key establishment handshake with each
+      individual relay in the circuit.  For every hop except the
+      first, these handshakes tunnel through existing hops in the
+      circuit.  Each cell type in this protocol also has a newer
+      version (with a "2" suffix), e.g., CREATE2.
+
+      CREATE cell: First part of a handshake, sent by the initiator.
+
+      CREATED cell: Second part of a handshake, sent by the responder.
+
+      EXTEND cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTEND cell) First part of a
+      handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit.  The last relay
+      in the circuit so far will decrypt this cell and send the
+      payload in a CREATED cell to the chosen next hop relay.
+
+      EXTENDED cell: (also known as a RELAY_EXTENDED cell) Second part
+      of a handshake, tunneled through an existing circuit.  The last
+      relay in the circuit so far receives the CREATED cell from the
+      new last hop relay and encrypts the payload in an EXTENDED cell
+      to tunnel back to the client.
+
+      Onion skin: A CREATE/CREATE2 or EXTEND/EXTEND2 payload that
+      contains the first part of the TAP or ntor key establishment
+      handshake.
+
+3.3. Hidden Service Protocol
+
+3.4. Directory Protocol
+
+
+4.0. General network definitions
+
+   Leaky Pipe Topology: The ability for the origin of a circuit to address
+   relay cells to be addressed to any hop in the path of a circuit. In Tor,
+   the destination hop is determined by using the 'recognized' field of relay
+   cells.
+
+   Stream: A single application-level connection or request, multiplexed over
+   a Tor circuit.  A 'Stream' can currently carry the contents of a TCP
+   connection, a DNS request, or a Tor directory request.
+
+   Channel: A pairwise connection between two Tor relays, or between a
+   client and a relay. Circuits are multiplexed over Channels. All
+   channels are currently implemented as TLS connections.
+