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+
+ TC: A Tor control protocol (Version 0)
+
+-1. Deprecation
+
+THIS PROTOCOL IS DEPRECATED. It is still documented here because Tor
+0.1.1.x happens to support much of it; but the support for v0 is not
+maintained, so you should expect it to rot in unpredictable ways. Support
+for v0 will be removed some time after Tor 0.1.2.
+
+0. Scope
+
+This document describes an implementation-specific protocol that is used
+for other programs (such as frontend user-interfaces) to communicate
+with a locally running Tor process. It is not part of the Tor onion
+routing protocol.
+
+We're trying to be pretty extensible here, but not infinitely
+forward-compatible.
+
+1. Protocol outline
+
+TC is a bidirectional message-based protocol. It assumes an underlying
+stream for communication between a controlling process (the "client") and
+a Tor process (the "server"). The stream may be implemented via TCP,
+TLS-over-TCP, a Unix-domain socket, or so on, but it must provide
+reliable in-order delivery. For security, the stream should not be
+accessible by untrusted parties.
+
+In TC, the client and server send typed variable-length messages to each
+other over the underlying stream. By default, all messages from the server
+are in response to messages from the client. Some client requests, however,
+will cause the server to send messages to the client indefinitely far into
+the future.
+
+Servers respond to messages in the order they're received.
+
+2. Message format
+
+The messages take the following format:
+
+ Length [2 octets; big-endian]
+ Type [2 octets; big-endian]
+ Body [Length octets]
+
+Upon encountering a recognized Type, implementations behave as described in
+section 3 below. If the type is not recognized, servers respond with an
+"ERROR" message (code UNRECOGNIZED; see 3.1 below), and clients simply ignore
+the message.
+
+2.1. Types and encodings
+
+ All numbers are given in big-endian (network) order.
+
+ OR identities are given in hexadecimal, in the same format as identity key
+ fingerprints, but without spaces; see tor-spec.txt for more information.
+
+3. Message types
+
+ Message types are drawn from the following ranges:
+
+ 0x0000-0xEFFF : Reserved for use by official versions of this spec.
+ 0xF000-0xFFFF : Unallocated; usable by unofficial extensions.
+
+3.1. ERROR (Type 0x0000)
+
+ Sent in response to a message that could not be processed as requested.
+
+ The body of the message begins with a 2-byte error code. The following
+ values are defined:
+
+ 0x0000 Unspecified error
+ []
+
+ 0x0001 Internal error
+ [Something went wrong inside Tor, so that the client's
+ request couldn't be fulfilled.]
+
+ 0x0002 Unrecognized message type
+ [The client sent a message type we don't understand.]
+
+ 0x0003 Syntax error
+ [The client sent a message body in a format we can't parse.]
+
+ 0x0004 Unrecognized configuration key
+ [The client tried to get or set a configuration option we don't
+ recognize.]
+
+ 0x0005 Invalid configuration value
+ [The client tried to set a configuration option to an
+ incorrect, ill-formed, or impossible value.]
+
+ 0x0006 Unrecognized byte code
+ [The client tried to set a byte code (in the body) that
+ we don't recognize.]
+
+ 0x0007 Unauthorized.
+ [The client tried to send a command that requires
+ authorization, but it hasn't sent a valid AUTHENTICATE
+ message.]
+
+ 0x0008 Failed authentication attempt
+ [The client sent a well-formed authorization message.]
+
+ 0x0009 Resource exhausted
+ [The server didn't have enough of a given resource to
+ fulfill a given request.]
+
+ 0x000A No such stream
+
+ 0x000B No such circuit
+
+ 0x000C No such OR
+
+ The rest of the body should be a human-readable description of the error.
+
+ In general, new error codes should only be added when they don't fall under
+ one of the existing error codes.
+
+3.2. DONE (Type 0x0001)
+
+ Sent from server to client in response to a request that was successfully
+ completed, with no more information needed. The body is usually empty but
+ may contain a message.
+
+3.3. SETCONF (Type 0x0002)
+
+ Change the value of a configuration variable. The body contains a list of
+ newline-terminated key-value configuration lines. An individual key-value
+ configuration line consists of the key, followed by a space, followed by
+ the value. The server behaves as though it had just read the key-value pair
+ in its configuration file.
+
+ The server responds with a DONE message on success, or an ERROR message on
+ failure.
+
+ When a configuration options takes multiple values, or when multiple
+ configuration keys form a context-sensitive group (see below), then
+ setting _any_ of the options in a SETCONF command is taken to reset all of
+ the others. For example, if two ORBindAddress values are configured,
+ and a SETCONF command arrives containing a single ORBindAddress value, the
+ new command's value replaces the two old values.
+
+ To _remove_ all settings for a given option entirely (and go back to its
+ default value), send a single line containing the key and no value.
+
+3.4. GETCONF (Type 0x0003)
+
+ Request the value of a configuration variable. The body contains one or
+ more NL-terminated strings for configuration keys. The server replies
+ with a CONFVALUE message.
+
+ If an option appears multiple times in the configuration, all of its
+ key-value pairs are returned in order.
+
+ Some options are context-sensitive, and depend on other options with
+ different keywords. These cannot be fetched directly. Currently there
+ is only one such option: clients should use the "HiddenServiceOptions"
+ virtual keyword to get all HiddenServiceDir, HiddenServicePort,
+ HiddenServiceNodes, and HiddenServiceExcludeNodes option settings.
+
+3.5. CONFVALUE (Type 0x0004)
+
+ Sent in response to a GETCONF message; contains a list of "Key Value\n"
+ (A non-whitespace keyword, a single space, a non-NL value, a NL)
+ strings.
+
+3.6. SETEVENTS (Type 0x0005)
+
+ Request the server to inform the client about interesting events.
+ The body contains a list of 2-byte event codes (see "event" below).
+ Any events *not* listed in the SETEVENTS body are turned off; thus, sending
+ SETEVENTS with an empty body turns off all event reporting.
+
+ The server responds with a DONE message on success, and an ERROR message
+ if one of the event codes isn't recognized. (On error, the list of active
+ event codes isn't changed.)
+
+3.7. EVENT (Type 0x0006)
+
+ Sent from the server to the client when an event has occurred and the
+ client has requested that kind of event. The body contains a 2-byte
+ event code followed by additional event-dependent information. Event
+ codes are:
+ 0x0001 -- Circuit status changed
+
+ Status [1 octet]
+ 0x00 Launched - circuit ID assigned to new circuit
+ 0x01 Built - all hops finished, can now accept streams
+ 0x02 Extended - one more hop has been completed
+ 0x03 Failed - circuit closed (was not built)
+ 0x04 Closed - circuit closed (was built)
+ Circuit ID [4 octets]
+ (Must be unique to Tor process/time)
+ Path [NUL-terminated comma-separated string]
+ (For extended/failed, is the portion of the path that is
+ built)
+
+ 0x0002 -- Stream status changed
+
+ Status [1 octet]
+ (Sent connect=0,sent resolve=1,succeeded=2,failed=3,
+ closed=4, new connection=5, new resolve request=6,
+ stream detached from circuit and still retriable=7)
+ Stream ID [4 octets]
+ (Must be unique to Tor process/time)
+ Target (NUL-terminated address-port string]
+
+ 0x0003 -- OR Connection status changed
+
+ Status [1 octet]
+ (Launched=0,connected=1,failed=2,closed=3)
+ OR nickname/identity [NUL-terminated]
+
+ 0x0004 -- Bandwidth used in the last second
+
+ Bytes read [4 octets]
+ Bytes written [4 octets]
+
+ 0x0005 -- Notice/warning/error occurred
+
+ Message [NUL-terminated]
+
+ <obsolete: use 0x0007-0x000B instead.>
+
+ 0x0006 -- New descriptors available
+
+ OR List [NUL-terminated, comma-delimited list of
+ OR identity]
+
+ 0x0007 -- Debug message occurred
+ 0x0008 -- Info message occurred
+ 0x0009 -- Notice message occurred
+ 0x000A -- Warning message occurred
+ 0x000B -- Error message occurred
+
+ Message [NUL-terminated]
+
+3.8. AUTHENTICATE (Type 0x0007)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. Contains a 'magic cookie' to prove
+ that client is really allowed to control this Tor process. The server
+ responds with DONE or ERROR.
+
+ The format of the 'cookie' is implementation-dependent; see 4.1 below for
+ information on how the standard Tor implementation handles it.
+
+3.9. SAVECONF (Type 0x0008)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. Instructs the server to write out
+ its config options into its torrc. Server returns DONE if successful, or
+ ERROR if it can't write the file or some other error occurs.
+
+3.10. SIGNAL (Type 0x0009)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The body contains one byte that
+ indicates the action the client wishes the server to take.
+
+ 1 (0x01) -- Reload: reload config items, refetch directory.
+ 2 (0x02) -- Controlled shutdown: if server is an OP, exit immediately.
+ If it's an OR, close listeners and exit after 30 seconds.
+ 10 (0x0A) -- Dump stats: log information about open connections and
+ circuits.
+ 12 (0x0C) -- Debug: switch all open logs to loglevel debug.
+ 15 (0x0F) -- Immediate shutdown: clean up and exit now.
+
+ The server responds with DONE if the signal is recognized (or simply
+ closes the socket if it was asked to close immediately), else ERROR.
+
+3.11. MAPADDRESS (Type 0x000A)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The body contains a sequence of
+ address mappings, each consisting of the address to be mapped, a single
+ space, the replacement address, and a NL character.
+
+ Addresses may be IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses, or hostnames.
+
+ The client sends this message to the server in order to tell it that future
+ SOCKS requests for connections to the original address should be replaced
+ with connections to the specified replacement address. If the addresses
+ are well-formed, and the server is able to fulfill the request, the server
+ replies with a single DONE message containing the source and destination
+ addresses. If request is malformed, the server replies with a syntax error
+ message. The server can't fulfill the request, it replies with an internal
+ ERROR message.
+
+ The client may decline to provide a body for the original address, and
+ instead send a special null address ("0.0.0.0" for IPv4, "::0" for IPv6, or
+ "." for hostname), signifying that the server should choose the original
+ address itself, and return that address in the DONE message. The server
+ should ensure that it returns an element of address space that is unlikely
+ to be in actual use. If there is already an address mapped to the
+ destination address, the server may reuse that mapping.
+
+ If the original address is already mapped to a different address, the old
+ mapping is removed. If the original address and the destination address
+ are the same, the server removes any mapping in place for the original
+ address.
+
+ {Note: This feature is designed to be used to help Tor-ify applications
+ that need to use SOCKS4 or hostname-less SOCKS5. There are three
+ approaches to doing this:
+ 1. Somehow make them use SOCKS4a or SOCKS5-with-hostnames instead.
+ 2. Use tor-resolve (or another interface to Tor's resolve-over-SOCKS
+ feature) to resolve the hostname remotely. This doesn't work
+ with special addresses like x.onion or x.y.exit.
+ 3. Use MAPADDRESS to map an IP address to the desired hostname, and then
+ arrange to fool the application into thinking that the hostname
+ has resolved to that IP.
+ This functionality is designed to help implement the 3rd approach.}
+
+ [XXXX When, if ever, can mappings expire? Should they expire?]
+ [XXXX What addresses, if any, are safe to use?]
+
+3.12 GETINFO (Type 0x000B)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body is as for GETCONF:
+ one or more NL-terminated strings. The server replies with an INFOVALUE
+ message.
+
+ Unlike GETCONF, this message is used for data that are not stored in the
+ Tor configuration file, but instead.
+
+ Recognized key and their values include:
+
+ "version" -- The version of the server's software, including the name
+ of the software. (example: "Tor 0.0.9.4")
+
+ "desc/id/<OR identity>" or "desc/name/<OR nickname>" -- the latest server
+ descriptor for a given OR, NUL-terminated. If no such OR is known, the
+ corresponding value is an empty string.
+
+ "network-status" -- a space-separated list of all known OR identities.
+ This is in the same format as the router-status line in directories;
+ see tor-spec.txt for details.
+
+ "addr-mappings/all"
+ "addr-mappings/config"
+ "addr-mappings/cache"
+ "addr-mappings/control" -- a NL-terminated list of address mappings, each
+ in the form of "from-address" SP "to-address". The 'config' key
+ returns those address mappings set in the configuration; the 'cache'
+ key returns the mappings in the client-side DNS cache; the 'control'
+ key returns the mappings set via the control interface; the 'all'
+ target returns the mappings set through any mechanism.
+
+3.13 INFOVALUE (Type 0x000C)
+
+ Sent from the server to the client in response to a GETINFO message.
+ Contains one or more items of the format:
+
+ Key [(NUL-terminated string)]
+ Value [(NUL-terminated string)]
+
+ The keys match those given in the GETINFO message.
+
+3.14 EXTENDCIRCUIT (Type 0x000D)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body contains two fields:
+ Circuit ID [4 octets]
+ Path [NUL-terminated, comma-delimited string of OR nickname/identity]
+
+ This request takes one of two forms: either the Circuit ID is zero, in
+ which case it is a request for the server to build a new circuit according
+ to the specified path, or the Circuit ID is nonzero, in which case it is a
+ request for the server to extend an existing circuit with that ID according
+ to the specified path.
+
+ If the request is successful, the server sends a DONE message containing
+ a message body consisting of the four-octet Circuit ID of the newly created
+ circuit.
+
+3.15 ATTACHSTREAM (Type 0x000E)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body contains two fields:
+ Stream ID [4 octets]
+ Circuit ID [4 octets]
+
+ This message informs the server that the specified stream should be
+ associated with the specified circuit. Each stream may be associated with
+ at most one circuit, and multiple streams may share the same circuit.
+ Streams can only be attached to completed circuits (that is, circuits that
+ have sent a circuit status 'built' event).
+
+ If the circuit ID is 0, responsibility for attaching the given stream is
+ returned to Tor.
+
+ {Implementation note: By default, Tor automatically attaches streams to
+ circuits itself, unless the configuration variable
+ "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is set to "1". Attempting to attach streams
+ via TC when "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is false may cause a race between
+ Tor and the controller, as both attempt to attach streams to circuits.}
+
+3.16 POSTDESCRIPTOR (Type 0x000F)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body contains one field:
+ Descriptor [NUL-terminated string]
+
+ This message informs the server about a new descriptor.
+
+ The descriptor, when parsed, must contain a number of well-specified
+ fields, including fields for its nickname and identity.
+
+ If there is an error in parsing the descriptor, the server must send an
+ appropriate error message. If the descriptor is well-formed but the server
+ chooses not to add it, it must reply with a DONE message whose body
+ explains why the server was not added.
+
+3.17 FRAGMENTHEADER (Type 0x0010)
+
+ Sent in either direction. Used to encapsulate messages longer than 65535
+ bytes in length.
+
+ Underlying type [2 bytes]
+ Total Length [4 bytes]
+ Data [Rest of message]
+
+ A FRAGMENTHEADER message MUST be followed immediately by a number of
+ FRAGMENT messages, such that lengths of the "Data" fields of the
+ FRAGMENTHEADER and FRAGMENT messages add to the "Total Length" field of the
+ FRAGMENTHEADER message.
+
+ Implementations MUST NOT fragment messages of length less than 65536 bytes.
+ Implementations MUST be able to process fragmented messages that not
+ optimally packed.
+
+3.18 FRAGMENT (Type 0x0011)
+
+ Data [Entire message]
+
+ See FRAGMENTHEADER for more information
+
+3.19 REDIRECTSTREAM (Type 0x0012)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body contains two fields:
+ Stream ID [4 octets]
+ Address [variable-length, NUL-terminated.]
+
+ Tells the server to change the exit address on the specified stream. No
+ remapping is performed on the new provided address.
+
+ To be sure that the modified address will be used, this event must be sent
+ after a new stream event is received, and before attaching this stream to
+ a circuit.
+
+3.20 CLOSESTREAM (Type 0x0013)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body contains three
+ fields:
+ Stream ID [4 octets]
+ Reason [1 octet]
+ Flags [1 octet]
+
+ Tells the server to close the specified stream. The reason should be
+ one of the Tor RELAY_END reasons given in tor-spec.txt. Flags is not
+ used currently. Tor may hold the stream open for a while to flush
+ any data that is pending.
+
+3.21 CLOSECIRCUIT (Type 0x0014)
+
+ Sent from the client to the server. The message body contains two
+ fields:
+ Circuit ID [4 octets]
+ Flags [1 octet]
+
+ Tells the server to close the specified circuit. If the LSB of the flags
+ field is nonzero, do not close the circuit unless it is unused.
+
+4. Implementation notes
+
+4.1. Authentication
+
+ By default, the current Tor implementation trusts all local users.
+
+ If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic cookie"
+ file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory. To authenticate,
+ the controller must send the contents of this file.
+
+ If the 'HashedControlPassword' option is set, it must contain the salted
+ hash of a secret password. The salted hash is computed according to the
+ S2K algorithm in RFC 2440 (OpenPGP), and prefixed with the s2k specifier.
+ This is then encoded in hexadecimal, prefixed by the indicator sequence
+ "16:". Thus, for example, the password 'foo' could encode to:
+ 16:660537E3E1CD49996044A3BF558097A981F539FEA2F9DA662B4626C1C2
+ ++++++++++++++++**^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+ salt hashed value
+ indicator
+ You can generate the salt of a password by calling
+ 'tor --hash-password <password>'
+ or by using the example code in the Python and Java controller libraries.
+ To authenticate under this scheme, the controller sends Tor the original
+ secret that was used to generate the password.
+
+4.2. Don't let the buffer get too big.
+
+ If you ask for lots of events, and 16MB of them queue up on the buffer,
+ the Tor process will close the socket.
+