diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | rend-spec-v3.txt | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tor-spec.txt | 6 |
2 files changed, 27 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/rend-spec-v3.txt b/rend-spec-v3.txt index 3f76824..4a12343 100644 --- a/rend-spec-v3.txt +++ b/rend-spec-v3.txt @@ -238,9 +238,10 @@ Table of contents: LSPEC (Link specifier) [LSLEN bytes] Link specifier types are as described in tor-spec.txt. Every set of - link specifiers MUST include at minimum specifiers of type [00] + link specifiers SHOULD include at minimum specifiers of type [00] (TLS-over-TCP, IPv4), [02] (legacy node identity) and [03] (ed25519 - identity key). + identity key). Sets of link specifiers without these three types + SHOULD be rejected. As of 0.4.1.1-alpha, Tor includes both IPv4 and IPv6 link specifiers in v3 onion service protocol link specifier lists. All available @@ -1380,7 +1381,7 @@ Table of contents: point section] The link-specifiers is a base64 encoding of a link specifier - block in the format described in BUILDING-BLOCKS. + block in the format described in [BUILDING-BLOCKS] above. As of 0.4.1.1-alpha, services include both IPv4 and IPv6 link specifiers in descriptors. All available addresses SHOULD be @@ -1392,11 +1393,20 @@ Table of contents: recognize; instead, it should use them verbatim in its EXTEND request to the introduction point. - The client MAY perform basic validity checks on the link - specifiers in the descriptor. These checks SHOULD NOT leak + The client SHOULD perform the basic validity checks on the link + specifiers in the descriptor, described in `tor-spec.txt` + section 5.1.2. These checks SHOULD NOT leak detailed information about the client's version, configuration, or consensus. (See 3.3 for service link specifier handling.) + When connecting to the introduction point, the client SHOULD send + this list of link specifiers verbatim, in the same order as given + here. + + The client MAY reject the list of link specifiers if it is + inconsistent with relay information from the directory, but SHOULD + NOT modify it. + "onion-key" SP "ntor" SP key NL [Exactly once per introduction point] @@ -1903,8 +1913,15 @@ Table of contents: The hidden service should handle invalid or unrecognised link specifiers the same way as clients do in section 2.5.2.2. In particular, services - MAY perform basic validity checks on link specifiers, and SHOULD NOT + SHOULD perform basic validity checks on link specifiers, and SHOULD NOT reject unrecognised link specifiers, to avoid information leaks. + The list of link specifiers received here SHOULD either be rejected, or + sent verbatim when extending to the rendezvous point, in the same order + received. + + The service MAY reject the list of link specifiers if it is + inconsistent with relay information from the directory, but SHOULD + NOT modify it. The ONION_KEY_TYPE field is: diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index 34a3b44..8f30624 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -1128,7 +1128,9 @@ see tor-design.pdf. be listed. Nodes MUST ignore unrecognized specifiers, and MUST accept multiple - instances of specifiers other than 'legacy identity'. + instances of specifiers other than 'legacy identity' and + 'Ed25519 identity'. (Nodes SHOULD reject link specifier lists + that include multiple instances of either one of those specifiers.) For purposes of indistinguishability, implementations SHOULD send these link specifiers, if using them, in this order: [00], [02], [03], @@ -1154,7 +1156,7 @@ see tor-design.pdf. target OR did not prove its ownership of any such identity key. If only one identity key is provided, but the extending OR knows the other (from directory information), then the OR SHOULD also - enforce that key. + enforce the key in the directory. If an extending OR has a channel with a given Ed25519 ID and RSA identity, and receives a request for that Ed25519 ID and a |