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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2023-10-14 17:18:16 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2023-10-14 17:18:16 -0400
commit334ddfe3d057ea71055e7416187b2d3f41313bef (patch)
tree74419d88a74b3dc879626af17288b155c8ffd9c2 /spec/guard-spec
parent3c829ac5b86c02ec025c5970b4a1045937da2189 (diff)
downloadtorspec-334ddfe3d057ea71055e7416187b2d3f41313bef.tar.gz
torspec-334ddfe3d057ea71055e7416187b2d3f41313bef.zip
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-<a id="guard-spec.txt-1"></a>
-
-# Introduction and motivation
-
-Tor uses entry guards to prevent an attacker who controls some
-fraction of the network from observing a fraction of every user's
-traffic. If users chose their entries and exits uniformly at
-random from the list of servers every time they build a circuit,
-then an adversary who had (k/N) of the network would deanonymize
-F=(k/N)^2 of all circuits... and after a given user had built C
-circuits, the attacker would see them at least once with
-probability 1-(1-F)^C. With large C, the attacker would get a
-sample of every user's traffic with probability 1.
-
-To prevent this from happening, Tor clients choose a small number
-of guard nodes (e.g. 3). These guard nodes are the only
-nodes that the client will connect to directly. If they are not
-compromised, the user's paths are not compromised.
-
-This specification outlines Tor's guard housekeeping algorithm,
-which tries to meet the following goals:
-
-```text
- - Heuristics and algorithms for determining how and which guards
- are chosen should be kept as simple and easy to understand as
- possible.
-
- - Clients in censored regions or who are behind a fascist
- firewall who connect to the Tor network should not experience
- any significant disadvantage in terms of reachability or
- usability.
-
- - Tor should make a best attempt at discovering the most
- appropriate behavior, with as little user input and
- configuration as possible.
-
- - Tor clients should discover usable guards without too much
- delay.
-
- - Tor clients should resist (to the extent possible) attacks
- that try to force them onto compromised guards.
-
- - Should maintain the load-balancing offered by the path selection
- algorithm
-```