convert text blocks into widely compatible "blockquote" syntax

This only adds newline characters to make the existing text blocks act like
"blockquote" or "code block" syntax in Markdown, asciidoc, and others.
This was accomplished by manually reviewing the output of this script:

```bash
for f in *.txt; do
  cat $f | python -c "import sys,re;print(re.sub(r'(\n {0,3}[^ \n][^\n]*\n)( {4,}[^\n]*)', r'\1\n\2', sys.stdin.read()))" > ${f}.tmp
  mv ${f}.tmp $f
done
```

1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/rend-spec-v3.txt b/rend-spec-v3.txt
index 169de74..ccd5992 100644
--- a/rend-spec-v3.txt
+++ b/rend-spec-v3.txt
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ Table of contents:
 0.6. Acknowledgments
 
    This design includes ideas from many people, including
+
      Christopher Baines,
      Daniel J. Bernstein,
      Matthew Finkel,
@@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ Table of contents:
    It's based on Tor's original hidden service design by Roger
    Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson, and on improvements to
    that design over the years by people including
+
      Tobias Kamm,
      Thomas Lauterbach,
      Karsten Loesing,
@@ -344,20 +346,24 @@ Table of contents:
 
    We wouldn't be able to do any of this work without good attack
    designs from researchers including
+
      Alex Biryukov,
      Lasse Øverlier,
      Ivan Pustogarov,
      Paul Syverson
      Ralf-Philipp Weinmann,
+
    See [ATTACK-REFS] for their papers.
 
    Several of these ideas have come from conversations with
+
       Christian Grothoff,
       Brian Warner,
       Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn,
 
    And if this document makes any sense at all, it's thanks to
    editing help from
+
       Matthew Finkel
       George Kadianakis,
       Peter Palfrader,
@@ -1488,6 +1494,7 @@ Table of contents:
 
    Single Onion Services attempt to build a non-anonymous single-hop circuit,
    but use an anonymous 3-hop circuit if:
+
      * the intro point is on an address that is configured as unreachable via
        a direct connection, or
      * the initial attempt to connect to the intro point over a single-hop
@@ -1737,6 +1744,7 @@ Table of contents:
        EXT_FIELD      [EXT_FIELD_LEN bytes]
 
    Recognized status values are:
+
      [00 00] -- Success: cell relayed to hidden service host.
      [00 01] -- Failure: service ID not recognized
      [00 02] -- Bad message format
@@ -1864,8 +1872,11 @@ Table of contents:
    To make an INTRODUCE1 cell, the client must know a public encryption
    key B for the hidden service on this introduction circuit. The client
    generates a single-use keypair:
+
              x,X = KEYGEN()
+
    and computes:
+
              intro_secret_hs_input = EXP(B,x) | AUTH_KEY | X | B | PROTOID
              info = m_hsexpand | subcredential
              hs_keys = KDF(intro_secret_hs_input | t_hsenc | info, S_KEY_LEN+MAC_LEN)
@@ -1938,6 +1949,7 @@ Table of contents:
       (The above are used to finish the ntor handshake.)
 
    The server's handshake reply is:
+
        SERVER_PK   Y                         [PK_PUBKEY_LEN bytes]
        AUTH        AUTH_INPUT_MAC            [MAC_LEN bytes]
 
@@ -1996,6 +2008,7 @@ Table of contents:
 
    Single Onion Services attempt to build a non-anonymous single-hop circuit,
    but use an anonymous 3-hop circuit if:
+
      * the rend point is on an address that is configured as unreachable via
        a direct connection, or
      * the initial attempt to connect to the rend point over a single-hop
@@ -2257,6 +2270,7 @@ A.2. Tor's key derivation scheme
   clear writeup.)
 
   Let B be the ed25519 basepoint as found in section 5 of [ED25519-B-REF]:
+
       B = (15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202,
            46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960)