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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2015-02-03 13:50:33 -0500
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2015-02-03 13:50:33 -0500
commitf547a82f219eabf5bcfbc965a29e1c5a1b52683a (patch)
tree5b4ec6019159fc74e34d3f4278a596395011cb5a /proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
parentfb7c47262f60f1c75108512305e37c89b0418fa1 (diff)
downloadtorspec-f547a82f219eabf5bcfbc965a29e1c5a1b52683a.tar.gz
torspec-f547a82f219eabf5bcfbc965a29e1c5a1b52683a.zip
three typo fixes
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diff --git a/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt b/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
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--- a/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
+++ b/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Status: Draft
In the presence of these attacks, we can't continue to connect to
the Tor network unconditionally. Doing so would eventually result
- in the user chosing a hostile node as their guard, and losing
+ in the user choosing a hostile node as their guard, and losing
anonymity.