prop224: Fix tabs issue

Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>

1 files changed, 51 insertions, 51 deletions

diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
index 4a685e5..6f71b32 100644
--- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
+++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
@@ -2137,80 +2137,80 @@ Appendix E. Managing authorized client data [CLIENT-AUTH-MGMT]
 
   E.1.1. Hidden Service side
 
-	  A hidden service that wants to perform client authorization, adds a new
-	  option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient to its torrc file:
+     A hidden service that wants to perform client authorization, adds a new
+     option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient to its torrc file:
 
-	     HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,...
+        HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,...
 
-	  The only recognized auth-type value is "basic" which describes the scheme in
-	  section [CLIENT-AUTH]. The rest of the line is a comma-separated list of
-	  human-readable authorized client names.
+     The only recognized auth-type value is "basic" which describes the scheme in
+     section [CLIENT-AUTH]. The rest of the line is a comma-separated list of
+     human-readable authorized client names.
 
-	  Let's consider that one of the listed client names is "alice". In this
-	  case, Tor checks the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file for any entries
-	  with client_name being "alice". If an "alice" entry is found, we use the
-	  relevant pubkeys to authenticate Alice.
+     Let's consider that one of the listed client names is "alice". In this
+     case, Tor checks the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file for any entries
+     with client_name being "alice". If an "alice" entry is found, we use the
+     relevant pubkeys to authenticate Alice.
 
-	  If no "alice" entry is found in the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file, Tor
-	  is tasked with generating public/private keys for Alice. To do so, Tor
-	  generates x25519 and ed25519 keypairs for Alice, then makes a
-	  "client_authorized_privkeys/alice.privkey" file and writes the private
-	  keys inside; it also adds an entry for alice to the
-	  "client_authorized_pubkeys" file.
+     If no "alice" entry is found in the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file, Tor
+     is tasked with generating public/private keys for Alice. To do so, Tor
+     generates x25519 and ed25519 keypairs for Alice, then makes a
+     "client_authorized_privkeys/alice.privkey" file and writes the private
+     keys inside; it also adds an entry for alice to the
+     "client_authorized_pubkeys" file.
 
-	  In this last case, the hidden service operator has the responsibility to
-	  pass the .key file to Alice in a secure out-of-band way. After the file
-	  is passed to Alice, it can be shredded from the filesystem, as only the
-	  public keys are required for the hidden service to function.
+     In this last case, the hidden service operator has the responsibility to
+     pass the .key file to Alice in a secure out-of-band way. After the file
+     is passed to Alice, it can be shredded from the filesystem, as only the
+     public keys are required for the hidden service to function.
 
   E.1.2. Client side
 
-	  A client who wants to register client authorization data for a hidden service
-	  needs to add the following line to their torrc:
+     A client who wants to register client authorization data for a hidden service
+     needs to add the following line to their torrc:
 
-	        HidServAuth onion-address x25519-private-key ed25519-private-key
+           HidServAuth onion-address x25519-private-key ed25519-private-key
 
-	  The keys above are either generated by Alice using a key generation utility,
-	  or they are extracted from a .key file provided by the hidden service.
+     The keys above are either generated by Alice using a key generation utility,
+     or they are extracted from a .key file provided by the hidden service.
 
-	  In the former case, the client is also tasked with transfering the public
-	  keys to the hidden service in a secure out-of-band way.
+     In the former case, the client is also tasked with transfering the public
+     keys to the hidden service in a secure out-of-band way.
 
   E.2. Configuring client authorization using the control port
 
   E.2.1. Service side
 
-	  A hidden service also has the option to configure authorized clients
-	  using the control port. The idea is that hidden service operators can use
-	  controller utilities that manage their access control instead of using
-	  the filesystem to register client keys.
+     A hidden service also has the option to configure authorized clients
+     using the control port. The idea is that hidden service operators can use
+     controller utilities that manage their access control instead of using
+     the filesystem to register client keys.
 
-	  Specifically, we require a new control port command ADD_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH
-	  which is able to register x25519/ed25519 public keys tied to a specific
-	  authorized client.
+     Specifically, we require a new control port command ADD_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH
+     which is able to register x25519/ed25519 public keys tied to a specific
+     authorized client.
       [XXX figure out control port command format]
 
-	  Hidden services who use the control port interface for client auth need
-	  to perform their own key management.
+     Hidden services who use the control port interface for client auth need
+     to perform their own key management.
 
   E.2.2. Client side
 
-	  There should also be a control port interface for clients to register
-	  authorization data for hidden services without having to use the
-	  torrc. It should allow both generation of client authorization private
-	  keys, and also to import client authorization data provided by a hidden
-	  service
+     There should also be a control port interface for clients to register
+     authorization data for hidden services without having to use the
+     torrc. It should allow both generation of client authorization private
+     keys, and also to import client authorization data provided by a hidden
+     service
 
-	  This way, Tor Browser can present "Generate client auth keys" and "Import
-	  client auth keys" dialogs to users when they try to visit a hidden service
-	  that is protected by client authorization.
+     This way, Tor Browser can present "Generate client auth keys" and "Import
+     client auth keys" dialogs to users when they try to visit a hidden service
+     that is protected by client authorization.
 
-	  Specifically, we require two new control port commands:
-	                IMPORT_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA
-	                GENERATE_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA
-	  which import and generate client authorization data respectively.
+     Specifically, we require two new control port commands:
+                   IMPORT_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA
+                   GENERATE_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA
+     which import and generate client authorization data respectively.
 
-	  [XXX how does key management work here?]
-	  [XXX what happens when people use both the control port interface and the
-	       filesystem interface?]
+     [XXX how does key management work here?]
+     [XXX what happens when people use both the control port interface and the
+          filesystem interface?]