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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-09-19 10:32:58 -0400 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-09-19 10:32:58 -0400 |
commit | 410335394dd7f1682fe25ff8a3343653fcd0bb98 (patch) | |
tree | 68c14420daa30b2ab21c18a406431a53e60a8029 /proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | |
parent | 4be7ff5ce84183604b717cad75d1157393e4e747 (diff) | |
download | torspec-410335394dd7f1682fe25ff8a3343653fcd0bb98.tar.gz torspec-410335394dd7f1682fe25ff8a3343653fcd0bb98.zip |
make validation MUST; clarify behavior on failure.
Diffstat (limited to 'proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 7 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt index 9c8b77e..73f8936 100644 --- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt +++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt @@ -974,9 +974,10 @@ Table of contents: 2.2.7. Client-side validation of onion addresses - When a Tor client receives a prop224 onion address from the user, it should - validate the onion address before attempting to connect or fetch its - descriptor. + When a Tor client receives a prop224 onion address from the user, it + MUST first validate the onion address before attempting to connect or + fetch its descriptor. If the validation fails, the client MUST + refuse to connect. As part of the address validation, Tor clients should check that the underlying ed25519 key does not have a torsion component. If Tor accepted |