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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2010-11-27 15:59:08 -0500 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2010-11-27 15:59:08 -0500 |
commit | 38c4046759b2094139eef9c65379279fc608ff93 (patch) | |
tree | 0992ab68eca66bc52542adb2c583a81d0f00c7f3 /proposals/171-separate-streams.txt | |
parent | 82b97119c2184abac554b46f311abd76cced7c25 (diff) | |
download | torspec-38c4046759b2094139eef9c65379279fc608ff93.tar.gz torspec-38c4046759b2094139eef9c65379279fc608ff93.zip |
Rename proposal 171 file
Diffstat (limited to 'proposals/171-separate-streams.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | proposals/171-separate-streams.txt | 99 |
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt b/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d71a5c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +Filename: 171-separate-streams-by-port-or-host.txt +Title: Separate streams across circuits by destination port or destination host +Author: Robert Hogan, Jacob Appelbaum, Damon McCoy +Created: 21-Oct-2008 +Modified: 30-Aug-2010 +Status: Draft + +Motivation: + +Streams are currently attached to circuits without regard to their content, +destination host, or destination port. We propose three options, +IsolateBySOCKSUser, IsolateStreamsByPort and IsolateStreamsByHost to change the +default behavior. + +The contents of some streams will always have revealing plain text information; +these streams should be treated differently than other streams that may or may +not have unencrypted PII content. DNS, with the exception of DNSCurve, is +always unencrypted. It is reasonable to assume that other protocols may exist +that have a similar issue and may cause user concern. It is also the case that +we must balance network load issues and stream privacy. The Tor network will not +currently scale to one circuit per application connection nor should it anytime +soon. + +Circuits are currently created with a few constraints and are rotated within +a reasonable time window. This allows a rogue exit node to correlate all +streams on a given circuit. + +Design: + +We propose two options for isolation of streams that lessen the observability +and linkability of the Tor client's traffic. + +IsolateStreamsByPort will take a list of ports or optionally the keyword 'All' +in place of a port list. The use of the keyword 'All' will ensure that all +application connections attached to streams will be isolated to separate +circuits by port number. + +IsolateStreamsByHost will take a boolean value. When enabled, all application +connections, regardless of port number will be isolated with separate circuits +per host. If this option is enabled, we should ensure that the client has a +reasonable number of pre-built circuits to ensure perceived performance. This +should also intentionally limit the total number of circuits a client will +build to ten circuits to prevent abuse and load on the network. This is a +trade-off of performance for anonymity. Tor will issue a warning if a client +encounters this limit. + +IsolateBySOCKSUser will take a boolean value. When enabled, all application +connections, regardless of port number will be isolated with separate circuits +per SOCKS username. This options ensures that any two streams that were created +with different SOCKS usernames will be sent over different circuits. The empty +username will be treated as its own username different from all other usernames. + +Security implications: + +It is believed that the proposed changes will improve the anonymity for end +user stream privacy. The end user will no longer link all streams at a single +exit node during a given time window. + +There is a possible attack where a hostile web page possibly in collusion with +an exit node contains image links for images at (say) "evil.example.com:53" and +"evil.example.com:31337", and thereby (if they're lucky) correlate port-80 +circuits with port-53 and port-31337 circuits. + +Specification: + +The Tor client circuit selection process is not entirely specified. Any client +circuit specification must take these changes into account. + +Compatibility: + +The proposed changes should not create any compatibility issues. New Tor clients +will be able to take advantage of this without any modification to the network. + +Implementation: + +It is further proposed that IsolateStreamsByPort will be enabled by default +for port 22, 53, and port 80. + +It is further proposed that IsolateStreamsByHost will be disabled by default. + +Implementation notes: + +The implementation of this option may want to consider cases where the same +exit node is shared by two or more circuits and IsolateStreamsByPort is in +force. Since the purpose of the option is to reduce the opportunity of Exit +Nodes to attack traffic from the same source on multiple ports, the +implementation may need to ensure that circuits reserved for the exclusive use +of given ports do not share the same exit node. + +Circuits should not be shared by unique clients. Tor should check to ensure +that peer IP addresses are identical when they connect to the SOCKS listener or +the TransPort listener before sharing a circuit. If the addresses are not +identical, Tor should ensure that the circuits are not shared. + +Performance and scalability notes: + +It is further proposed that IsolateStreamsByPort will be enabled by default for +all ports after a reasonable assessment is performed. Specifically, we should +determine the impact this option has on Tor clients and the Tor network. |