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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2007-04-30 17:16:40 +0000
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2007-04-30 17:16:40 +0000
commit001d8f3d64311b7f6d35a361097eac97884abcce (patch)
treec4b54250be3fd3ea0b58f32bd7d410e98caf7ca5 /proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt
parent9783a4ba807bbbbbd549aba7cde4b605d84cda91 (diff)
downloadtorspec-001d8f3d64311b7f6d35a361097eac97884abcce.tar.gz
torspec-001d8f3d64311b7f6d35a361097eac97884abcce.zip
r12576@catbus: nickm | 2007-04-30 13:16:31 -0400
Changes to 103 based on or-dev mail from arma. svn:r10065
Diffstat (limited to 'proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt')
-rw-r--r--proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt105
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt b/proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt
index 02946ac..39814b8 100644
--- a/proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt
+++ b/proposals/103-multilevel-keys.txt
@@ -108,41 +108,54 @@ A possible solution:
Extensions to Proposal 101.
- Add the following elements to vote documents:
-
- "dir-identity-key": The long-term identity key for this authority.
- "dir-key-published": The time when this directory's signing key was last
- changed.
- "dir-key-certification": A signature of the fields "fingerprint",
- "dir-key-published", "dir-signing-key", and "dir-identity-key",
- concatenated, in that order. The signed material extends from the
- beginning of "fingerprint" through the newline after
- "dir-key-certification". The identity key is used to generate this
- signature.
-
- The elements "fingerprint", "dir-key-published", "dir-signing-key",
- "dir-identity-key", and "dir-key-certification" together constitute a
- "key certificate". These are generated offline when starting a v3
- authority.
-
- The elements "dir-signing-key", "dir-key-published", and
- "dir-identity-key", "dir-key-certification" and MUST NOT appear in
- consensus documents.
-
- The "fingerprint" field is generated based on the identity key, not
- the signing key.
+ Define a new document type, "Key certificate". It contains the
+ following fields, in order:
+
+ "dir-key-certificate-version": As network-status-version. Must be
+ "3".
+ "fingerprint": Hex fingerprint, with spaces, based on the directory
+ authority's identity key.
+ "dir-identity-key": The long-term identity key for this authority.
+ "dir-key-published": The time when this directory's signing key was
+ last changed.
+ "dir-signing-key": As in proposal 101.
+ "dir-key-certification": A signature of the above fields, in order.
+ The signed material extends from the beginning of
+ "dir-key-certicate-version" through the newline after
+ "dir-key-certification". The identity key is used to generate
+ this signature.
+
+ These elements together constitute a "key certificate". These are
+ generated offline when starting a v3 authority. Private identity
+ keys SHOULD be stored offline, encrypted, or both. A running
+ authority only needs access to the signing key.
+
+ Unlike other keys currently used by Tor, the authority identity
+ keys and directory signing keys MAY be longer than 1024 bits.
+ (They SHOULD be 2048 bits or longer; they MUST NOT be shorter than
+ 1024.)
+
+ Vote documents change as follows:
+
+ A key certificate MUST be included in-line in every vote document. With
+ the exception of "fingerprint", its elements MUST NOT appear in consensus
+ documents.
Consensus network statuses change as follows:
Remove dir-signing-key.
Change "directory-signature" to take a fingerprint of the authority's
- identity key rather than the authority's nickname.
+ identity key and a fingerprint of the authority's current signing key
+ rather than the authority's nickname.
+
+ Change "dir-source" to take the a fingerprint of the authority's
+ identity key rather than the authority's nickname or hostname.
Add a new document type:
- A "keys" document contains all currently known key certification
- certificates. All authorities serve it at
+ A "keys" document contains all currently known key certificates.
+ All authorities serve it at
http://<hostname>/tor/status/keys.z
@@ -150,6 +163,42 @@ Extensions to Proposal 101.
consensus vote that uses a key they do not recognize. Caches download
from authorities; clients download from caches.
- Verification:
+ Processing votes:
+
+ When receiving a vote, authorities check to see if the key
+ certificate for the voter is different from the one they have. If
+ the key certificate _is_ different, and its dir-key-published is
+ more recent than the most recently known one, and it is
+ well-formed and correctly signed with the correct identity key,
+ then authorities remember it as the new canonical key certificate
+ for that voter.
+
+ A key certificate is invalid if any of the following hold:
+ * The version is unrecognized
+ * The fingerprint does not match the identity key.
+ * The identity key or the signing key is ill-formed.
+ * The published date is very far in the past or future.
+
+ * The signature is not a valid signature of the key certificate
+ generated with the identity key.
+
+ When processing the signatures on consensus, clients and caches act as
+ follows:
+
+ 1. Only consider the directory-signature entries whose identity
+ key hashes match trusted authorities.
+
+ 2. If any such entries have signing key hashes that match unknown
+ signing keys, download a new keys document.
+
+ 3. For every entry with a known (identity key,signing key) pair,
+ check the signature on the document.
+
+ 4. If the document has been signed by more than half of the
+ authorities the client recognizes, treat the consensus as
+ correctly signed.
- [XXXX write me]
+ If not, but the number entries with known identity keys but
+ unknown signing keys might be enough to make the consensus
+ correctly signed, do not use the consensus, but do not discard
+ it until we have a new keys document.