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| author | Oleh Franchuk <0x00.gear@gmail.com> | 2021-08-23 19:30:36 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Oleh Franchuk <0x00.gear@gmail.com> | 2021-09-22 16:13:19 +0300 |
| commit | 8f906ed1c5d009e7c5180dbffef111f983dda097 (patch) | |
| tree | 975abc94bcbd03a56d877a5806b10d68063bbb88 /path-spec.txt | |
| parent | 4d4feeab4d4f873fc8533bf987e447175b12ef05 (diff) | |
| download | torspec-8f906ed1c5d009e7c5180dbffef111f983dda097.tar.gz torspec-8f906ed1c5d009e7c5180dbffef111f983dda097.zip | |
path-spec: Add 'Table of contents'
Diffstat (limited to 'path-spec.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | path-spec.txt | 42 |
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/path-spec.txt b/path-spec.txt index 90c4d96..b1c9fde 100644 --- a/path-spec.txt +++ b/path-spec.txt @@ -19,6 +19,48 @@ of their choices. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. +Tables of Contents + + 1. General operation + 1.1. Terminology + 1.2. A relay's bandwidth + 2. Building circuits + 2.1. When we build + 2.1.0. We don't build circuits until we have enough directory info + 2.1.1. Clients build circuits preemptively + 2.1.2. Clients build circuits on demand + 2.1.3. Relays build circuits for testing reachability and bandwidth + 2.1.4. Hidden-service circuits + 2.1.5. Rate limiting of failed circuits + 2.1.6. When to tear down circuits + 2.2. Path selection and constraints + 2.2.1. Choosing an exit + 2.2.2. User configuration + 2.3. Cannibalizing circuits + 2.4. Learning when to give up ("timeout") on circuit construction + 2.4.1 Distribution choice and parameter estimation + 2.4.2. How much data to record + 2.4.3. How to record timeouts + 2.4.4. Detecting Changing Network Conditions + 2.4.5. Consensus parameters governing behavior + 2.4.6. Consensus parameters governing behavior + 2.5. Handling failure + 3. Attaching streams to circuits + 4. Hidden-service related circuits + 5. Guard nodes + 5.1. How consensus bandwidth weights factor into entry guard selection + 6. Server descriptor purposes + 7. Detecting route manipulation by Guard nodes (Path Bias) + 7.1. Measuring path construction success rates + 7.2. Measuring path usage success rates + 7.3. Scaling success counts + 7.4. Parametrization + 7.5. Known barriers to enforcement + X. Old notes + X.1. Do we actually do this? + X.2. A thing we could do to deal with reachability. + X.3. Some stuff that worries me about entry guards. 2006 Jun, Nickm. + 1. General operation Tor begins building circuits as soon as it has enough directory |