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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2021-10-15 11:09:30 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2021-10-15 11:09:30 -0400
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Start writing a specification for DoS defense mechanism.
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+# Denial-of-service prevention mechanisms in Tor
+
+This document is incomplete; it describes some mechanisms that Tor
+uses to avoid different kinds of denial-of-service attacks.
+
+## Handling low-memory conditions
+
+(See also `tor-spec.txt`, section 8.1.)
+
+The Tor protocol requires clients, onion services, relays, and
+authorities to store various kind of information in buffers and
+caches. But an attacker can use these buffers and queues to queues
+to exhaust the memory of the a targeted Tor process, and force the
+operating system to kill that process.
+
+Worse still, the ability to kill targeted Tor instances can be used
+to facilitate traffic analysis. (For example, see
+[the "Sniper Attack" paper](https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#sniper14)
+by Jansen, Tschorsch, Johnson, and Scheuermann.
+
+With this in mind, any Tor implementation—especially one that
+runs as a relay or onion service—must take steps to prevent
+memory-based denial-of-service attacks.
+
+### Detecting low memory
+
+The easiest way to notice you're out of memory would, in theory, be
+getting an error when you try to allocate more. Unfortunately, some
+systems (e.g. Linux) won't actually give you an "out of memory"
+error when you're low on memory. Instead, they overcommit and
+promise you memory that they can't actually provide… and then later on,
+they might kill processes that actually try to use more memory than
+they wish they'd given out.
+
+So in practice, the mainline Tor implementation uses a different
+strategy. It uses a self-imposed "MaxMemInQueues" value as an
+upper bound for how much memory it's willing to allocate to certain
+kinds of queued usages. This value can either be set by the user,
+or derived from a fraction of the total amount of system RAM.
+
+As of Tor 0.4.7.x, the MaxMemInQueues mechanism tracks the following
+kinds of allocation:
+ * Cells queued on circuits.
+ * Per-connection read or write buffers.
+ * On-the-fly compression or decompression state.
+ * Half-open stream records.
+ * Cached onion service descriptors (hsdir only).
+ * Cached DNS resolves (relay only).
+ * GEOIP-based usage activity statistics.
+
+Note that directory caches aren't counted, since those are stored on
+disk and accessed via mmap.
+
+### Responding to low memory
+
+If our allocations exceed MaxMemInQueues, then we take the following
+steps to reduce our memory allocation.
+
+*Freeing from caches*: For each of our onion service descriptor
+cache, our DNS cache, and our GEOIP statistics cache, we check
+whether they account for greater than 20% of our total allocation.
+If they do, we free memory from the offending cache until the total
+remaining is no more than 10% of our total allocation.
+
+When freeing entries from a cache, we aim to free (approximately)
+the oldest entries first.
+
+*Freeing from buffers*: After freeing data from caches, we see
+whether allocations are still above 90% of MaxMemInQueues. If they
+are, we try to close circuits and connections until we are below 90%
+of MaxMemInQueues.
+
+When deciding to what circuits to free, we sort them based on the
+age of the oldest data in their queues, and free the ones with the
+oldest data. (For example, a circuit on which a single cell has
+been queued for 5 minutes would be freed before a circuit where 100
+cells have been queued for 5 seconds.) "Data queued on a circuit"
+includes all data that we could drop if the circuit were destroyed:
+not only the cells on the circuit's cell queue, but also any bytes
+queued in buffers associated with streams or half-stream records
+attached to the circuit.
+
+We free non-tunneled directory connections according to a similar
+rule, according to the age of their oldest queued data.
+
+Upon freeing a circuit, a "DESTROY cell" must be sent in both
+directions.
+
+### Reporting low memory.
+
+We define a "low threshold" equal to 3/4 of MaxMemInQueues. Every
+time our memory usage is above the low threshold, we record
+ourselves as being "under memory pressure".
+
+(This is not currently reported.)
+
+