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Specifically, you can look at the directory to see if somebody is
lying about a relay (mismatched IDs, etc), but you can't modify
the list of linkspecs.
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We can make these non-mandatory in the future if we want, using a
consensus flag.
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This resolved "problem 2" from torspec#193.
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We were previously a bit unclear on how to handle multiple linkspecs
of type ed25519, and our spec didn't actually permit Tor's current
behavior.
Now we say that both Ed25519 ID and Legacy ID linkspecs MUST appear
at most once in a list of linkspecs, and that parties SHOULD
enforce this.
This is "problem 1" on torspec#193.
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Really, AUTH_KEY in the display ought to be KP_IPT_SID, to get rid of
a layer of terminological indirection.
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The previous wording implied that SIG_LEN was also signed, which
it isn't.
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These new names are the ones used in arti's hsdir_ring.rs and make a
lot more sense than calling one of them the "directory" index and
the other just the "index".
In C Tor these are calculated by functions called
hs_build_hs_index
hs_build_hsdir_index
That might be a reason *not* to accept this change. Or it might be a
reason to change the C Tor code.
If we don't change the names in the spec the Arti function names
should change.
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It was never implemented, is not specified, and neither dgoulet nor
I can quite remember how it was supposed to work.
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By our current logic, it needs to have `hs` in it.
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It has no independent existence outside of the encryption algorithm
of 2.5.3.
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These names are slightly shorter and a bit more descriptive IMO, and
now (when they are still fresh) is the best time to rename these
keys.
`hs_intro_tid` becomes `hs_ipt_sid`: It is a _session identifier_
key used with an _introduction point_. Using `ipt` here emphasizes
that it is not part of the introduction _handshake_.
`hs_intro_ntor` becomes `hss_ntor`. The extra "s" means it is owned
by the service. Renaming "intro" here removes the implication that
it is held by or used by the introduction point.
`onion_ntor` becomes `ntor`: There is no such thing as an ntor key
that is not an onion key.
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Fix terminology for handshake type
See merge request tpo/core/torspec!112
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Use the phrase which is used elsehwer, and enumerate them again since
this is where one would expect to find that enumeration.
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We're not the code, we're the spec. We can define things, not
recognise them.
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The phrase "format number" is not defined anywhere. I think it means
an HTYPE value.
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Proposed by @nickm in
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/merge_requests/999/diffs#50f9790ab3f0a65f7ac3e4f413c84f51fae1f855_0_26
(I think the spec is not 100% clear that hs_y and hs_Y are *this* key,
rather than some other possible ephemeral keypair the HS might have,
so please would the reviewer check that this is actually true.)
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(See text for more info!)
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The spec says "exactly once", but that only refers to the ntor
variant.
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It looks like C tor doesn't include a final newline in the middle
layer of its onion service descriptors. That made arti reject them
the first time I tried to parse one! Here I document this behavior,
and tell other implementations what to do.
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Based on this email thread with dgoulet:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2023-January/014808.html
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As per review comments
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This reverts commit 81c1be641557d1cd3fb6d9195de08e9f411be517.
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Prompted by
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/merge_requests/105#note_2869614
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Suggested here
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/merge_requests/105#note_2869613
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Even the ones that are actually ntor. Perhaps that's wrong and those
should be ntor? Personally I like it this way.
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In particular, give these formal names which contain "hs" (since they
are part of the hidden service protocol, and not any other kind of
authentication or authorisation scheme), and "N" to indicate that they
are hash-generated nonces, not passwords.
Change the references in the formulae, which it really seems to me
ought to refer to the formal names.
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Introduce the credential and subcredential before we use them.
Talk about the public identity key rather than the credential,
when we can.
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All supported versions for relays on the Tor network support v3
onion services. As such, we can mark the sections about "how do I
use an 0.2.9.x relay as my intro/rend point?" as obsolete.
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These patch changes describe new default behaviors for extension
field lists, as appear in ntor3 and in many places throughout the
ntor3 protocol. In general:
* Unrecognized extensions MUST be ignored.
Additionally, all the following rules apply _unless otherwise stated
in the documentation for an extension.
* Extensions are sent in sorted order.
* Extensions should only be sent once in a message
* If you receive multiple copies of an extension, only the first
one counts.
This comes out of discussions on tor!525.
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