1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/spec/path-spec/detecting-route-manipulation-by-guard-nodes-path.md b/spec/path-spec/detecting-route-manipulation-by-guard-nodes-path.md
index 1191efc..c7ff50c 100644
--- a/spec/path-spec/detecting-route-manipulation-by-guard-nodes-path.md
+++ b/spec/path-spec/detecting-route-manipulation-by-guard-nodes-path.md
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 <a id="path-spec.txt-7"></a>
+
 # Detecting route manipulation by Guard nodes (Path Bias)
 
 The Path Bias defense is designed to defend against a type of route
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ restrict the defense to being informational only at this stage (see
 section 7.5).
 
 <a id="path-spec.txt-7.1"></a>
+
 ## Measuring path construction success rates
 
 Clients maintain two counts for each of their guards: a count of the
@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ If a circuit closes prematurely after construction but before being
 requested to close by the client, this is counted as a failure.
 
 <a id="path-spec.txt-7.2"></a>
+
 ## Measuring path usage success rates
 
 Clients maintain two usage counts for each of their guards: a count
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@ Prematurely closed circuits are not probed, and are counted as usage
 failures.
 
 <a id="path-spec.txt-7.3"></a>
+
 ## Scaling success counts
 
 To provide a moving average of recent Guard activity while
@@ -99,6 +103,7 @@ currently open circuits are subtracted from the usage counts before
 scaling, and added back after scaling.
 
 <a id="path-spec.txt-7.4"></a>
+
 ## Parametrization
 
 The following consensus parameters tune various aspects of the
@@ -183,6 +188,7 @@ defense.
 ```
 
 <a id="path-spec.txt-7.5"></a>
+
 ## Known barriers to enforcement
 
 Due to intermittent CPU overload at relays, the normal rate of
@@ -190,4 +196,3 @@ successful circuit completion is highly variable. The Guard-dropping
 version of the defense is unlikely to be deployed until the ntor
 circuit handshake is enabled, or the nature of CPU overload induced
 failure is better understood.
-