1 files changed, 5 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/spec/path-spec-intro.md b/spec/path-spec-intro.md
index db16f60..107d640 100644
--- a/spec/path-spec-intro.md
+++ b/spec/path-spec-intro.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Tor Path Specification
+# Tor Path Specification
 
 ```text
                               Roger Dingledine
@@ -15,51 +15,8 @@ of their choices.
 
 THIS SPEC ISN'T DONE YET.
 
-```text
-      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
-      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
-      "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
-      RFC 2119.
-
-Tables of Contents
+The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
+NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
+"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
+RFC 2119.
 
-    1. General operation
-        1.1. Terminology
-        1.2. A relay's bandwidth
-    2. Building circuits
-        2.1. When we build
-            2.1.0. We don't build circuits until we have enough directory info
-            2.1.1. Clients build circuits preemptively
-            2.1.2. Clients build circuits on demand
-            2.1.3. Relays build circuits for testing reachability and bandwidth
-            2.1.4. Hidden-service circuits
-            2.1.5. Rate limiting of failed circuits
-            2.1.6. When to tear down circuits
-        2.2. Path selection and constraints
-            2.2.1. Choosing an exit
-            2.2.2. User configuration
-        2.3. Cannibalizing circuits
-        2.4. Learning when to give up ("timeout") on circuit construction
-            2.4.1 Distribution choice and parameter estimation
-            2.4.2. How much data to record
-            2.4.3. How to record timeouts
-            2.4.4. Detecting Changing Network Conditions
-            2.4.5. Consensus parameters governing behavior
-            2.4.6. Consensus parameters governing behavior
-        2.5. Handling failure
-    3. Attaching streams to circuits
-    4. Hidden-service related circuits
-    5. Guard nodes
-        5.1. How consensus bandwidth weights factor into entry guard selection
-    6. Server descriptor purposes
-    7. Detecting route manipulation by Guard nodes (Path Bias)
-        7.1. Measuring path construction success rates
-        7.2. Measuring path usage success rates
-        7.3. Scaling success counts
-        7.4. Parametrization
-        7.5. Known barriers to enforcement
-    X. Old notes
-    X.1. Do we actually do this?
-    X.2. A thing we could do to deal with reachability.
-    X.3. Some stuff that worries me about entry guards. 2006 Jun, Nickm.
-```