diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection_edge.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_edge.c | 53 |
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index ade3b48df2..45f3a06f38 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" +#include "channel.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "config.h" @@ -3068,27 +3069,29 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) tor_free(address); return 0; } - if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn && !options->AllowSingleHopExits && - (or_circ->is_first_hop || - (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay( - or_circ->p_conn->identity_digest) && + if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) { + if (!options->AllowSingleHopExits && + (or_circ->is_first_hop || + (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay( + or_circ->p_chan->identity_digest) && should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) { - /* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user - * has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers - * and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies. - */ - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.", - safe_str(or_circ->p_conn->_base.address), - or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" : - "from unknown relay"); - relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ, - or_circ->is_first_hop ? - END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL : - END_STREAM_REASON_MISC, - NULL); - tor_free(address); - return 0; + /* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user + * has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers + * and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies. + */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.", + safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)), + or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" : + "from unknown relay"); + relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ, + or_circ->is_first_hop ? + END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL : + END_STREAM_REASON_MISC, + NULL); + tor_free(address); + return 0; + } } } else if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) { if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(options) || @@ -3101,8 +3104,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) * caller might want to know whether his IP address has changed, and * we might already have corrected _base.addr[ess] for the relay's * canonical IP address. */ - if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn) - address = tor_dup_addr(&or_circ->p_conn->real_addr); + if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) + address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)); else address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1"); port = 1; /* XXXX This value is never actually used anywhere, and there @@ -3120,7 +3123,7 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) /* Remember the tunneled request ID in the new edge connection, so that * we can measure download times. */ - TO_CONN(n_stream)->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id; + n_stream->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id; n_stream->_base.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT; @@ -3178,8 +3181,6 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) { tor_assert(or_circ); - if (or_circ->p_conn && !tor_addr_is_null(&or_circ->p_conn->real_addr)) - tor_addr_copy(&n_stream->_base.addr, &or_circ->p_conn->real_addr); return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream); } @@ -3364,7 +3365,7 @@ connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn) /* Note that the new dir conn belongs to the same tunneled request as * the edge conn, so that we can measure download times. */ - TO_CONN(dirconn)->dirreq_id = TO_CONN(exitconn)->dirreq_id; + dirconn->dirreq_id = exitconn->dirreq_id; connection_link_connections(TO_CONN(dirconn), TO_CONN(exitconn)); |