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| author | teor <teor2345@gmail.com> | 2017-03-01 16:23:02 +1100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2017-05-02 19:17:56 -0400 |
| commit | f9af7e8bd01d4b7a70776a96c649a89cf1717dd1 (patch) | |
| tree | 078668eb76ebfb84846a752633f4f6b5cc4c6f5b /src/or/channeltls.c | |
| parent | 934003587305dcfb2cbc7f01e7248e3bd378317b (diff) | |
| download | tor-f9af7e8bd01d4b7a70776a96c649a89cf1717dd1.tar.gz tor-f9af7e8bd01d4b7a70776a96c649a89cf1717dd1.zip | |
Accurately identify client connections by their lack of peer authentication
This means that we bail out earlier if asked to extend to a client.
Follow-up to 21407.
Fixes bug 21406; bugfix on 0.2.4.23.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/channeltls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/channeltls.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index dbed95fb43..e7349139fc 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -1654,6 +1654,10 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero( (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32)); + /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge + * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as + * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */ + channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)); channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL, chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); |