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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2020-07-13 15:14:41 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2020-07-16 09:02:10 -0400
commit9d2867c396161e6a5a7604a5de062d8e13719d17 (patch)
tree75c34f73fd34355e8737c1fcadd980994a0c3b77 /src/core/or/connection_or.c
parentaa33b88778c2eda110eb79cfe887621853010287 (diff)
downloadtor-9d2867c396161e6a5a7604a5de062d8e13719d17.tar.gz
tor-9d2867c396161e6a5a7604a5de062d8e13719d17.zip
Use connection_describe() for log messages.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/or/connection_or.c')
-rw-r--r--src/core/or/connection_or.c64
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
index 079fa3dfcb..e62c28821a 100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn,
if (conn->chan)
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
- log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %p (%s): %s %s.",
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %s at %p: %s %s.",
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(conn)),
conn,
- escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address),
hex_str(rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
ed25519_fmt(ed_id));
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, " (Previously: %s %s)",
@@ -575,11 +575,9 @@ connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
* 100% true. */
if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) > MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated too much data (%d bytes) "
- "on nonopen OR connection %s %s:%u in state %s; closing.",
+ "on non-open %s; closing.",
(int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
- connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn) ? "to" : "from",
- conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
- conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(conn)));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
ret = -1;
}
@@ -691,8 +689,8 @@ connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
- conn->address,conn->port);
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"connect finished for %s",
+ connection_describe(conn));
if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
/* start proxy handshake */
@@ -1010,9 +1008,10 @@ connection_or_single_set_badness_(time_t now,
or_conn->base_.timestamp_created + TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
< now) {
log_info(LD_OR,
- "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as too old for new circuits "
+ "Marking %s as too old for new circuits "
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).",
- or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
+ or_conn->base_.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
}
@@ -1077,10 +1076,11 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
/* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
* and this one is open but not canonical. Mark it bad. */
log_info(LD_OR,
- "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
+ "Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). It is not "
"canonical, and we have another connection to that OR that is.",
- or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
+ or_conn->base_.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
continue;
@@ -1121,22 +1121,24 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
/* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it */
if (best->is_canonical) {
log_info(LD_OR,
- "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
+ "Marking %s as unsuitable for new circuits: "
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). "
"We have a better canonical one "
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
- or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
+ or_conn->base_.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
} else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn->real_addr,
&best->real_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
log_info(LD_OR,
- "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
+ "Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). We have a better "
"one with the "
"same address (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
- or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(or_conn)),
+ or_conn->base_.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
@@ -1464,10 +1466,9 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
* that is we haven't had a failure earlier. This is to avoid to try to
* constantly connect to relays that we think are not reachable. */
if (!should_connect_to_relay(conn)) {
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to identity %s at %s:%u because we "
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to %s because we "
"failed earlier. Refusing.",
- hex_str(id_digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr),
- TO_CONN(conn)->port);
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
return NULL;
}
@@ -1507,7 +1508,7 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
"transport proxy supporting '%s'. This can happen if you "
"haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if "
"your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.",
- fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port),
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)),
transport_name, transport_name);
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
@@ -1516,9 +1517,9 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
conn);
} else {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to '%s' through a proxy, but "
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to %s through a proxy, but "
"the proxy address could not be found.",
- fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port));
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
}
connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
@@ -1891,9 +1892,9 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
const int expected_ed_key =
! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
- log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %p (%s): %s, %s",
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %s at %p: %s, %s",
+ connection_describe(TO_CONN(conn)),
conn,
- safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
hex_str((const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN),
ed25519_fmt(ed_peer_id));
@@ -1907,9 +1908,9 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router %s at %s:%d without knowing "
- "its key. Hoping for the best.",
- conn->nickname, conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port);
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router at %s without knowing "
+ "its key. Hoping for the best.",
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
/* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
* we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
@@ -1983,9 +1984,9 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
}
log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
- "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but RSA + ed25519 identity "
+ "Tried connecting to router at %s, but RSA + ed25519 identity "
"keys were not as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
- conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)),
expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log);
/* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
@@ -2057,11 +2058,10 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
tor_assert(!started_here);
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %p with %s done, using "
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %s done, using "
"ciphersuite %s. verifying.",
started_here?"outgoing":"incoming",
- conn,
- safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)),
tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls));
if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,