hs_pow: client side effort adjustment

The goal of this patch is to add an additional mechanism for adjusting
PoW effort upwards, where clients rather than services can choose to
solve their puzzles at a higher effort than what was suggested in the
descriptor.

I wanted to use hs_cache's existing unreachability stats to drive this
effort bump, but this revealed some cases where a circuit (intro or
rend) closed early on can end up in hs_cache with an all zero intro
point key, where nobody will find it. This moves intro_auth_pk
initialization earlier in a couple places and adds nonfatal asserts to
catch the problem if it shows up elsewhere.

The actual effort adjustment method I chose is to multiply the suggested
effort by (1 + unresponsive_count), then ensure the result is at least
1. If a service has suggested effort of 0 but we fail to connect,
retries will all use an effort of 1. If the suggestion was 50, we'll try
50, 100, 150, 200, etc. This is bounded both by our client effort limit
and by the limit on unresponsive_count (currently 5).

Signed-off-by: Micah Elizabeth Scott <beth@torproject.org>

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c
index b78f72e835..ac9005e1d4 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c
@@ -564,14 +564,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
       continue;
     }
 
-    /* Ignore circuits that are waiting for an introduction to a service with
-     * PoW enabled, it can take an arbitrary amount of time. They will get
-     * cleaned up if the SOCKS connection is closed. */
-    if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_with_pow_circ &&
-        victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
-      continue;
-    }
-
     build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state;
     if (build_state && build_state->onehop_tunnel)
       cutoff = begindir_cutoff;
@@ -2560,6 +2552,11 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
           circ->hs_ident =
             hs_ident_circuit_new(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk);
         }
+        if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
+          if (hs_client_setup_intro_circ_auth_key(circ) < 0) {
+            return 0;
+          }
+        }
         if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
             circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
           circuit_has_opened(circ);
@@ -3012,6 +3009,16 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
       conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, &introcirc);
     if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
 
+    if (rendcirc && introcirc) {
+      /* Let's fill out the hs_ident fully as soon as possible, so that
+       * unreachability counts can be updated properly even if circuits close
+       * early. */
+      tor_assert_nonfatal(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(
+                             &introcirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk));
+      ed25519_pubkey_copy(&rendcirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
+                          &introcirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk);
+    }
+
     if (retval > 0) {
       /* one has already sent the intro. keep waiting. */
       tor_assert(introcirc);