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authorteor <teor@torproject.org>2020-03-17 17:18:40 +1000
committerteor <teor@torproject.org>2020-03-20 18:05:10 +1000
commit81687f5bc975842bb4d251881b04e19092ab336e (patch)
tree1450f4ea123bf03e8ec9baa32164d45f5ed15409 /src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
parentfdba6ff0c0f27b9948101e63efd5acb965a2f6a3 (diff)
downloadtor-81687f5bc975842bb4d251881b04e19092ab336e.tar.gz
tor-81687f5bc975842bb4d251881b04e19092ab336e.zip
relay: Split out relay-only circuit building
Move the relay-only circuit building functions into a new file. Part of 33633.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/or/circuitbuild.c')
-rw-r--r--src/core/or/circuitbuild.c233
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 227 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
index ea51d7b9b9..0527548f27 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
* cells arrive, the client will invoke circuit_send_next_onion_skin() to send
* CREATE or RELAY_EXTEND cells.
*
- * On the server side, this module also handles the logic of responding to
- * RELAY_EXTEND requests, using circuit_extend().
+ * The server side is handled in feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c.
**/
#define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE
@@ -35,7 +34,6 @@
#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h"
-#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h"
#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
#include "core/or/channel.h"
@@ -84,13 +82,6 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
-static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr,
- uint16_t port,
- const char *id_digest,
- const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id);
-static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ,
- const create_cell_t *create_cell,
- int relayed);
static int circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ);
static int circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ);
static int circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ,
@@ -104,10 +95,10 @@ static const node_t *choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose,
* and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right
* callbacks.
*/
-static channel_t *
+channel_t *
channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest,
- const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
+ const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
{
channel_t *chan;
@@ -707,8 +698,9 @@ circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int close_origin_circuits)
* gave us via an EXTEND cell, so we shouldn't worry if we don't understand
* it. Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0.
*/
-static int
-circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell,
+int
+circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ,
+ const struct create_cell_t *create_cell,
int relayed)
{
cell_t cell;
@@ -1166,164 +1158,6 @@ circuit_note_clock_jumped(int64_t seconds_elapsed, bool was_idle)
}
}
-/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion
- * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected,
- * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise
- * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the
- * connection succeeds or fails.
- *
- * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0.
- */
-int
-circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
-{
- channel_t *n_chan;
- relay_header_t rh;
- extend_cell_t ec;
- const char *msg = NULL;
- int should_launch = 0;
-
- if (circ->n_chan) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
- return -1;
- }
- if (circ->n_hop) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
-
- if (extend_cell_parse(&ec, rh.command,
- cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
- rh.length) < 0) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Can't parse extend cell. Closing circuit.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!ec.orport_ipv4.port || tor_addr_is_null(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr)) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (tor_addr_is_internal(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, 0) &&
- !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Client asked me to extend to a private address");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
- * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
- * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty
- * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack,
- * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a
- * new TLS connection for each extend request. */
- if (tor_digest_is_zero((const char*)ec.node_id)) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer it from
- * our networkstatus */
- if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey)) {
- const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)ec.node_id);
- const ed25519_public_key_t *node_ed_id = NULL;
- if (node &&
- node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) &&
- (node_ed_id = node_get_ed25519_id(node))) {
- ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec.ed_pubkey, node_ed_id);
- }
- }
-
- /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the
- * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can
- * assist circular-path attacks. */
- if (tor_memeq(ec.node_id,
- TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->identity_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN)) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop.");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check the previous hop Ed25519 ID too */
- if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey) &&
- ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ec.ed_pubkey,
- &TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->ed25519_identity)) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop "
- "(by Ed25519 ID).");
- return -1;
- }
-
- n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id,
- &ec.ed_pubkey,
- &ec.orport_ipv4.addr,
- &msg,
- &should_launch);
-
- if (!n_chan) {
- log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s): %s",
- fmt_addrport(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr,ec.orport_ipv4.port),
- msg?msg:"????");
-
- circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/,
- (const char*)ec.node_id,
- &ec.ed_pubkey,
- NULL, /*onion_key*/
- NULL, /*curve25519_key*/
- &ec.orport_ipv4.addr,
- ec.orport_ipv4.port);
-
- circ->n_chan_create_cell = tor_memdup(&ec.create_cell,
- sizeof(ec.create_cell));
-
- circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT);
-
- if (should_launch) {
- /* we should try to open a connection */
- n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr,
- ec.orport_ipv4.port,
- (const char*)ec.node_id,
- &ec.ed_pubkey);
- if (!n_chan) {
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit.");
- circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
- return 0;
- }
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
- }
- /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
- * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches
- * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
- */
- return 0;
- }
-
- tor_assert(!circ->n_hop); /* Connection is already established. */
- circ->n_chan = n_chan;
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,
- "n_chan is %s",
- channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan));
-
- if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, &ec.create_cell, 1) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>.
* (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake
* this is.)
@@ -1433,61 +1267,6 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason)
#endif /* 0 */
}
-/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created
- * cell back.
- */
-int
-onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
- const created_cell_t *created_cell,
- const char *keys, size_t keys_len,
- const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce)
-{
- cell_t cell;
-
- tor_assert(keys_len == CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
-
- if (created_cell_format(&cell, created_cell) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't format created cell (type=%d, len=%d)",
- (int)created_cell->cell_type, (int)created_cell->handshake_len);
- return -1;
- }
- cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
-
- circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
-
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
- (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys),
- (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20));
- if (relay_crypto_init(&circ->crypto, keys, keys_len, 0, 0)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN);
-
- int used_create_fast = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
-
- append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
- circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0);
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.",
- used_create_fast ? "created_fast" : "created");
-
- /* Ignore the local bit when ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set:
- * it violates the assumption that private addresses are local.
- * Also, many test networks run on local addresses, and
- * TestingTorNetwork sets ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses. */
- if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan)
- || get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses)
- && !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) {
- /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
- * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
- * can reach us too. */
- router_orport_found_reachable();
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Helper for new_route_len(). Choose a circuit length for purpose
* <b>purpose</b>: DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN (+ 1 if someone else chose the
* exit). If someone else chose the exit, they could be colluding