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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2010-01-19 17:54:41 -0500
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2010-01-19 17:54:41 -0500
commit8d84b4bfa1b23b2e1325bc7f15f8501ee5a5c0be (patch)
tree5286d6edd29964ab21bdf80ae3bbd038d5fc11e6
parent38b2331ea949185c2efc2acd1ad50fe1468eabe0 (diff)
parent1fc94bfd0e0b2ab70ec51c35acde6330c8a7fd1d (diff)
downloadtor-8d84b4bfa1b23b2e1325bc7f15f8501ee5a5c0be.tar.gz
tor-8d84b4bfa1b23b2e1325bc7f15f8501ee5a5c0be.zip
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1'
Conflicts: ChangeLog
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog18
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.c57
2 files changed, 47 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index ab55e81a40..3adcf0f081 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,21 @@
+Changes in version 0.2.1.23 - 2010-0?-??
+ o Major bugfixes (performance):
+ - We were selecting our guards uniformly at random, and then weighting
+ which of our guards we'd use uniformly at random. This imbalance
+ meant that Tor clients were severely limited on throughput (and
+ probably latency too) by the first hop in their circuit. Now we
+ select guards weighted by currently advertised bandwidth. We also
+ automatically discard guards picked using the old algorithm. Fixes
+ bug 1217; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. Found by Mike Perry.
+
+ o Minor features:
+ - Avoid a mad rush at the beginning of each month when each client
+ rotates half of its guards. Instead we spread the rotation out
+ throughout the month, but we still avoid leaving a precise timestamp
+ in the state file about when we first picked the guard. Improves
+ over the behavior introduced in 0.1.2.17.
+
+
Changes in version 0.2.2.7-alpha - 2010-01-19
o Major features (performance):
- When choosing which cells to relay first, relays can now favor
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 7eafeb35e1..300da7eed0 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers);
static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
static void entry_guards_changed(void);
-static time_t start_of_month(time_t when);
/** Make a note that we're running unit tests (rather than running Tor
* itself), so we avoid clobbering our state file. */
@@ -2555,7 +2554,7 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
smartlist_t *excluded;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
- router_crn_flags_t flags = 0;
+ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_GUARD;
if (state && options->UseEntryGuards &&
(purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || options->BridgeRelay)) {
@@ -2592,7 +2591,6 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
}
if (state) {
- flags |= CRN_NEED_GUARD;
if (state->need_uptime)
flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
if (state->need_capacity)
@@ -3022,7 +3020,12 @@ add_an_entry_guard(routerinfo_t *chosen, int reset_status)
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose '%s' as new entry guard.", router->nickname);
strlcpy(entry->nickname, router->nickname, sizeof(entry->nickname));
memcpy(entry->identity, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- entry->chosen_on_date = start_of_month(time(NULL));
+ /* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here
+ * is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they
+ * don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a
+ * precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
+ * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
+ entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
if (chosen) /* prepend */
smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
@@ -3074,7 +3077,7 @@ static int
remove_obsolete_entry_guards(void)
{
int changed = 0, i;
- time_t this_month = start_of_month(time(NULL));
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) {
entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
@@ -3088,15 +3091,26 @@ remove_obsolete_entry_guards(void)
} else if (tor_version_parse(ver, &v)) {
msg = "does not seem to be from any recognized version of Tor";
version_is_bad = 1;
- } else if ((tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&
- !tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||
- (tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
- !tor_version_as_new_as(ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha"))) {
- msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth";
- version_is_bad = 1;
- } else if (entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*35 < this_month) {
- /* It's been more than a month, and probably more like two since
- * chosen_on_date is clipped to the beginning of its month. */
+ } else {
+ size_t len = strlen(ver)+5;
+ char *tor_ver = tor_malloc(len);
+ tor_snprintf(tor_ver, len, "Tor %s", ver);
+ if ((tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha")) ||
+ /* above are bug 440; below are bug 1217 */
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.3-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.23")) ||
+ (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.0-alpha") &&
+ !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.7-alpha"))) {
+ msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth";
+ version_is_bad = 1;
+ }
+ tor_free(tor_ver);
+ }
+ if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*60 < now) {
+ /* It's been 2 months since the date listed in our state file. */
msg = "was selected several months ago";
date_is_bad = 1;
}
@@ -3594,19 +3608,6 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
return r;
}
-/** Helper: Return the start of the month containing <b>time</b>. */
-static time_t
-start_of_month(time_t now)
-{
- struct tm tm;
- tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm);
- tm.tm_sec = 0;
- tm.tm_min = 0;
- tm.tm_hour = 0;
- tm.tm_mday = 1;
- return tor_timegm(&tm);
-}
-
/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes.
* If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global
* entry_list with what we find.
@@ -3715,7 +3716,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
} else {
if (state_version) {
e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version);
- e->chosen_on_date = start_of_month(time(NULL));
+ e->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
}
}
});