1 files changed, 146 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/docs/source/locale/it/LC_MESSAGES/security.po b/docs/source/locale/it/LC_MESSAGES/security.po
index 13d11a17..79923cda 100644
--- a/docs/source/locale/it/LC_MESSAGES/security.po
+++ b/docs/source/locale/it/LC_MESSAGES/security.po
@@ -8,23 +8,21 @@ msgid ""
 msgstr ""
 "Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.3\n"
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
-"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-09-03 11:37-0700\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-11-15 14:42-0800\n"
 "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
 "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
 "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
-"Generated-By: Babel 2.8.0\n"
+"Generated-By: Babel 2.9.0\n"
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:2
-msgid "Security design"
+msgid "Security Design"
 msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:4
-msgid ""
-"First read :ref:`how_it_works` to understand the basics of how OnionShare"
-" works."
+msgid "Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works."
 msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:6
@@ -38,25 +36,22 @@ msgstr ""
 #: ../../source/security.rst:11
 msgid ""
 "**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in "
-"OnionShare.** When you use OnionShare, you host services directly on your"
-" computer. For example, when you share files with OnionShare, you don't "
-"upload these files to any server, and when you start an OnionShare chat "
-"room, your computer is the chat room server itself. Traditional ways of "
-"sharing files or setting up websites and chat rooms require trusting a "
-"service with access to your data."
+"OnionShare.** Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your "
+"computer. When sharing files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to "
+"any server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a "
+"server for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust"
+" the computers of others."
 msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:13
 msgid ""
 "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare "
-"in transit.** Because connections between Tor onion services and Tor "
-"Browser are end-to-end encrypted, no network attackers can eavesdrop on "
-"what happens in an OnionShare service. If the eavesdropper is positioned "
-"on the OnionShare user's end, the Tor Browser user's end, or is a "
-"malicious Tor node, they will only see Tor traffic. If the eavesdropper "
-"is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect Tor Browser with "
-"OnionShare's onion service, the traffic will be encrypted using the onion"
-" service key."
+"in transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor "
+"Browser is end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't "
+"eavesdrop on anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an "
+"eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor "
+"Browser with OnionShare's onion service, the traffic is encrypted using "
+"the onion service's private key."
 msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:15
@@ -70,16 +65,16 @@ msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:17
 msgid ""
-"**If an attacker learns about the onion service, they still can't access "
-"anything.** There have been attacks against the Tor network that can "
-"enumerate onion services. Even if someone discovers the .onion address of"
-" an OnionShare onion service, they can't access it without also knowing "
-"the service's random password (unless, of course, the OnionShare users "
-"chooses to disable the password and make it public). The password is "
-"generated by choosing two random words from a list of 6800 words, meaning"
-" there are 6800^2, or about 46 million possible password. But they can "
-"only make 20 wrong guesses before OnionShare stops the server, preventing"
-" brute force attacks against the password."
+"**If an attacker learns about the onion service, it still can't access "
+"anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion "
+"services allowed the attacker to discover private .onion addresses. If an"
+" attack discovers a private OnionShare address, a password will be "
+"prevent them from accessing it (unless the OnionShare user chooses to "
+"turn it off and make it public).. The password is generated by choosing "
+"two random words from a list of 6800 words, making 6800^2, or about 46 "
+"million possible passwords. Only 20 wrong guesses can be made before "
+"OnionShare stops the server, preventing brute force attacks against the "
+"password."
 msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:20
@@ -88,27 +83,130 @@ msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:22
 msgid ""
-"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be secure.** The "
-"OnionShare user is responsible for securely communicating the OnionShare "
-"address with people. If they send it insecurely (such as through an email"
-" message, and their email is being monitored by an attacker), the "
-"eavesdropper will learn that they're using OnionShare. If the attacker "
-"loads the address in Tor Browser before the legitimate recipient gets to "
-"it, they can access the service. If this risk fits the user's threat "
-"model, they must find a more secure way to communicate the address, such "
-"as in an encrypted email, chat, or voice call. This isn't necessary in "
-"cases where OnionShare is being used for something that isn't secret."
+"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be secure.** "
+"Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of "
+"the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an email message"
+" monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is "
+"being used. If the eavesdropper loads the address in Tor Browser while "
+"the service is still up, they can access it. To avoid this, the address "
+"must be communicateed securely, via encrypted text message (probably with"
+" disappearing messages enabled), encrypted email, or in person. This "
+"isn't necessary when using OnionShare for something that isn't secret."
 msgstr ""
 
 #: ../../source/security.rst:24
 msgid ""
-"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be anonymous.** While "
-"OnionShare and Tor Browser allow for anonymity, if the user wishes to "
-"remain anonymous they must take extra steps to ensure this while "
-"communicating the OnionShare address. For example, they might need to use"
-" Tor to create a new anonymous email or chat account, and only access it "
-"over Tor, to use for sharing the address. This isn't necessary in cases "
-"where there's no need to protect anonymity, such as co-workers who know "
-"each other sharing work documents."
+"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be anonymous.** Extra "
+"steps must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address is communicated "
+"anonymously. A new email or chat account, only accessed over Tor, can be "
+"used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless anonymity is a "
+"goal."
 msgstr ""
 
+#~ msgid "Security design"
+#~ msgstr ""
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "First read :ref:`how_it_works` to understand"
+#~ " the basics of how OnionShare works."
+#~ msgstr ""
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "**Third parties don't have access to "
+#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** "
+#~ "When you use OnionShare, you host "
+#~ "services directly on your computer. For"
+#~ " example, when you share files with"
+#~ " OnionShare, you don't upload these "
+#~ "files to any server, and when you"
+#~ " start an OnionShare chat room, your"
+#~ " computer is the chat room server "
+#~ "itself. Traditional ways of sharing "
+#~ "files or setting up websites and "
+#~ "chat rooms require trusting a service"
+#~ " with access to your data."
+#~ msgstr ""
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on "
+#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare in"
+#~ " transit.** Because connections between Tor"
+#~ " onion services and Tor Browser are"
+#~ " end-to-end encrypted, no network "
+#~ "attackers can eavesdrop on what happens"
+#~ " in an OnionShare service. If the "
+#~ "eavesdropper is positioned on the "
+#~ "OnionShare user's end, the Tor Browser"
+#~ " user's end, or is a malicious "
+#~ "Tor node, they will only see Tor"
+#~ " traffic. If the eavesdropper is a"
+#~ " malicious rendezvous node used to "
+#~ "connect Tor Browser with OnionShare's "
+#~ "onion service, the traffic will be "
+#~ "encrypted using the onion service key."
+#~ msgstr ""
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "**If an attacker learns about the "
+#~ "onion service, they still can't access"
+#~ " anything.** There have been attacks "
+#~ "against the Tor network that can "
+#~ "enumerate onion services. Even if "
+#~ "someone discovers the .onion address of"
+#~ " an OnionShare onion service, they "
+#~ "can't access it without also knowing "
+#~ "the service's random password (unless, "
+#~ "of course, the OnionShare users chooses"
+#~ " to disable the password and make "
+#~ "it public). The password is generated"
+#~ " by choosing two random words from"
+#~ " a list of 6800 words, meaning "
+#~ "there are 6800^2, or about 46 "
+#~ "million possible password. But they can"
+#~ " only make 20 wrong guesses before"
+#~ " OnionShare stops the server, preventing"
+#~ " brute force attacks against the "
+#~ "password."
+#~ msgstr ""
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
+#~ " not be secure.** The OnionShare user"
+#~ " is responsible for securely communicating"
+#~ " the OnionShare address with people. "
+#~ "If they send it insecurely (such "
+#~ "as through an email message, and "
+#~ "their email is being monitored by "
+#~ "an attacker), the eavesdropper will "
+#~ "learn that they're using OnionShare. If"
+#~ " the attacker loads the address in"
+#~ " Tor Browser before the legitimate "
+#~ "recipient gets to it, they can "
+#~ "access the service. If this risk "
+#~ "fits the user's threat model, they "
+#~ "must find a more secure way to "
+#~ "communicate the address, such as in "
+#~ "an encrypted email, chat, or voice "
+#~ "call. This isn't necessary in cases "
+#~ "where OnionShare is being used for "
+#~ "something that isn't secret."
+#~ msgstr ""
+
+#~ msgid ""
+#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might"
+#~ " not be anonymous.** While OnionShare "
+#~ "and Tor Browser allow for anonymity, "
+#~ "if the user wishes to remain "
+#~ "anonymous they must take extra steps "
+#~ "to ensure this while communicating the"
+#~ " OnionShare address. For example, they "
+#~ "might need to use Tor to create"
+#~ " a new anonymous email or chat "
+#~ "account, and only access it over "
+#~ "Tor, to use for sharing the "
+#~ "address. This isn't necessary in cases"
+#~ " where there's no need to protect "
+#~ "anonymity, such as co-workers who "
+#~ "know each other sharing work documents."
+#~ msgstr ""
+