diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po | 152 |
1 files changed, 129 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po b/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po index 05816266..ac7f6a29 100644 --- a/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po +++ b/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.3\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-13 15:48-0800\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2021-09-10 12:35-0700\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n" @@ -67,14 +67,11 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "**If an attacker learns about the onion service, it still can't access " "anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion " -"services allowed the attacker to discover private .onion addresses. If an" -" attack discovers a private OnionShare address, a password will be " -"prevent them from accessing it (unless the OnionShare user chooses to " -"turn it off and make it public). The password is generated by choosing " -"two random words from a list of 6800 words, making 6800², or about 46 " -"million possible passwords. Only 20 wrong guesses can be made before " -"OnionShare stops the server, preventing brute force attacks against the " -"password." +"services allowed the attacker to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. " +"If an attack discovers a private OnionShare address, they will also need " +"to guess the private key used for client authentication in order to " +"access it (unless the OnionShare user chooses make their service public " +"by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:20 @@ -83,24 +80,25 @@ msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:22 msgid "" -"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be secure.** " -"Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of " -"the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an email message" -" monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is " -"being used. If the eavesdropper loads the address in Tor Browser while " -"the service is still up, they can access it. To avoid this, the address " -"must be communicateed securely, via encrypted text message (probably with" -" disappearing messages enabled), encrypted email, or in person. This " -"isn't necessary when using OnionShare for something that isn't secret." +"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be " +"secure.** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the " +"responsibility of the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as " +"through an email message monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can " +"tell that OnionShare is being used. If the eavesdropper loads the address" +" in Tor Browser while the service is still up, they can access it. To " +"avoid this, the address must be communicated securely, via encrypted text" +" message (probably with disappearing messages enabled), encrypted email, " +"or in person. This isn't necessary when using OnionShare for something " +"that isn't secret." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:24 msgid "" -"**Communicating the OnionShare address might not be anonymous.** Extra " -"precautions must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address is " -"communicated anonymously. A new email or chat account, only accessed over" -" Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless " -"anonymity is a goal." +"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be " +"anonymous.** Extra precautions must be taken to ensure the OnionShare " +"address is communicated anonymously. A new email or chat account, only " +"accessed over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary" +" unless anonymity is a goal." msgstr "" #~ msgid "Security design" @@ -242,3 +240,111 @@ msgstr "" #~ "necessary unless anonymity is a goal." #~ msgstr "" +#~ msgid "" +#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " +#~ "onion service, it still can't access " +#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " +#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" +#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " +#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack" +#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address," +#~ " a password will be prevent them " +#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare" +#~ " user chooses to turn it off " +#~ "and make it public). The password " +#~ "is generated by choosing two random " +#~ "words from a list of 6800 words," +#~ " making 6800², or about 46 million" +#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong " +#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare" +#~ " stops the server, preventing brute " +#~ "force attacks against the password." +#~ msgstr "" + +#~ msgid "" +#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" +#~ " not be secure.** Communicating the " +#~ "OnionShare address to people is the " +#~ "responsibility of the OnionShare user. " +#~ "If sent insecurely (such as through " +#~ "an email message monitored by an " +#~ "attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that" +#~ " OnionShare is being used. If the " +#~ "eavesdropper loads the address in Tor" +#~ " Browser while the service is still" +#~ " up, they can access it. To " +#~ "avoid this, the address must be " +#~ "communicateed securely, via encrypted text " +#~ "message (probably with disappearing messages" +#~ " enabled), encrypted email, or in " +#~ "person. This isn't necessary when using" +#~ " OnionShare for something that isn't " +#~ "secret." +#~ msgstr "" + +#~ msgid "" +#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" +#~ " not be anonymous.** Extra precautions " +#~ "must be taken to ensure the " +#~ "OnionShare address is communicated " +#~ "anonymously. A new email or chat " +#~ "account, only accessed over Tor, can " +#~ "be used to share the address. This" +#~ " isn't necessary unless anonymity is " +#~ "a goal." +#~ msgstr "" + +#~ msgid "" +#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " +#~ "onion service, it still can't access " +#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " +#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" +#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " +#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack" +#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address," +#~ " but not the private key used " +#~ "for Client Authentication, they will be" +#~ " prevented from accessing it (unless " +#~ "the OnionShare user chooses to turn " +#~ "off the private key and make it" +#~ " public - see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." +#~ msgstr "" + +#~ msgid "" +#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " +#~ "onion service, it still can't access " +#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " +#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" +#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " +#~ "private ``.onion`` addresses. If an " +#~ "attack discovers a private OnionShare " +#~ "address, they will also need to " +#~ "guess the private key used for " +#~ "client authentication in order to access" +#~ " it (unless the OnionShare user " +#~ "chooses make their serivce public by " +#~ "turning off the private key -- see" +#~ " :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." +#~ msgstr "" + +#~ msgid "" +#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and " +#~ "private key might not be secure.** " +#~ "Communicating the OnionShare address to " +#~ "people is the responsibility of the " +#~ "OnionShare user. If sent insecurely " +#~ "(such as through an email message " +#~ "monitored by an attacker), an " +#~ "eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is" +#~ " being used. If the eavesdropper " +#~ "loads the address in Tor Browser " +#~ "while the service is still up, " +#~ "they can access it. To avoid this," +#~ " the address must be communicateed " +#~ "securely, via encrypted text message " +#~ "(probably with disappearing messages enabled)," +#~ " encrypted email, or in person. This" +#~ " isn't necessary when using OnionShare " +#~ "for something that isn't secret." +#~ msgstr "" + |