diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po | 395 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 362 deletions
diff --git a/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po b/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po index 4832f4be..c52128e1 100644 --- a/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po +++ b/docs/source/locale/en/LC_MESSAGES/security.po @@ -35,32 +35,32 @@ msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:11 msgid "" -"**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in " -"OnionShare.** Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your " -"computer. When sharing your files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded " -"to any third-party server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your " -"computer acts as a server for that too. This avoids the traditional model" -" of having to trust the computers of others." +"**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in OnionShare.** " +"Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your computer. When " +"sharing your files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to any third-party " +"server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a server " +"for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust the " +"computers of others." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:17 msgid "" -"**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare " -"in transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor " -"Browser is end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't " -"eavesdrop on anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an " -"eavesdropper is a malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor " -"Browser with OnionShare's onion service, the traffic is encrypted using " -"the onion service's private key." +"**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare in " +"transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor Browser is " +"end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't eavesdrop on " +"anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an eavesdropper is a " +"malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor Browser with OnionShare's " +"onion service, the traffic is encrypted using the onion service's private " +"key." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:23 msgid "" -"**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and " -"Tor Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare" -" user anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor " -"Browser users, the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the " -"identity of the OnionShare user." +"**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and Tor " +"Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare user " +"anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor Browser users, " +"the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the identity of the " +"OnionShare user." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:28 @@ -69,9 +69,8 @@ msgid "" "anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion " "services allowed attackers to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. To " "access an OnionShare service from its address, the private key used for " -"client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made" -" public by turning off the private key -- see " -":ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." +"client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made " +"public by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:33 @@ -80,350 +79,22 @@ msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:35 msgid "" -"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be " -"secure.** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the " -"responsibility of the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as " -"through an e-mail message monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can " -"tell that OnionShare is being used. Eavesdroppers can access services " -"that are still up by loading their addresses and/or lost key in the Tor " -"Browser. Avoid this by communicating the address securely, via encrypted " -"text message (probably with disappearing messages enabled), encrypted " -"e-mail, or in person. This isn't necessary when using OnionShare for " -"something that isn't secret." +"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be secure." +"** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of " +"the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an e-mail message " +"monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is being " +"used. Eavesdroppers can access services that are still up by loading their " +"addresses and/or lost key in the Tor Browser. Avoid this by communicating " +"the address securely, via encrypted text message (probably with disappearing " +"messages enabled), encrypted e-mail, or in person. This isn't necessary when " +"using OnionShare for something that isn't secret." msgstr "" #: ../../source/security.rst:42 msgid "" "**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be " -"anonymous.** Extra precaution must be taken to ensure the OnionShare " -"address is communicated anonymously. A new e-mail or chat account, only " -"accessed over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary" -" unless anonymity is a goal." +"anonymous.** Extra precaution must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address " +"is communicated anonymously. A new e-mail or chat account, only accessed " +"over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless " +"anonymity is a goal." msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "Security design" -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "First read :ref:`how_it_works` to understand" -#~ " the basics of how OnionShare works." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Third parties don't have access to " -#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** " -#~ "When you use OnionShare, you host " -#~ "services directly on your computer. For" -#~ " example, when you share files with" -#~ " OnionShare, you don't upload these " -#~ "files to any server, and when you" -#~ " start an OnionShare chat room, your" -#~ " computer is the chat room server " -#~ "itself. Traditional ways of sharing " -#~ "files or setting up websites and " -#~ "chat rooms require trusting a service" -#~ " with access to your data." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on " -#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare in" -#~ " transit.** Because connections between Tor" -#~ " onion services and Tor Browser are" -#~ " end-to-end encrypted, no network " -#~ "attackers can eavesdrop on what happens" -#~ " in an OnionShare service. If the " -#~ "eavesdropper is positioned on the " -#~ "OnionShare user's end, the Tor Browser" -#~ " user's end, or is a malicious " -#~ "Tor node, they will only see Tor" -#~ " traffic. If the eavesdropper is a" -#~ " malicious rendezvous node used to " -#~ "connect Tor Browser with OnionShare's " -#~ "onion service, the traffic will be " -#~ "encrypted using the onion service key." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, they still can't access" -#~ " anything.** There have been attacks " -#~ "against the Tor network that can " -#~ "enumerate onion services. Even if " -#~ "someone discovers the .onion address of" -#~ " an OnionShare onion service, they " -#~ "can't access it without also knowing " -#~ "the service's random password (unless, " -#~ "of course, the OnionShare users chooses" -#~ " to disable the password and make " -#~ "it public). The password is generated" -#~ " by choosing two random words from" -#~ " a list of 6800 words, meaning " -#~ "there are 6800^2, or about 46 " -#~ "million possible password. But they can" -#~ " only make 20 wrong guesses before" -#~ " OnionShare stops the server, preventing" -#~ " brute force attacks against the " -#~ "password." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" -#~ " not be secure.** The OnionShare user" -#~ " is responsible for securely communicating" -#~ " the OnionShare address with people. " -#~ "If they send it insecurely (such " -#~ "as through an email message, and " -#~ "their email is being monitored by " -#~ "an attacker), the eavesdropper will " -#~ "learn that they're using OnionShare. If" -#~ " the attacker loads the address in" -#~ " Tor Browser before the legitimate " -#~ "recipient gets to it, they can " -#~ "access the service. If this risk " -#~ "fits the user's threat model, they " -#~ "must find a more secure way to " -#~ "communicate the address, such as in " -#~ "an encrypted email, chat, or voice " -#~ "call. This isn't necessary in cases " -#~ "where OnionShare is being used for " -#~ "something that isn't secret." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" -#~ " not be anonymous.** While OnionShare " -#~ "and Tor Browser allow for anonymity, " -#~ "if the user wishes to remain " -#~ "anonymous they must take extra steps " -#~ "to ensure this while communicating the" -#~ " OnionShare address. For example, they " -#~ "might need to use Tor to create" -#~ " a new anonymous email or chat " -#~ "account, and only access it over " -#~ "Tor, to use for sharing the " -#~ "address. This isn't necessary in cases" -#~ " where there's no need to protect " -#~ "anonymity, such as co-workers who " -#~ "know each other sharing work documents." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, it still can't access " -#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " -#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" -#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " -#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack" -#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address," -#~ " a password will be prevent them " -#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare" -#~ " user chooses to turn it off " -#~ "and make it public).. The password " -#~ "is generated by choosing two random " -#~ "words from a list of 6800 words," -#~ " making 6800^2, or about 46 million" -#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong " -#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare" -#~ " stops the server, preventing brute " -#~ "force attacks against the password." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" -#~ " not be anonymous.** Extra steps must" -#~ " be taken to ensure the OnionShare" -#~ " address is communicated anonymously. A " -#~ "new email or chat account, only " -#~ "accessed over Tor, can be used to" -#~ " share the address. This isn't " -#~ "necessary unless anonymity is a goal." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, it still can't access " -#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " -#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" -#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " -#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack" -#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address," -#~ " a password will be prevent them " -#~ "from accessing it (unless the OnionShare" -#~ " user chooses to turn it off " -#~ "and make it public). The password " -#~ "is generated by choosing two random " -#~ "words from a list of 6800 words," -#~ " making 6800², or about 46 million" -#~ " possible passwords. Only 20 wrong " -#~ "guesses can be made before OnionShare" -#~ " stops the server, preventing brute " -#~ "force attacks against the password." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" -#~ " not be secure.** Communicating the " -#~ "OnionShare address to people is the " -#~ "responsibility of the OnionShare user. " -#~ "If sent insecurely (such as through " -#~ "an email message monitored by an " -#~ "attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that" -#~ " OnionShare is being used. If the " -#~ "eavesdropper loads the address in Tor" -#~ " Browser while the service is still" -#~ " up, they can access it. To " -#~ "avoid this, the address must be " -#~ "communicateed securely, via encrypted text " -#~ "message (probably with disappearing messages" -#~ " enabled), encrypted email, or in " -#~ "person. This isn't necessary when using" -#~ " OnionShare for something that isn't " -#~ "secret." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address might" -#~ " not be anonymous.** Extra precautions " -#~ "must be taken to ensure the " -#~ "OnionShare address is communicated " -#~ "anonymously. A new email or chat " -#~ "account, only accessed over Tor, can " -#~ "be used to share the address. This" -#~ " isn't necessary unless anonymity is " -#~ "a goal." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, it still can't access " -#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " -#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" -#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " -#~ "private .onion addresses. If an attack" -#~ " discovers a private OnionShare address," -#~ " but not the private key used " -#~ "for Client Authentication, they will be" -#~ " prevented from accessing it (unless " -#~ "the OnionShare user chooses to turn " -#~ "off the private key and make it" -#~ " public - see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, it still can't access " -#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " -#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" -#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " -#~ "private ``.onion`` addresses. If an " -#~ "attack discovers a private OnionShare " -#~ "address, they will also need to " -#~ "guess the private key used for " -#~ "client authentication in order to access" -#~ " it (unless the OnionShare user " -#~ "chooses make their serivce public by " -#~ "turning off the private key -- see" -#~ " :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and " -#~ "private key might not be secure.** " -#~ "Communicating the OnionShare address to " -#~ "people is the responsibility of the " -#~ "OnionShare user. If sent insecurely " -#~ "(such as through an email message " -#~ "monitored by an attacker), an " -#~ "eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is" -#~ " being used. If the eavesdropper " -#~ "loads the address in Tor Browser " -#~ "while the service is still up, " -#~ "they can access it. To avoid this," -#~ " the address must be communicateed " -#~ "securely, via encrypted text message " -#~ "(probably with disappearing messages enabled)," -#~ " encrypted email, or in person. This" -#~ " isn't necessary when using OnionShare " -#~ "for something that isn't secret." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Third parties don't have access to " -#~ "anything that happens in OnionShare.** " -#~ "Using OnionShare means hosting services " -#~ "directly on your computer. When sharing" -#~ " files with OnionShare, they are not" -#~ " uploaded to any server. If you " -#~ "make an OnionShare chat room, your " -#~ "computer acts as a server for that" -#~ " too. This avoids the traditional " -#~ "model of having to trust the " -#~ "computers of others." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, it still can't access " -#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " -#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" -#~ " allowed the attacker to discover " -#~ "private ``.onion`` addresses. If an " -#~ "attack discovers a private OnionShare " -#~ "address, they will also need to " -#~ "guess the private key used for " -#~ "client authentication in order to access" -#~ " it (unless the OnionShare user " -#~ "chooses make their service public by " -#~ "turning off the private key -- see" -#~ " :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and " -#~ "private key might not be secure.** " -#~ "Communicating the OnionShare address to " -#~ "people is the responsibility of the " -#~ "OnionShare user. If sent insecurely " -#~ "(such as through an email message " -#~ "monitored by an attacker), an " -#~ "eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is" -#~ " being used. If the eavesdropper " -#~ "loads the address in Tor Browser " -#~ "while the service is still up, " -#~ "they can access it. To avoid this," -#~ " the address must be communicated " -#~ "securely, via encrypted text message " -#~ "(probably with disappearing messages enabled)," -#~ " encrypted email, or in person. This" -#~ " isn't necessary when using OnionShare " -#~ "for something that isn't secret." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**Communicating the OnionShare address and " -#~ "private key might not be anonymous.**" -#~ " Extra precautions must be taken to" -#~ " ensure the OnionShare address is " -#~ "communicated anonymously. A new email or" -#~ " chat account, only accessed over " -#~ "Tor, can be used to share the " -#~ "address. This isn't necessary unless " -#~ "anonymity is a goal." -#~ msgstr "" - -#~ msgid "" -#~ "**If an attacker learns about the " -#~ "onion service, it still can't access " -#~ "anything.** Prior attacks against the " -#~ "Tor network to enumerate onion services" -#~ " allowed attackers to discover private " -#~ "``.onion`` addresses. To access an " -#~ "OnionShare service from its address, the" -#~ " private key used for client " -#~ "authentication must be guessed (unless " -#~ "the service is already made public " -#~ "by turning off the private key --" -#~ " see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)." -#~ msgstr "" - |