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/* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file rendcommon.c
* \brief Rendezvous implementation: shared code between
* introducers, services, clients, and rendezvous points.
**/
#define RENDCOMMON_PRIVATE
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_client.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendmid.h"
#include "core/or/circuit_st.h"
#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h"
#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h"
#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
/** Called when we get a rendezvous-related relay cell on circuit
* <b>circ</b>. Dispatch on rendezvous relay command. */
void
rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint,
int command, size_t length,
const uint8_t *payload)
{
or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = NULL;
int r = -2;
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (!layer_hint || layer_hint != origin_circ->cpath->prev) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"Relay cell (rend purpose %d) from wrong hop on origin circ",
command);
origin_circ = NULL;
}
} else {
or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
}
switch (command) {
case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
if (or_circ)
r = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS:
if (or_circ)
r = rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1:
if (or_circ)
r = hs_intro_received_introduce1(or_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2:
if (origin_circ)
r = hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK:
if (origin_circ)
r = hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1:
if (or_circ)
r = rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2:
if (origin_circ)
r = hs_client_receive_rendezvous2(origin_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED:
if (origin_circ)
r = hs_service_receive_intro_established(origin_circ, payload, length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED:
if (origin_circ)
r = hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circ, payload, length);
break;
default:
tor_fragile_assert();
}
if (r == 0 && origin_circ) {
/* This was a valid cell. Count it as delivered + overhead. */
circuit_read_valid_data(origin_circ, length);
}
if (r == -2)
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Dropping cell (type %d) for wrong circuit type.",
command);
}
/* Make sure that tor only builds one-hop circuits when they would not
* compromise user anonymity.
*
* One-hop circuits are permitted in Single Onion modes.
*
* Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits.
* For example, single onion HSDir circuits are 3-hop to prevent denial of
* service.
*/
void
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
const or_options_t *options)
{
tor_assert(options);
tor_assert(circ);
tor_assert(circ->build_state);
if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
tor_assert(hs_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options));
}
}
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