path: root/src/common/util.c

/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine
 * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
 * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */

/**
 * \file util.c
 * \brief Common functions for strings, IO, network, data structures,
 * process control.
 **/

#include "orconfig.h"
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
#include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#define UTIL_PRIVATE
#include "common/util.h"
#include "lib/log/torlog.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
#include "lib/fdio/fdio.h"
#include "lib/net/address.h"
#include "lib/sandbox/sandbox.h"
#include "lib/err/backtrace.h"
#include "lib/process/waitpid.h"
#include "lib/encoding/binascii.h"

#ifdef _WIN32
#include <io.h>
#include <direct.h>
#include <process.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include <winbase.h>
#else /* !(defined(_WIN32)) */
#include <dirent.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */

/* math.h needs this on Linux */
#ifndef _USE_ISOC99_
#define _USE_ISOC99_ 1
#endif
#include <math.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>

#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
#include <netinet/in.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H
#include <errno.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FCNTL_H
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
#include <time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_MALLOC_H
#include <malloc/malloc.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_H
#if !defined(OpenBSD) && !defined(__FreeBSD__)
/* OpenBSD has a malloc.h, but for our purposes, it only exists in order to
 * scold us for being so stupid as to autodetect its presence.  To be fair,
 * they've done this since 1996, when autoconf was only 5 years old. */
#include <malloc.h>
#endif /* !defined(OpenBSD) && !defined(__FreeBSD__) */
#endif /* defined(HAVE_MALLOC_H) */
#ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_NP_H
#include <malloc_np.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H
#include <sys/wait.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) && defined(__linux__)
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#endif

/* =====
 * Memory management
 * ===== */

DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(aggregate-return)
/** Call the platform malloc info function, and dump the results to the log at
 * level <b>severity</b>.  If no such function exists, do nothing. */
void
tor_log_mallinfo(int severity)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MALLINFO
  struct mallinfo mi;
  memset(&mi, 0, sizeof(mi));
  mi = mallinfo();
  tor_log(severity, LD_MM,
      "mallinfo() said: arena=%d, ordblks=%d, smblks=%d, hblks=%d, "
      "hblkhd=%d, usmblks=%d, fsmblks=%d, uordblks=%d, fordblks=%d, "
      "keepcost=%d",
      mi.arena, mi.ordblks, mi.smblks, mi.hblks,
      mi.hblkhd, mi.usmblks, mi.fsmblks, mi.uordblks, mi.fordblks,
      mi.keepcost);
#else /* !(defined(HAVE_MALLINFO)) */
  (void)severity;
#endif /* defined(HAVE_MALLINFO) */
}
ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(aggregate-return)

/* =====
 * Math
 * ===== */

/**
 * Returns the natural logarithm of d base e.  We defined this wrapper here so
 * to avoid conflicts with old versions of tor_log(), which were named log().
 */
double
tor_mathlog(double d)
{
  return log(d);
}

/** Return the long integer closest to <b>d</b>. We define this wrapper
 * here so that not all users of math.h need to use the right incantations
 * to get the c99 functions. */
long
tor_lround(double d)
{
#if defined(HAVE_LROUND)
  return lround(d);
#elif defined(HAVE_RINT)
  return (long)rint(d);
#else
  return (long)(d > 0 ? d + 0.5 : ceil(d - 0.5));
#endif /* defined(HAVE_LROUND) || ... */
}

/** Return the 64-bit integer closest to d.  We define this wrapper here so
 * that not all users of math.h need to use the right incantations to get the
 * c99 functions. */
int64_t
tor_llround(double d)
{
#if defined(HAVE_LLROUND)
  return (int64_t)llround(d);
#elif defined(HAVE_RINT)
  return (int64_t)rint(d);
#else
  return (int64_t)(d > 0 ? d + 0.5 : ceil(d - 0.5));
#endif /* defined(HAVE_LLROUND) || ... */
}

/** Transform a random value <b>p</b> from the uniform distribution in
 * [0.0, 1.0[ into a Laplace distributed value with location parameter
 * <b>mu</b> and scale parameter <b>b</b>. Truncate the final result
 * to be an integer in [INT64_MIN, INT64_MAX]. */
int64_t
sample_laplace_distribution(double mu, double b, double p)
{
  double result;
  tor_assert(p >= 0.0 && p < 1.0);

  /* This is the "inverse cumulative distribution function" from:
   * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace_distribution */
  if (p <= 0.0) {
    /* Avoid taking log(0.0) == -INFINITY, as some processors or compiler
     * options can cause the program to trap. */
    return INT64_MIN;
  }

  result = mu - b * (p > 0.5 ? 1.0 : -1.0)
                  * tor_mathlog(1.0 - 2.0 * fabs(p - 0.5));

  return clamp_double_to_int64(result);
}

/** Add random noise between INT64_MIN and INT64_MAX coming from a Laplace
 * distribution with mu = 0 and b = <b>delta_f</b>/<b>epsilon</b> to
 * <b>signal</b> based on the provided <b>random</b> value in [0.0, 1.0[.
 * The epsilon value must be between ]0.0, 1.0]. delta_f must be greater
 * than 0. */
int64_t
add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal_, double random_, double delta_f,
                  double epsilon)
{
  int64_t noise;

  /* epsilon MUST be between ]0.0, 1.0] */
  tor_assert(epsilon > 0.0 && epsilon <= 1.0);
  /* delta_f MUST be greater than 0. */
  tor_assert(delta_f > 0.0);

  /* Just add noise, no further signal */
  noise = sample_laplace_distribution(0.0,
                                      delta_f / epsilon,
                                      random_);

  /* Clip (signal + noise) to [INT64_MIN, INT64_MAX] */
  if (noise > 0 && INT64_MAX - noise < signal_)
    return INT64_MAX;
  else if (noise < 0 && INT64_MIN - noise > signal_)
    return INT64_MIN;
  else
    return signal_ + noise;
}

/* =====
 * String manipulation
 * ===== */

/** Return true if <b>string</b> is a valid 'key=[value]' string.
 *  "value" is optional, to indicate the empty string. Log at logging
 *  <b>severity</b> if something ugly happens. */
int
string_is_key_value(int severity, const char *string)
{
  /* position of equal sign in string */
  const char *equal_sign_pos = NULL;

  tor_assert(string);

  if (strlen(string) < 2) { /* "x=" is shortest args string */
    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "'%s' is too short to be a k=v value.",
            escaped(string));
    return 0;
  }

  equal_sign_pos = strchr(string, '=');
  if (!equal_sign_pos) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "'%s' is not a k=v value.", escaped(string));
    return 0;
  }

  /* validate that the '=' is not in the beginning of the string. */
  if (equal_sign_pos == string) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "'%s' is not a valid k=v value.",
            escaped(string));
    return 0;
  }

  return 1;
}

/** Return a newly allocated string equal to <b>string</b>, except that every
 * character in <b>chars_to_escape</b> is preceded by a backslash. */
char *
tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(const char *string, const char *chars_to_escape)
{
  char *new_string = NULL;
  char *new_cp = NULL;
  size_t length, new_length;

  tor_assert(string);

  length = strlen(string);

  if (!length) /* If we were given the empty string, return the same. */
    return tor_strdup("");
  /* (new_length > SIZE_MAX) => ((length * 2) + 1 > SIZE_MAX) =>
     (length*2 > SIZE_MAX - 1) => (length > (SIZE_MAX - 1)/2) */
  if (length > (SIZE_MAX - 1)/2) /* check for overflow */
    return NULL;

  /* this should be enough even if all characters must be escaped */
  new_length = (length * 2) + 1;

  new_string = new_cp = tor_malloc(new_length);

  while (*string) {
    if (strchr(chars_to_escape, *string))
      *new_cp++ = '\\';

    *new_cp++ = *string++;
  }

  *new_cp = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate the new string */

  return new_string;
}

/* =====
 * Time
 * ===== */

#define TOR_USEC_PER_SEC 1000000

/** Return the difference between start->tv_sec and end->tv_sec.
 * Returns INT64_MAX on overflow and underflow.
 */
static int64_t
tv_secdiff_impl(const struct timeval *start, const struct timeval *end)
{
  const int64_t s = (int64_t)start->tv_sec;
  const int64_t e = (int64_t)end->tv_sec;

  /* This may not be the most efficient way of implemeting this check,
   * but it's easy to see that it's correct and doesn't overflow */

  if (s > 0 && e < INT64_MIN + s) {
    /* s is positive: equivalent to e - s < INT64_MIN, but without any
     * overflow */
    return INT64_MAX;
  } else if (s < 0 && e > INT64_MAX + s) {
    /* s is negative: equivalent to e - s > INT64_MAX, but without any
     * overflow */
    return INT64_MAX;
  }

  return e - s;
}

/** Return the number of microseconds elapsed between *start and *end.
 * Returns LONG_MAX on overflow and underflow.
 */
long
tv_udiff(const struct timeval *start, const struct timeval *end)
{
  /* Sanity check tv_usec */
  if (start->tv_usec > TOR_USEC_PER_SEC || start->tv_usec < 0) {
    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "comparing times on microsecond detail with bad "
             "start tv_usec: " I64_FORMAT " microseconds",
             I64_PRINTF_ARG(start->tv_usec));
    return LONG_MAX;
  }

  if (end->tv_usec > TOR_USEC_PER_SEC || end->tv_usec < 0) {
    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "comparing times on microsecond detail with bad "
             "end tv_usec: " I64_FORMAT " microseconds",
             I64_PRINTF_ARG(end->tv_usec));
    return LONG_MAX;
  }

  /* Some BSDs have struct timeval.tv_sec 64-bit, but time_t (and long) 32-bit
   */
  int64_t udiff;
  const int64_t secdiff = tv_secdiff_impl(start, end);

  /* end->tv_usec - start->tv_usec can be up to 1 second either way */
  if (secdiff > (int64_t)(LONG_MAX/1000000 - 1) ||
      secdiff < (int64_t)(LONG_MIN/1000000 + 1)) {
    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "comparing times on microsecond detail too far "
             "apart: " I64_FORMAT " seconds", I64_PRINTF_ARG(secdiff));
    return LONG_MAX;
  }

  /* we'll never get an overflow here, because we check that both usecs are
   * between 0 and TV_USEC_PER_SEC. */
  udiff = secdiff*1000000 + ((int64_t)end->tv_usec - (int64_t)start->tv_usec);

  /* Some compilers are smart enough to work out this is a no-op on L64 */
#if SIZEOF_LONG < 8
  if (udiff > (int64_t)LONG_MAX || udiff < (int64_t)LONG_MIN) {
    return LONG_MAX;
  }
#endif

  return (long)udiff;
}

/** Return the number of milliseconds elapsed between *start and *end.
 * If the tv_usec difference is 500, rounds away from zero.
 * Returns LONG_MAX on overflow and underflow.
 */
long
tv_mdiff(const struct timeval *start, const struct timeval *end)
{
  /* Sanity check tv_usec */
  if (start->tv_usec > TOR_USEC_PER_SEC || start->tv_usec < 0) {
    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "comparing times on millisecond detail with bad "
             "start tv_usec: " I64_FORMAT " microseconds",
             I64_PRINTF_ARG(start->tv_usec));
    return LONG_MAX;
  }

  if (end->tv_usec > TOR_USEC_PER_SEC || end->tv_usec < 0) {
    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "comparing times on millisecond detail with bad "
             "end tv_usec: " I64_FORMAT " microseconds",
             I64_PRINTF_ARG(end->tv_usec));
    return LONG_MAX;
  }

  /* Some BSDs have struct timeval.tv_sec 64-bit, but time_t (and long) 32-bit
   */
  int64_t mdiff;
  const int64_t secdiff = tv_secdiff_impl(start, end);

  /* end->tv_usec - start->tv_usec can be up to 1 second either way, but the
   * mdiff calculation may add another temporary second for rounding.
   * Whether this actually causes overflow depends on the compiler's constant
   * folding and order of operations. */
  if (secdiff > (int64_t)(LONG_MAX/1000 - 2) ||
      secdiff < (int64_t)(LONG_MIN/1000 + 1)) {
    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "comparing times on millisecond detail too far "
             "apart: " I64_FORMAT " seconds", I64_PRINTF_ARG(secdiff));
    return LONG_MAX;
  }

  /* Subtract and round */
  mdiff = secdiff*1000 +
      /* We add a million usec here to ensure that the result is positive,
       * so that the round-towards-zero behavior of the division will give
       * the right result for rounding to the nearest msec. Later we subtract
       * 1000 in order to get the correct result.
       * We'll never get an overflow here, because we check that both usecs are
       * between 0 and TV_USEC_PER_SEC. */
      ((int64_t)end->tv_usec - (int64_t)start->tv_usec + 500 + 1000000) / 1000
      - 1000;

  /* Some compilers are smart enough to work out this is a no-op on L64 */
#if SIZEOF_LONG < 8
  if (mdiff > (int64_t)LONG_MAX || mdiff < (int64_t)LONG_MIN) {
    return LONG_MAX;
  }
#endif

  return (long)mdiff;
}

/**
 * Converts timeval to milliseconds.
 */
int64_t
tv_to_msec(const struct timeval *tv)
{
  int64_t conv = ((int64_t)tv->tv_sec)*1000L;
  /* Round ghetto-style */
  conv += ((int64_t)tv->tv_usec+500)/1000L;
  return conv;
}

#ifdef _WIN32
HANDLE
load_windows_system_library(const TCHAR *library_name)
{
  TCHAR path[MAX_PATH];
  unsigned n;
  n = GetSystemDirectory(path, MAX_PATH);
  if (n == 0 || n + _tcslen(library_name) + 2 >= MAX_PATH)
    return 0;
  _tcscat(path, TEXT("\\"));
  _tcscat(path, library_name);
  return LoadLibrary(path);
}
#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */

/** Initialize the insecure RNG <b>rng</b> from a seed value <b>seed</b>. */
void
tor_init_weak_random(tor_weak_rng_t *rng, unsigned seed)
{
  rng->state = (uint32_t)(seed & 0x7fffffff);
}

/** Return a randomly chosen value in the range 0..TOR_WEAK_RANDOM_MAX based
 * on the RNG state of <b>rng</b>.  This entropy will not be cryptographically
 * strong; do not rely on it for anything an adversary should not be able to
 * predict. */
int32_t
tor_weak_random(tor_weak_rng_t *rng)
{
  /* Here's a linear congruential generator. OpenBSD and glibc use these
   * parameters; they aren't too bad, and should have maximal period over the
   * range 0..INT32_MAX. We don't want to use the platform rand() or random(),
   * since some platforms have bad weak RNGs that only return values in the
   * range 0..INT16_MAX, which just isn't enough. */
  rng->state = (rng->state * 1103515245 + 12345) & 0x7fffffff;
  return (int32_t) rng->state;
}

/** Return a random number in the range [0 , <b>top</b>). {That is, the range
 * of integers i such that 0 <= i < top.}  Chooses uniformly.  Requires that
 * top is greater than 0. This randomness is not cryptographically strong; do
 * not rely on it for anything an adversary should not be able to predict. */
int32_t
tor_weak_random_range(tor_weak_rng_t *rng, int32_t top)
{
  /* We don't want to just do tor_weak_random() % top, since random() is often
   * implemented with an LCG whose modulus is a power of 2, and those are
   * cyclic in their low-order bits. */
  int divisor, result;
  tor_assert(top > 0);
  divisor = TOR_WEAK_RANDOM_MAX / top;
  do {
    result = (int32_t)(tor_weak_random(rng) / divisor);
  } while (result >= top);
  return result;
}

/** Cast a given double value to a int64_t. Return 0 if number is NaN.
 * Returns either INT64_MIN or INT64_MAX if number is outside of the int64_t
 * range. */
int64_t
clamp_double_to_int64(double number)
{
  int exponent;

#if defined(MINGW_ANY) && GCC_VERSION >= 409
/*
  Mingw's math.h uses gcc's __builtin_choose_expr() facility to declare
  isnan, isfinite, and signbit.  But as implemented in at least some
  versions of gcc, __builtin_choose_expr() can generate type warnings
  even from branches that are not taken.  So, suppress those warnings.
*/
#define PROBLEMATIC_FLOAT_CONVERSION_WARNING
DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(float-conversion)
#endif /* defined(MINGW_ANY) && GCC_VERSION >= 409 */

/*
  With clang 4.0 we apparently run into "double promotion" warnings here,
  since clang thinks we're promoting a double to a long double.
 */
#if defined(__clang__)
#if __has_warning("-Wdouble-promotion")
#define PROBLEMATIC_DOUBLE_PROMOTION_WARNING
DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(double-promotion)
#endif
#endif /* defined(__clang__) */

  /* NaN is a special case that can't be used with the logic below. */
  if (isnan(number)) {
    return 0;
  }

  /* Time to validate if result can overflows a int64_t value. Fun with
   * float! Find that exponent exp such that
   *    number == x * 2^exp
   * for some x with abs(x) in [0.5, 1.0). Note that this implies that the
   * magnitude of number is strictly less than 2^exp.
   *
   * If number is infinite, the call to frexp is legal but the contents of
   * are exponent unspecified. */
  frexp(number, &exponent);

  /* If the magnitude of number is strictly less than 2^63, the truncated
   * version of number is guaranteed to be representable. The only
   * representable integer for which this is not the case is INT64_MIN, but
   * it is covered by the logic below. */
  if (isfinite(number) && exponent <= 63) {
    return (int64_t)number;
  }

  /* Handle infinities and finite numbers with magnitude >= 2^63. */
  return signbit(number) ? INT64_MIN : INT64_MAX;

#ifdef PROBLEMATIC_DOUBLE_PROMOTION_WARNING
ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(double-promotion)
#endif
#ifdef PROBLEMATIC_FLOAT_CONVERSION_WARNING
ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(float-conversion)
#endif
}