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/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* Wrapper code for an ed25519 implementation. */
#include "orconfig.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include "crypto.h"
#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
#include "torlog.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h"
int
ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
int extra_strong)
{
(void) extra_strong;
if (ed25519_ref10_seckey(seckey_out->seckey) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
{
if (ed25519_ref10_pubkey(pubkey_out->pubkey, seckey->seckey) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/** Generate a new ed25519 keypair in <b>keypair_out</b>. If
* <b>extra_strong</b> is set, try to mix some system entropy into the key
* generation process. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
int
ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong)
{
(void) extra_strong;
if (ed25519_ref10_keygen(keypair_out->pubkey.pubkey,
keypair_out->seckey.seckey)<0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/**
* Set <b>signature_out</b> to a signature of the <b>len</b>-byte message
* <b>msg</b>, using the secret and public key in <b>keypair</b>.
*/
int
ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
const ed25519_keypair_t *keypair)
{
uint8_t keys[64];
uint8_t *tmp;
uint64_t tmplen;
/* XXXX Make crypto_sign in ref10 friendlier so we don't need this stupid
* copying. */
tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
tmplen = ((uint64_t)len) + 64;
tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
memcpy(keys, keypair->seckey.seckey, 32);
memcpy(keys+32, keypair->pubkey.pubkey, 32);
if (ed25519_ref10_sign(tmp, &tmplen, msg, len, keys) < 0) {
tor_free(tmp);
return -1;
}
memcpy(signature_out->sig, tmp, 64);
memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
tor_free(tmp);
return 0;
}
/**
* Check whether if <b>signature</b> is a valid signature for the
* <b>len</b>-byte message in <b>msg</b> made with the key <b>pubkey</b>.
*
* Return 0 if the signature is valid; -1 if it isn't.
*/
int
ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
{
uint8_t *smtmp;
uint8_t *tmp;
uint64_t tmplen;
int r;
tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
tmplen = len + 64;
tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
smtmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
memcpy(smtmp, signature->sig, 64);
memcpy(smtmp+64, msg, len);
r = ed25519_ref10_open(tmp, &tmplen, smtmp, tmplen, pubkey->pubkey);
tor_free(tmp);
tor_free(smtmp);
return r;
}
/** Validate every signature among those in <b>checkable</b>, which contains
* exactly <b>n_checkable</b> elements. If <b>okay_out</b> is non-NULL, set
* the i'th element of <b>okay_out</b> to 1 if the i'th element of
* <b>checkable</b> is valid, and to 0 otherwise. Return 0 if every signature
* was valid. Otherwise return -N, where N is the number of invalid
* signatures.
*/
int
ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
int n_checkable)
{
int res, i;
res = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
const ed25519_checkable_t *ch = &checkable[i];
int r = ed25519_checksig(&ch->signature, ch->msg, ch->len, ch->pubkey);
if (r < 0)
--res;
if (okay_out)
okay_out[i] = (r == 0);
}
#if 0
const uint8_t **ms;
size_t *lens;
const uint8_t **pks;
const uint8_t **sigs;
int *oks;
ms = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
lens = tor_malloc(sizeof(size_t)*n_checkable);
pks = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
sigs = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
oks = okay_out ? okay_out : tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*n_checkable);
for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
ms[i] = checkable[i].msg;
lens[i] = checkable[i].len;
pks[i] = checkable[i].pubkey->pubkey;
sigs[i] = checkable[i].signature.sig;
oks[i] = 0;
}
ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna_fb(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks);
res = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
if (!oks[i])
--res;
}
tor_free(ms);
tor_free(lens);
tor_free(pks);
if (! okay_out)
tor_free(oks);
#endif
return res;
}
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