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We've been seeing problems with destroy cells queues taking up a
huge amount of RAM. We can mitigate this, since while a full packed
destroy cell takes 514 bytes, we only need 5 bytes to remember a
circuit ID and a reason.
Fixes bug 24666. Bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha, when destroy cell queues
were introduced.
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Fixes bug 24480; bugfix on 0.2.5.16.
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TROVE-2017-12. Severity: Medium
When choosing a random node for a circuit, directly use our router
descriptor to exclude ourself instead of the one in the global
descriptor list. That list could be empty because tor could be
downloading them which could lead to not excluding ourself.
Closes #21534
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Fixes bug 24246 and TROVE-2017-011.
This bug is so old, it's in Matej's code. Seems to have been
introduced with e01522bbed6eea.
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This is a regression; we should have been checking only the
public-key encrypted portion. Fixes bug 24244, TROVE-2017-009, and
CVE-2017-8819.
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Going from 4 hours to 24 hours in order to try reduce the efficiency of guard
discovery attacks.
Closes #23856
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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When we close a connection via connection_close_immediately, we kill
its events immediately. But if it had been blocked on bandwidth
read/write, we could try to re-add its (nonexistent) events later
from connection_bucket_refill -- if we got to that callback before
we swept the marked connections.
Fixes bug 24167. Fortunately, this hasn't been a crash bug since we
introduced connection_check_event in 0.2.9.10, and backported it.
This is a bugfix on commit 89d422914a0c3cb, I believe, which
appeared in Tor 0.1.0.1-rc.
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Just advertise the line when we're a bridge, using "any" if we're
published or "none" if we aren't.
This is done in lieu of a full backport of #18329.
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Fixes #23910
Based on a patch by dgoulet; backported to 0.2.5
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Fixes bug 22789; bugfix on 0.2.3.8-alpha.
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This mistake causes two possible bugs. I believe they are both
harmless IRL.
BUG 1: memory stomping
When we call the memset, we are overwriting two 0 bytes past the end
of packed_cell_t.body. But I think that's harmless in practice,
because the definition of packed_cell_t is:
// ...
typedef struct packed_cell_t {
TOR_SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(packed_cell_t) next;
char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
uint32_t inserted_time;
} packed_cell_t;
So we will overwrite either two bytes of inserted_time, or two bytes
of padding, depending on how the platform handles alignment.
If we're overwriting padding, that's safe.
If we are overwriting the inserted_time field, that's also safe: In
every case where we call cell_pack() from connection_or.c, we ignore
the inserted_time field. When we call cell_pack() from relay.c, we
don't set or use inserted_time until right after we have called
cell_pack(). SO I believe we're safe in that case too.
BUG 2: memory exposure
The original reason for this memset was to avoid the possibility of
accidentally leaking uninitialized ram to the network. Now
remember, if wide_circ_ids is false on a connection, we shouldn't
actually be sending more than 512 bytes of packed_cell_t.body, so
these two bytes can only leak to the network if there is another bug
somewhere else in the code that sends more data than is correct.
Fortunately, in relay.c, where we allocate packed_cell_t in
packed_cell_new() , we allocate it with tor_malloc_zero(), which
clears the RAM, right before we call cell_pack. So those
packed_cell_t.body bytes can't leak any information.
That leaves the two calls to cell_pack() in connection_or.c, which
use stack-alocated packed_cell_t instances.
In or_handshake_state_record_cell(), we pass the cell's contents to
crypto_digest_add_bytes(). When we do so, we get the number of
bytes to pass using the same setting of wide_circ_ids as we passed
to cell_pack(). So I believe that's safe.
In connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(), we also use the same setting
of wide_circ_ids in both calls. So I believe that's safe too.
I introduced this bug with 1c0e87f6d8c7a0abdadf1b5cd9082c10abc7f4e2
back in 0.2.4.11-alpha; it is bug 22737 and CID 1401591
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On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Fixes bug 22490; bugfix on 6a241ff3ffe7dc1 in 0.2.4.6-alpha.
Found by teor using clang-5.0's AddressSanitizer stack-use-after-scope.
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