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This is to avoid having two sendme.{c|h} in the repository since the subsystem
is implemented in src/core/or/sendme.{c|h}.
Fixes #30769
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Co-authored-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
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We had accumulated a bunch of cruft here. Now let's only include
src and src/ext. (exception: src/trunnel is autogenerated code, and
need to include src/trunnel.)
This commit will break the build hard. The next commit will fix it.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This defense will cause Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet, and other routers operating
in the default configuration to collapse netflow records that would normally
be split due to the 15 second flow idle timeout.
Collapsing these records should greatly reduce the utility of default netflow
data for correlation attacks, since all client-side records should become 30
minute chunks of total bytes sent/received, rather than creating multiple
separate records for every webpage load/ssh command interaction/XMPP chat/whatever
else happens to be inactive for more than 15 seconds.
The defense adds consensus parameters to govern the range of timeout values
for sending padding packets, as well as for keeping connections open.
The defense only sends padding when connections are otherwise inactive, and it
does not pad connections used solely for directory traffic at all. By default
it also doesn't pad inter-relay connections.
Statistics on the total padding in the last 24 hours are exported to the
extra-info descriptors.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Fixed numerous conflicts, and ported code to use new base64 api.
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This includes the link handshake variations for proposal220.
We'll use this for testing first, and then use it to extend our
current code to support prop220.
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For prop220, we have a new ed25519 certificate type. This patch
implements the code to create, parse, and validate those, along with
code for routers to maintain their own sets of certificates and
keys. (Some parts of master identity key encryption are done, but
the implementation of that isn't finished)
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This removes roughly 5000 branches in my testing. We never want to
trigger assertions even during tests, so this is sane. Implements #15400.
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This reduces the likelihood that I have made any exploitable errors
in the encoding/decoding.
This commit also imports the trunnel runtime source into Tor.
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