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We had this safeguard around dos_init() but not when the consensus changes
which can modify consensus parameters and possibly enable the DoS mitigation
even if tor wasn't a public relay.
Fixes #25223
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This is to avoid positively identifying Exit relays if tor client connection
comes from them that is reentering the network.
One thing to note is that this is done only in the DoS subsystem but we'll
still add it to the geoip cache as a "client" seen. This is done that way so
to avoid as much as possible changing the current behavior of the geoip client
cache since this is being backported.
Closes #25193
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This also adds one that tests the integration with the nodelist.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This set is rebuilt whenever a consensus arrives. In between
consensuses, it is add-only.
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The HT_FOREACH() is insanely heavy on the CPU and this is part of the fast
path so make it return the nice memory size counter we added in
4d812e29b9b1ec88.
Fixes #25148
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Becasue the circuit creation burst and rate can change at runtime it is
possible that between two refill of a bucket, we end up setting the bucket
value to less than there currently is.
Fixes #25128
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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These functions protect againts over and underflow. They BUG() in case we
overflow the counter.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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If the cache is using 20% of our maximum allowed memory, clean 10% of it. Same
behavior as the HS descriptor cache.
Closes #25122
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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The accurate address of a connection is real_addr, not the addr member.
channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method() now returns real_addr instead.
Fixes #24952; bugfix on 707c1e2 in 0.2.4.11-alpha.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
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Debug log the elapsed time in cc_stats_refill_bucket
Part of #25094.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Because this touches too many commits at once, it is made into one single
commit.
Remove the use of "tenths" for the circuit rate to simplify things. We can
only refill the buckets at best once every second because of the use of
approx_time() and our token system is set to be 1 token = 1 circuit so make
the rate a flat integer of circuit per second.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Imagine this scenario. We had 10 connections over the 24h lifetime of a geoip
cache entry. The lifetime of the entry has been reached so it is about to get
freed but 2 connections remain for it. After the free, a third connection
comes in thus making us create a new geoip entry for that address matching the
2 previous ones that are still alive. If they end up being closed, we'll have
a concurrent count desynch from what the reality is.
To mitigate this probably very rare scenario in practice, when we free a geoip
entry and it has a concurrent count above 0, we'll go over all connections
matching the address and clear out the tracked flag. So once they are closed,
we don't try to decrement the count.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This option refuses any ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell arriving from a client
connection. Its default value is "auto" for which we can turn it on or off
with a consensus parameter. Default value is 0.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Defend against an address that has reached the concurrent connection count
threshold.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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If the client address was detected as malicious, apply a defense which is at
this commit to return a DESTROY cell.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Add a function that notifies the DoS subsystem that a new CREATE cell has
arrived. The statistics are updated accordingly and the IP address can also be
marked as malicious if it is above threshold.
At this commit, no defense is applied, just detection with a circuit creation
token bucket system.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Implement a basic connection tracking that counts the number of concurrent
connections when they open and close.
This commit also adds the circuit creation mitigation data structure that will
be needed at later commit to keep track of the circuit rate.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Make the geoip cache track client address if the DoS subsystem is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This commit introduces the src/or/dos.{c|h} files that contains the code for
the Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. It currently contains basic
functions to initialize and free the subsystem. They are used at this commit.
The torrc options and consensus parameters are defined at this commit and
getters are implemented.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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The upcoming DoS mitigation subsytem needs to keep information on a per-IP
basis which is also what the geoip clientmap does.
For another subsystem to access that clientmap, this commit adds a lookup
function that returns the entry. For this, the clientmap_entry_t had to be
moved to the header file.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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no actual changes in behavior
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Fix an "off by 2" error in counting rendezvous failures on the onion
service side.
While we thought we would stop the rendezvous attempt after one failed
circuit, we were actually making three circuit attempts before giving up.
Fixes bug 24895; bugfix on 0.0.6.
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These are from "fallback_dirs_2018_01_06_2323_UTC_44aa1adf35_AU.inc"
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This takes the updated fallback_dirs_2018_01_06_CA.inc from
pastly's scan.
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When the fascist_firewall_choose_address_ functions don't find a
reachable address, set the returned address to the null address and port.
This is a precautionary measure, because some callers do not check the
return value.
Fixes bug 24736; bugfix on 0.2.8.2-alpha.
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This makes clients on the public tor network prefer to bootstrap off fallback
directory mirrors.
This is a follow-up to 24679, which removed weights from the default fallbacks.
Implements ticket 24681.
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This way it will match the insert queue in 029 and later.
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We've been seeing problems with destroy cells queues taking up a
huge amount of RAM. We can mitigate this, since while a full packed
destroy cell takes 514 bytes, we only need 5 bytes to remember a
circuit ID and a reason.
Fixes bug 24666. Bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha, when destroy cell queues
were introduced.
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Fixes bug 24480; bugfix on 0.2.5.16.
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