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This commit won't build yet -- it just puts everything in a slightly
more logical place.
The reasoning here is that "src/core" will hold the stuff that every (or
nearly every) tor instance will need in order to do onion routing.
Other features (including some necessary ones) will live in
"src/feature". The "src/app" directory will hold the stuff needed
to have Tor be an application you can actually run.
This commit DOES NOT refactor the former contents of src/or into a
logical set of acyclic libraries, or change any code at all. That
will have to come in the future.
We will continue to move things around and split them in the future,
but I hope this lays a reasonable groundwork for doing so.
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Fix a memory leak where directory authorities would leak a chunk of
memory for every router descriptor every time they considered voting.
This bug was taking down directory authorities in the live network due
to out-of-memory issues.
Fixes bug 26435; bugfix on 0.3.3.6.
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and contract_protocol_list()
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In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1;
range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
[…]
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
* ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
* FIXES #25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
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In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1;
range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
[…]
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
* ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
* FIXES #25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
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Previously, if "Link=1-5" was supported, and you asked protover_all_supported()
(or protover::all_supported() in Rust) if it supported "Link=3-999", the C
version would return "Link=3-999" and the Rust would return "Link=6-999". These
both behave the same now, i.e. both return "Link=6-999".
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Previously, if "Link=1-5" was supported, and you asked protover_all_supported()
(or protover::all_supported() in Rust) if it supported "Link=3-999", the C
version would return "Link=3-999" and the Rust would return "Link=6-999". These
both behave the same now, i.e. both return "Link=6-999".
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The C code and the rust code had different separate integer overflow
bugs here. That suggests that we're better off just forbidding this
pathological case.
Also, add tests for expected behavior on receiving a bad protocol
list in a consensus.
Fixes another part of 25249.
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Fixes part of 24249; bugfix on 0.2.9.4-alpha.
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This one can only be exploited if you can generate a correctly
signed consensus, so it's not as bad as 25074.
Fixes bug 25251; also tracked as TROVE-2018-004.
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In some cases we had checked for it, but in others we had not. One
of these cases could have been used to remotely cause
denial-of-service against directory authorities while they attempted
to vote.
Fixes TROVE-2018-001.
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Part of #25070, bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha.
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Fixes bug 24245; bugfix on 0.2.9.4-alpha. TROVE-2017-010.
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Also, add unit tests for this new function and for the regular
"does this list include support for protocol X" code.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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