Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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This patch is a result of auditing all of our uses of
get_datadir_fname() and its kin, and dividing them into cache vs
keys vs other data.
The new get_keydir_fname() and get_cachedir_fname() functions don't
actually do anything new yet.
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We gonna use this cache to avoid dirservers without outdated md info.
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The old implementation had duplicated code in a bunch of places, and
it interspersed spool-management with resource management. The new
implementation should make it easier to add new resource types and
maintain the spooling code.
Closing ticket 21651.
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(like clients do) rather than old-style router descriptors. Now bridges
will blend in with clients in terms of the circuits they build.
Fixes bug 6769; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha.
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Clients that use bridges were ignoring their cached microdesc-flavor
consensus files, because they only thought they should use the microdesc
flavor once they had a known-working bridge that could offer microdescs,
and at first boot no bridges are known-working.
This bug caused bridge-using clients to download a new microdesc consensus
on each startup.
Fixes bug 20269; bugfix on 0.2.3.12-alpha.
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Fixes #17758.
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So, back long ago, XXX012 meant, "before Tor 0.1.2 is released, we
had better revisit this comment and fix it!"
But we have a huge pile of such comments accumulated for a large
number of released versions! Not cool.
So, here's what I tried to do:
* 0.2.9 and 0.2.8 are retained, since those are not yet released.
* XXX+ or XXX++ or XXX++++ or whatever means, "This one looks
quite important!"
* The others, after one-by-one examination, are downgraded to
plain old XXX. Which doesn't mean they aren't a problem -- just
that they cannot possibly be a release-blocking problem.
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This patch was generated using;
sed -i -e "s/\bINLINE\b/inline/" src/*/*.[ch] src/*/*/*.[ch]
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microdesc_free_() called get_microdesc_cache(), which had the fun
side-effect of potentially reloading the whole cache from disk.
Replace it with a variant that doesn't.
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Because in 95 years, we or our successors will surely care about
enforcing the BSD license terms on this code. Right?
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Suggested by Andrea in her review of 11243.
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One pain point in evolving the Tor design and implementing has been
adding code that makes clients reject directory documents that they
previously would have accepted, if those descriptors actually exist.
When this happened, the clients would get the document, reject it,
and then decide to try downloading it again, ad infinitum. This
problem becomes particularly obnoxious with authorities, since if
some authorities accept a descriptor that others don't, the ones
that don't accept it would go crazy trying to re-fetch it over and
over. (See for example ticket #9286.)
This patch tries to solve this problem by tracking, if a descriptor
isn't parseable, what its digest was, and whether it is invalid
because of some flaw that applies to the portion containing the
digest. (This excludes RSA signature problems: RSA signatures
aren't included in the digest. This means that a directory
authority can still put another directory authority into a loop by
mentioning a descriptor, and then serving that descriptor with an
invalid RSA signatures. But that would also make the misbehaving
directory authority get DoSed by the server it's attacking, so it's
not much of an issue.)
We already have a mechanism to mark something undownloadable with
downloadstatus_mark_impossible(); we use that here for
microdescriptors, extrainfos, and router descriptors.
Unit tests to follow in another patch.
Closes ticket #11243.
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[CID 1234702, 1234703]
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We're calling mallocfn() and reallocfn() in the HT_GENERATE macro
with the result of a product. But that makes any sane analyzer
worry about overflow.
This patch keeps HT_GENERATE having its old semantics, since we
aren't the only project using ht.h. Instead, define a HT_GENERATE2
that takes a reallocarrayfn.
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This may let us know if we're hitting 7164 because of an
hte_hash-corruption situation proposed by "cypherpunks" in bug
11737.
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Subtracting two time_t values was yielding something that maybe
can't be fit in an int.
Bugfix on 0389d4aa; bug not in any released Tor.
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This time, check in microdesc_cache_clean() to see what could be
going wrong with an attempt to clean a microdesc that's held by a node.
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I've made an exception for cases where I'm sure that users can't
influence the inputs. This is likely to cause a slowdown somewhere,
but it's safer to siphash everything and *then* look for cases to
optimize.
This patch doesn't actually get us any _benefit_ from siphash yet,
since we don't really randomize the key at any point.
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Conflicts:
src/or/microdesc.c
Conflict because one change was on line adjacent to line where
01206893 got fixed.
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