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We need to call it before nt_service_parse_options(), since
nt_service_parse_options() can call back into nt_service_main(),
which calls do_main_loop().
Fixes bug 21356; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
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Currently, this code doesn't actually have the contexts behave
differently, (except for the legacy context), but it does switch
back and forth between them nicely.
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(This is required by 3.9 in prop271, but is better done as a
separate function IMO)
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(Also, prepare to tie guard changes into the mark-all-old-circuits
logic.)
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The new HS circuitmap API replaces old public functions as follows:
circuit_clear_rend_token -> hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit
circuit_get_rendezvous -> hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ
circuit_get_intro_point -> hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2
circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie -> hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ
circuit_set_intro_point_digest -> hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2
This commit also removes the old rendinfo code that is now unused.
It also fixes the broken rendinfo unittests.
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This was the last user of our or_connections-by-ID map. It also had
a tendency to be O(N) in cases that only had to be O(1).
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This patch doesn't cover every case; omitted cases are marked with
"XXXX prop271", as usual. It leaves both the old interface and the
new interface for guard status notification, since they don't
actually work in the same way: the new API wants to be told when a
circuit has failed or succeeded, whereas the old API wants to know
when a channel has failed or succeeded.
I ran into some trouble with directory guard stuff, since when we
pick the directory guard, we don't actually have a circuit to
associate it with. I solved that by allowing guard states to be
associated with directory connections, not just circuits.
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This patch is just:
* Code movement
* Adding headers here and there as needed
* Adding a bridges_free_all() with a call to it.
It breaks compilation, since the bridge code needed to make exactly
2 calls into entrynodes.c internals. I'll fix those in the next
commit.
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Conflicts:
src/or/rendclient.c
src/or/rendcommon.c
src/or/routerparse.c
src/test/test_dir.c
src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This implements the proposal 224 directory descriptor cache store and lookup
functionalities. Furthermore, it merges the OOM call for the HSDir cache with
current protocol v2 and the new upcoming v3.
Add hs_cache.{c|h} with store/lookup API.
Closes #18572
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
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Fixes bug 19969; bugfix on b1d56fc58. We can fix this some more in
later Tors, but for now, this is probably the simplest fix possible.
This is a belt-and-suspenders fix, where the earlier fix ("Ask
event_base_loop to finish when we add a pending stream") aims to respond
to new streams as soon as they arrive, and this one aims to make sure
that we definitely respond to all of the streams.
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no actual changes
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We log this message every time we validate tor's options.
There's no need to log a duplicate in main() as well.
(It is impossible to run main() without validating our options.)
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Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
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Fixes #15381.
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Remove or adjust as appropriate.
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This is another way that we had bufferevents-only code marked.
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Signed-off-by: U+039b <*@0x39b.fr>
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Only some very ancient distributions don't ship with Libevent 2 anymore,
even the oldest supported Ubuntu LTS version has it. This allows us to
get rid of a lot of compat code.
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Our sandboxing code would not allow us to write to stats/hidserv-stats,
causing tor to abort while trying to write stats. This was previously
masked by bug#19556.
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When sandboxing is enabled, we could not write any stats to disk.
check_or_create_data_subdir("stats"), which prepares the private stats
directory, calls check_private_dir(), which also opens and not just stats() the
directory. Therefore, we need to also allow open() for the stats dir in our
sandboxing setup.
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Trivial Conflicts:
src/or/or.h
src/or/routerparse.c
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This commit makes it that tor now uses the shared random protocol by
initializing the subsystem.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
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