| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
This is a pretty big commit but it only moves these files to src/or/dirauth:
dircollate.c dirvote.c shared_random.c shared_random_state.c
dircollate.h dirvote.h shared_random.h shared_random_state.h
Then many files are modified to change the include line for those header files
that have moved into a new directory.
Without using --disable-module-dirauth, everything builds fine. When using the
flag to disable the module, tor doesn't build due to linking errors. This will
be addressed in the next commit(s).
No code behavior change.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Many functions become static to the C file or exposed to the tests within the
PRIVATE define of dirvote.h.
This commit moves a function to the top. No code behavior change.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
(Remove support for running without this method.)
|
|
Also remove client detection for pre-EXCLUDING_INVALID_NODES
consensuses, and a test for that detection.
|
|
This also lets us remove the old rsa-based routerstatus collator.
|
|
Also remove a rest for pre-19 microdesc versions.
|
|
|
|
Also remove a unit test for pre-MIN_METHOD_FOR_NTOR_KEY consensuses.
|
|
Also, in networkstatus.c, remove client code for recognizing pre-
MIN_METHOD_FOR_A_LINES consensuses, and corresponding unit tests in
test_dir.c.
|
|
Consensus method 25 is the oldest one supported by any stable
version of 0.2.9, which is our current most-recent LTS. Thus, by
proposal 290, they should be removed.
This commit does not actually remove the code to implement these
methods: it only makes it so authorities will no longer support
them. I'll remove the backend code for them in later commits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Closes ticket 24849.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Closes bug 24372.
|
|
|
|
Commit e67f4441eb2646368e3e7cb1bcee403667b786f0 introduced a safeguard against
using an uninitialized voting schedule object. However, the dirvote_act() code
was looking roughly at the same thing to know if it had to compute the timings
before voting with this condition:
if (!voting_schedule.voting_starts) {
...
dirvote_recalculate_timing(options, now);
}
The sr_init() function is called very early and goes through the safeguard
thus the voting schedule is always initilized before the first vote.
That first vote is a crucial one because we need to have our voting schedule
aligned to the "now" time we are about to use for voting. Then, the schedule
is updated when we publish our consensus or/and when we set a new consensus.
From that point on, we only want to update the voting schedule through that
code flow.
This "created_on_demand" is indicating that the timings have been recalculated
on demand by another subsystem so if it is flagged, we know that we need to
ignore its values before voting.
Fixes #24186
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
|
|
dirvote_get_next_valid_after_time() is the only public function that uses the
voting schedule outside of the dirvote subsystem so if it is zeroed,
recalculate its timing if we can that is if a consensus exists.
Part of #24161
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Because the HS subsystem needs the voting schedule to compute time period, we
need all tor type to do that.
Part of #23623
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
The exposed get_voting_schedule() allocates and return a new object everytime
it is called leading to an awful lot of memory allocation when getting the
start time of the current round which is done for each node in the consensus.
Closes #23623
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Needed for next commit to address #23623.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Implements #23828.
|
|
And pass ROUTERSTATUS_FORMAT_NO_CONSENSUS_METHOD when it's not applicable.
Preparation for #23826.
|
|
|
|
Most of these buffers were never actually inspected, but it's still
bad style.
|
|
|
|
These statistics were largely ununsed, and kept track of statistical information
on things like how many time we had done TLS or how many signatures we had
verified. This information is largely not useful, and would only be logged
after receiving a SIGUSR1 signal (but only if the logging severity level was
less than LOG_INFO).
* FIXES #19871.
* REMOVES note_crypto_pk_op(), dump_pk_op(), and pk_op_counts from
src/or/rephist.c.
* REMOVES every external call to these functions.
|
|
Fixes bug 21495.
|
|
|
|
|
|
This should be "impossible" without making a SHA1 collision, but
let's not keep the assumption that SHA1 collisions are super-hard.
This prevents another case related to 21278. There should be no
behavioral change unless -ftrapv is on.
|
|
Use the following coccinelle script to change uses of
smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup(str)) to
smartlist_add_strdup(sl, string) (coccinelle script from nickm
via bug 20048):
@@
expression a;
expression b;
@@
- smartlist_add
+ smartlist_add_strdup
(a,
- tor_strdup(
b
- )
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
See #14881
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(Despite the increased size of the consensus, this should have
approximately zero effect on the compressed consensus size, since
the "proto" line should be completely implied by the "v" line.)
|
|
|
|
|
