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Needed by the client when fetching a descriptor. This function checks the
directory purpose and hard assert if it is not for fetching.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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- Add tests that ensure that SOCKS requests for v2/v3 addresses get
intercepted and handled.
- Add test that stores and lookups an HS descriptor in the client-side cache.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This code handles received HS descriptors by storing them in the
client-side HS cache.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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I repurposed the old directory_request_set_hs_ident() into a new
directory_request_upload_set_hs_ident() which is only used for the
upload purpose and so it can assert on the dir_purpose.
When coding the client-side we can make a second function for fetch.
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This commit adds a directory command function to make an upload directory
request for a service descriptor.
It is not used yet, just the groundwork.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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There are only so many times you can type "4".
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This guards against future occurrences of 17750.
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Make clients wait for 6 seconds before trying to download their
consensus from an authority.
Fixes bug 17750, bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha.
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connection.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/22305
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See: https://bugs.torproject.org/22305
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We used to not set the guard state in launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch().
So when a bridge descriptor fetch failed, the guard subsystem would never
learn about the fail (and hence the guard's reachability state would not
be updated).
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See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21667
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This commit mainly moves the responsibility for directory request
construction one level higher. It also allows a directory request
to contain a pointer to a routerstatus, which will get turned into
the correct contact information at the last minute.
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See https://bugs.torproject.org/21663
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This patch adds the object type, and makes all of the functions
that used to feed into directory_initiate_command_rend() feed into
that type instead.
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The old implementation had duplicated code in a bunch of places, and
it interspersed spool-management with resource management. The new
implementation should make it easier to add new resource types and
maintain the spooling code.
Closing ticket 21651.
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(Nick extracted this patch from a larger patch by Teor.)
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This patch doesn't cover every case; omitted cases are marked with
"XXXX prop271", as usual. It leaves both the old interface and the
new interface for guard status notification, since they don't
actually work in the same way: the new API wants to be told when a
circuit has failed or succeeded, whereas the old API wants to know
when a channel has failed or succeeded.
I ran into some trouble with directory guard stuff, since when we
pick the directory guard, we don't actually have a circuit to
associate it with. I solved that by allowing guard states to be
associated with directory connections, not just circuits.
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Fixes bug 20536; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
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Conflicts:
src/or/rendclient.c
src/or/rendcommon.c
src/or/routerparse.c
src/test/test_dir.c
src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
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Closes #19205
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
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When we refactored purpose_needs_anonymity(), we made it so _all_
bridge requests required anonymity. But that missed the case
that we are allowed to ask a bridge for its own descriptor.
With this patch, we consider the resource, and allow "authority.z"
("your own descriptor, compressed") for a bridge's server descriptor
to be non-anonymous.
Fix for bug 20410; bug not in any released Tor.
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Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
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download_status_schedule_get_delay() into separate function, per code review
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we should avoid launching a consensus fetch if we don't want one,
but if we do end up with an extra one, we should let the other checks
take care of it.
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We'll back off from the request in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit,
or cancel it in connection_dir_close_consensus_fetches, and those are the
only places we need to check.
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