| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Part of 20830.
|
|
|
|
This will make it easier to see what we remove down the line.
|
|
|
|
This prevents us from mixing up multiple guard_selections
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a node can prove its Ed25519 identity, don't consider connections
to it canonical unless they match both identities.
Includes link handshake changes needed to avoid crashing with bug
warnings, since the tests now reach more parts of the code.
Closes ticket 20355
|
|
(Only run the connection_or_group_set_badness_() function on groups
of channels that have the same RSA and Ed25519 identities.)
There's a possible opportunity here where we might want to set a
channel to "bad" if it has no ed25519 identity and some other
channel has some. Also there's an opportunity to add a warning if
we ever have an Ed mismatch on open connections with the same RSA
ID.
|
|
This function has never gotten testing for the case where an
identity had been set, and then got set to something else. Rather
than make it handle those cases, we forbid them.
|
|
|
|
This patch makes two absolutely critical changes:
- If an ed25519 identity is not as expected when creating a channel,
we call that channel unsuccessful and close it.
- When a client creating a channel or an extend cell for a circuit, we
only include the ed25519 identity if we believe that the node on
the other side supports ed25519 link authentication (from
#15055). Otherwise we will insist on nodes without the right
link protocol authenticating themselves.
- When deciding to extend to another relay, we only upgrade the
extend to extend by ed25519 ID when we know the ed25519 ID _and_
we know that the other side can authenticate.
This patch also tells directory servers, when probing nodes, to
try to check their ed25519 identities too (if they can authenticate
by ed25519 identity).
Also, handle the case where we connect by RSA Id, and learn the
ED25519 ID for the node in doing so.
|
|
Actually set ed25519 identities on channels when we set a channel's
identity.
|
|
|
|
It is no longer needed; look up channels by identity instead.
|
|
This was the last user of our or_connections-by-ID map. It also had
a tendency to be O(N) in cases that only had to be O(1).
|
|
|
|
Right now, there's only a mechanism to look for a channel where the
RSA ID matches *and* the ED ID matches. We can add a separate map
later if we want.
|
|
This patch doesn't cover every case; omitted cases are marked with
"XXXX prop271", as usual. It leaves both the old interface and the
new interface for guard status notification, since they don't
actually work in the same way: the new API wants to be told when a
circuit has failed or succeeded, whereas the old API wants to know
when a channel has failed or succeeded.
I ran into some trouble with directory guard stuff, since when we
pick the directory guard, we don't actually have a circuit to
associate it with. I solved that by allowing guard states to be
associated with directory connections, not just circuits.
|
|
This patch is just:
* Code movement
* Adding headers here and there as needed
* Adding a bridges_free_all() with a call to it.
It breaks compilation, since the bridge code needed to make exactly
2 calls into entrynodes.c internals. I'll fix those in the next
commit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This was a stopgap method, designed on the theory that some routers
might support it before they could support Ed25519. But it looks
like everybody who supports RFC5705 will also have an Ed25519 key,
so there's not a lot of reason to have this even supported.
|
|
|
|
Includes updated test for authchallenge cells
|
|
This code stores the ed certs as appropriate, and tries to check
them. The Ed25519 result is not yet used, and (because of its
behavior) this will break RSA authenticate cells. That will get
fixed as we go, however.
This should implement 19157, but it needs tests, and it needs
to get wired in.
|
|
In particular, these functions are the ones that set the identity of
a given connection or channel, and/or confirm that we have learned
said IDs.
There's a lot of stub code here: we don't actually need to use the
new keys till we start looking up connections/channels by Ed25519
IDs. Still, we want to start passing the Ed25519 IDs in now, so it
makes sense to add these stubs as part of 15055.
|
|
|
|
This will help us do cert-checking in the background in the future,
perhaps.
|
|
This means we don't need to precompute the length.
Helps simplify the implementation of 19156.
|
|
Implements the major part of 19156, except doesn't actually send the
new cell type yet.
|
|
See proposal 244. This feature lets us stop looking at the internals
of SSL objects, *and* should let us port better to more SSL libraries,
if they have RFC5705 support.
Preparatory for #19156
|
|
Implements 19155 (send CERTS cells correctly for Ed25519)
Also send RSA->Ed crosscert
|
|
We no longer generate certs cells by pasting the certs together one
by one. Instead we use trunnel to generate them.
Preliminary work for 19155 (send CERTS cell with ed certs)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is another way that we had bufferevents-only code marked.
|
|
This is a partial fix for 18902.
|
|
Signed-off-by: U+039b <*@0x39b.fr>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No behavioural change.
Also clarify some comments.
|
|
So, back long ago, XXX012 meant, "before Tor 0.1.2 is released, we
had better revisit this comment and fix it!"
But we have a huge pile of such comments accumulated for a large
number of released versions! Not cool.
So, here's what I tried to do:
* 0.2.9 and 0.2.8 are retained, since those are not yet released.
* XXX+ or XXX++ or XXX++++ or whatever means, "This one looks
quite important!"
* The others, after one-by-one examination, are downgraded to
plain old XXX. Which doesn't mean they aren't a problem -- just
that they cannot possibly be a release-blocking problem.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Patch from icanhasaccount; closes 18462.
|
