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This mistake causes two possible bugs. I believe they are both
harmless IRL.
BUG 1: memory stomping
When we call the memset, we are overwriting two 0 bytes past the end
of packed_cell_t.body. But I think that's harmless in practice,
because the definition of packed_cell_t is:
// ...
typedef struct packed_cell_t {
TOR_SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(packed_cell_t) next;
char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
uint32_t inserted_time;
} packed_cell_t;
So we will overwrite either two bytes of inserted_time, or two bytes
of padding, depending on how the platform handles alignment.
If we're overwriting padding, that's safe.
If we are overwriting the inserted_time field, that's also safe: In
every case where we call cell_pack() from connection_or.c, we ignore
the inserted_time field. When we call cell_pack() from relay.c, we
don't set or use inserted_time until right after we have called
cell_pack(). SO I believe we're safe in that case too.
BUG 2: memory exposure
The original reason for this memset was to avoid the possibility of
accidentally leaking uninitialized ram to the network. Now
remember, if wide_circ_ids is false on a connection, we shouldn't
actually be sending more than 512 bytes of packed_cell_t.body, so
these two bytes can only leak to the network if there is another bug
somewhere else in the code that sends more data than is correct.
Fortunately, in relay.c, where we allocate packed_cell_t in
packed_cell_new() , we allocate it with tor_malloc_zero(), which
clears the RAM, right before we call cell_pack. So those
packed_cell_t.body bytes can't leak any information.
That leaves the two calls to cell_pack() in connection_or.c, which
use stack-alocated packed_cell_t instances.
In or_handshake_state_record_cell(), we pass the cell's contents to
crypto_digest_add_bytes(). When we do so, we get the number of
bytes to pass using the same setting of wide_circ_ids as we passed
to cell_pack(). So I believe that's safe.
In connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(), we also use the same setting
of wide_circ_ids in both calls. So I believe that's safe too.
I introduced this bug with 1c0e87f6d8c7a0abdadf1b5cd9082c10abc7f4e2
back in 0.2.4.11-alpha; it is bug 22737 and CID 1401591
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Closes ticket 15212
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Conflicts:
src/or/or.h
src/test/Makefile.nmake
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Because in 95 years, we or our successors will surely care about
enforcing the BSD license terms on this code. Right?
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queue total
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writes; doesn't actually drive the cell flow from it yet
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This implements the meat of #12899. This commit should simply remove the
parts of Tor dirauths used to check whether a relay was supposed to be
named or not, it doesn't yet convert to a new mechanism for
reject/invalid/baddir/badexiting relays.
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changes after handshake; fixes bug #12160
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Conflicts:
src/or/channel.c
src/or/circuitlist.c
src/or/connection.c
Conflicts involved removal of next_circ_id and addition of
unusable-circid tracking.
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The point of the "idle timeout" for connections is to kill the
connection a while after it has no more circuits. But using "last
added a non-padding cell" as a proxy for that is wrong, since if the
last circuit is closed from the other side of the connection, we
will not have sent anything on that connection since well before the
last circuit closed.
This is part of fixing 6799.
When applied to 0.2.5, it is also a fix for 12023.
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Instead of killing an or_connection_t that has had no circuits for
the last 3 minutes, give every or_connection_t a randomized timeout,
so that an observer can't so easily infer from the connection close
time the time at which its last circuit closed.
Also, increase the base timeout for canonical connections from 3
minutes to 15 minutes.
Fix for ticket 6799.
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Most of these are simple. The only nontrivial part is that our
pattern for using ENUM_BF was confusing doxygen by making declarations
that didn't look like declarations.
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late; fixes bug 9602
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This avoids skew warnings as authorities test reachability.
Fix 9798; fix not on any released Tor.
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this was causing directory authorities to send a time of 0 on all
connections they generated themselves, which means everybody reachability
test caused a time skew warning in the log for that relay.
(i didn't just revert, because the changes file has been modified by
other later commits.)
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This isn't actually much of an issue, since only relays send
AUTHENTICATE cells, but while we're removing timestamps, we might as
well do this too.
Part of proposal 222. I didn't take the approach in the proposal of
using a time-based HMAC, since that was a bad-prng-mitigation hack
from SSL3, and in real life, if you don't have a good RNG, you're
hopeless as a Tor server.
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Implements part of proposal 222.
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(These have proved invaluable for other global accessors.)
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Change the global circ_times to a static variable and use
accessor functions throughout the code, instead of
accessing it directly.
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The spec requires them to do so, and not doing so creates a situation
where they can't send-test because relays won't extend to them because
of the other part of bug 9546.
Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
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Relays previously, when initiating a connection, would only send a
NETINFO after sending an AUTHENTICATE. But bridges, when receiving a
connection, would never send AUTH_CHALLENGE. So relays wouldn't
AUTHENTICATE, and wouldn't NETINFO, and then bridges would be
surprised to be receiving CREATE cells on a non-open circuit.
Fixes bug 9546.
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(Okay, white-box plus mocking enough other functions so they don't
crash.)
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Move the code from the connection_or module to ext_orport.
This commit only moves code: it shouldn't modify anything.
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* Add documentation.
* Free ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash.
* Use VPORT(ExtORPort) instead of V(ExtORPOrt).
See dfe03d36c8749eb07e9bb2ea47e88ff05e9e3127 for details.
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