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This adds a new option to fix bug 8508 which broke chutney
networks. The bug was introduced by 317d16de.
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Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
src/or/config.c
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Conflicts:
doc/tor.1.txt
src/or/circuitbuild.c
src/or/config.c
src/or/or.h
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Fixes 8240.
(Don't actually increase the default guard lifetime. It seems likely to
break too many things if done precipitiously.)
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fixes bug 8180
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This is for bug 6304.
Add a changes file too
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resolves ticket 8443.
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no actual changes in behavior yet
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since it's only enableable by authorities, nobody else would be able
to start their tor
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I have no idea whether b0rken clients will DoS the network if the v2
authorities all turn this on or not. It's experimental. See #6783 for
a description of how to test it more or less safely, and please be
careful!
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The new name is circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable.
This resolves an XXX024
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and replace it with the good old-fashioned two functions approach
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I didn't make any of the callers use this feature yet.
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This one occurs when changing configuration options. Found by
coverity.
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It returns the method by which we decided our public IP address
(explicitly configured, resolved from explicit hostname, guessed from
interfaces, learned by gethostname).
Now we can provide more helpful log messages when a relay guesses its IP
address incorrectly (e.g. due to unexpected lines in /etc/hosts). Resolves
ticket 2267.
While we're at it, stop sending a stray "(null)" in some cases for the
server status "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" controller event. Resolves bug 8200.
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The other remaining parameters don't really need range checks.
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Also, deprecate the torrc options for the scaling values. It's unlikely anyone
but developers will ever tweak them, even if we provided a single ratio value.
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This is meant to avoid conflict with the built-in log() function in
math.h. It resolves ticket 7599. First reported by dhill.
This was generated with the following perl script:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
s/\blog\(LOG_(ERR|WARN|NOTICE|INFO|DEBUG)\s*,\s*/log_\L$1\(/g;
s/\blog\(/tor_log\(/g;
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Instead of hardcoding the minimum fraction of possible paths to 0.6, we
take it from the user, and failing that from the consensus, and
failing that we fall back to 0.6.
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Path use bias measures how often we can actually succeed using the circuits we
actually try to use. It is a subset of path bias accounting, but it is
computed as a separate statistic because the rate of client circuit use may
vary depending on use case.
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This is ticket 7706, reported by "bugcatcher." The rationale here
is that if somebody says 'ExcludeNodes {tv}', then they probably
don't just want to block definitely Tuvaluan nodes: they also want
to block nodes that have unknown country, since for all they know
such nodes are also in Tuvalu.
This behavior is controlled by a new GeoIPExcludeUnknown autobool
option. With the default (auto) setting, we exclude ?? and A1 if
any country is excluded. If the option is 1, we add ?? and A1
unconditionally; if the option is 0, we never add them.
(Right now our geoip file doesn't actually seem to include A1: I'm
including it here in case it comes back.)
This feature only takes effect if you have a GeoIP file. Otherwise
you'd be excluding every node.
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The right way to set "MaxOnionsPending" was to adjust it until the
processing delay was appropriate. So instead, let's measure how long
it takes to process onionskins (sampling them once we have a big
number), and then limit the queue based on its expected time to
finish.
This change is extra-necessary for ntor, since there is no longer a
reasonable way to set MaxOnionsPending without knowing what mix of
onionskins you'll get.
This patch also reserves 1/3 of the onionskin spots for ntor
handshakes, on the theory that TAP handshakes shouldn't be allowed to
starve their speedier cousins. We can change this later if need be.
Resolves 7291.
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Conflicts:
src/or/cpuworker.c
src/or/or.h
src/test/bench.c
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"works for me"
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Our old warn_nonlocal_client_ports() would give a bogus warning for
every nonlocal port every time it parsed any ports at all. So if it
parsed a nonlocal socksport, it would complain that it had a nonlocal
socksport...and then turn around and complain about the nonlocal
socksport again, calling it a nonlocal transport or nonlocal dnsport,
if it had any of those.
Fixes bug 7836; bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha.
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In addition to all the other ways to make directory gurads not go,
you can now set UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards to 0.
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I think this is actually his third code review of this branch so far.
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With an IPv6 virtual address map, we can basically hand out a new
IPv6 address for _every_ address we connect to. That'll be cool, and
will let us maybe get around prop205 issues.
This uses some fancy logic to try to make the code paths in the ipv4
and the ipv6 case as close as possible, and moves to randomly
generated addresses so we don't need to maintain those stupid counters
that will collide if Tor restarts but apps don't.
Also has some XXXX items to fix to make this useful. More design
needed.
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This function gives us a single place to set reasonable default flags
for port_cfg_t entries, to avoid bugs like the one where we weren't
setting ipv4_traffic_ok to 1 on SocksPorts initialized in an older
way.
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(This is part 1 of making DNS cache use enabled/disabled on a
per-client port basis. These options are shuffled around correctly,
but don't do anything yet.)
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