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This controls the circuit dirtyness reset behavior added for Tor
Browser's user experience fix (#15482). Unlike previous iterations
of this patch, the tunable actually works, and is documented.
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Only applies to connections with SOCKS auth set, so that non-web Tor
activity is not affected.
Simpler version of Nick's patch because the randomness worried me, and I'm not
otherwise sure why we want a max here.
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Task #15824
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When we ran out of intro points for a hidden service (which could
happen on a newnym), we would change the connection's state back to
"waiting for hidden service descriptor." But this would make an
assertion fail if we went on to call circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch
again.
This fixes bug 16013; I believe the bug was introduced in
38be533c69417aacf28cedec1c3bae808ce29f4, where we made it possible for
circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() to change the connection's state.
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Fixes #16260
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
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When set, this limits the maximum number of simultaneous streams per
rendezvous circuit on the server side of a HS, with further RELAY_BEGIN
cells being silently ignored.
This can be modified via "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit", which
if set will cause offending rendezvous circuits to be torn down instead.
Addresses part of #16052.
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Stop using an onion address since it's not indexed with that anymore in the
last hid serv request cache. Instead use a base32 encoded descriptor ID
contained in the rend_data_t object.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
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Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
src/test/include.am
src/test/test_entrynodes.c
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Tor can now build circuits from a consensus with no exits.
But if it tries to build exit circuits, they fail and flood the logs.
The circuit types in the Exit Circuits list below will only be
built if the current consensus has exits. If it doesn't,
only the Internal Circuits will be built. (This can change
with each new consensus.)
Fixes bug #13814, causes fewer path failures due to #13817.
Exit Circuits:
Predicted Exit Circuits
User Traffic Circuits
Most AP Streams
Circuits Marked Exit
Build Timeout Circuits (with exits)
Internal Circuits:
Hidden Service Server Circuits
Hidden Service Client Circuits
Hidden Service AP Streams
Hidden Service Intro Point Streams
Circuits Marked Internal
Build Timeout Circuits (with no exits)
Other Circuits?
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In circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(), for a rendezvous circuit,
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened() but circuit_has_opened() is preferred here
since it will call the right function for a specific circuit purpose.
Furthermore, a controller event is triggered where the former did not.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
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Part of fix for 13172
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Fixes bug 13701.
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Because in 95 years, we or our successors will surely care about
enforcing the BSD license terms on this code. Right?
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Allow clients to use optimistic data when connecting to a hidden service,
which should cut out the initial round-trip for client-side programs
including Tor Browser.
(Now that Tor 0.2.2.x is obsolete, all hidden services should support
server-side optimistic data.)
See proposal 181 for details. Implements ticket 13211.
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I think we should know the routerstatus for our exit relay, since
we built a circuit to it. So I think this is just a code simplication.
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Clients are now willing to send optimistic circuit data (before they
receive a 'connected' cell) to relays of any version. We used to
only do it for relays running 0.2.3.1-alpha or later, but now all
relays are new enough.
Resolves ticket 13153.
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Breaks compilation.
Used this coccinelle script:
@@
identifier c;
typedef circuit_t;
iterator name TOR_LIST_FOREACH;
iterator name SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN;
statement S;
@@
- circuit_t *c;
...
- TOR_LIST_FOREACH(c, \(&global_circuitlist\|circuit_get_global_list()\), head)
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, c)
S
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
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When we run into bug 8387 (if we run into it again), report when we
last called circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(). This will let
us know -- if my fix for 8387 doesn't work -- whether my diagnosis
was at least correct.
Suggested by Andrea.
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fixes bug 8387; fix on 0.1.1.11-alpha (code), or on 0.2.4.10-alpha (behavior).
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When we find a stranded one-hop circuit, log whether it is dirty,
log information about any streams on it, and log information about
connections they might be linked to.
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On OpenBSD 5.4, time_t is a 32-bit integer. These instances contain
implicit treatment of long and time_t as comparable types, so explicitly
cast to time_t.
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This is an attempt to diagnose 8387.
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Throughout circuituse, when we log about a circuit, we log its
desired path length from build_state. scan-build is irrationally
concerned that build_state might be NULL.
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Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
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Fixes bug 11519, apparently bugfix on 0.2.3.11-alpha.
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When I introduced the unusable_for_new_circuits flag in
62fb209d837f3f551, I had a spurious ! in the
circuit_stream_is_being_handled loop. This made us decide that
non-unusable circuits (that is, usable ones) were the ones to avoid,
and caused it to launch a bunch of extra circuits.
Fixes bug 10456; bugfix on 0.2.4.12-alpha.
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Conflicts:
src/or/or.h
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Roger spotted this on tor-dev in his comments on proposal 221.
We etect DESTROY vs everything else, since arma likes network
timeout indicating failure but not overload indicating failure.
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Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
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Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
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This would make us do testing circuits "even when cbt is disabled by
consensus, or when we're a directory authority, or when we've failed
to write cbt history to our state file lately." (Roger's words.)
This is a fix for 9671 and an improvement in our fix for 5049.
The original misbehavior was in 0.2.2.14-alpha; the incomplete
fix was in 0.2.3.17-beta.
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(These have proved invaluable for other global accessors.)
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